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I will send my terror before you, 
and will throw into confusion all the people... 
 
(Exodus 23: 27)
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1. Introduction 
 
The first edition of the International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences (1933) contained 
two articles on terrorism. The authors concluded that in the future the subject of terrorism 
would only be of interest to historians and antiquarians as modern technology would have 
made our world invulnerable to attacks by individuals and small groups (Rapoport & 
Alexander 1982: xi).  
They were dead wrong.  
In fact, there has never been so much written on the subject of terrorism as today, and 
the reasons are certainly not antiquarian. 9/11 was a shock, and it is no surprise that it has 
provoked an increased interest in the subject of terrorism amongst academics. One obvious 
reason is this: About 3,000 people were killed in the 9/11 attacks. The deadliest act of 
terrorism the world had seen prior to this date had caused ‘only’ 440 deaths, when a cinema 
was set on fire in Abadan, Iran in 1978. In fact, during the entirety of the 20th century only 14 
terrorist attacks had more than 100 casualties (Hoffman 2004, in Martin (ed.): 2).  
But does this mean that 9/11 has changed the world as we know it, or are we 
exaggerating its importance? Whatever answer one would like to give to this question, one 
thing is certain: The dust cloud of the Twin Towers certainly did provoke a dramatic political 
climate change. Two wars have been fought, first in Afghanistan, then in Iraq, the latter 
forming deep demarcation lines within the international political system of a kind we have 
not seen since the cold war era. Demarcation lines that were not only limited to diplomatic 
disagreements, but that also invoke deeper cultural controversies, more severe than just 
transforming ‘French fries’ into ‘Freedom fries’ or ‘Coca-cola’ into ‘Mecca-cola’.   
Another thing that is equally clear is that 9/11 created a sense of vulnerability and a 
cry for countermeasures; countermeasures that create conflicting values between the 
preservation of civil liberties on the one hand and securitisation on the other. How should 
these aspects be weighed in relation to each other? How should we confront terrorism 
without sacrificing the basic values of the society that we are trying to secure?  
We are struggling with difficult questions. Yet, they are begging for answers. The 
academic task set before us is both urgent and highly complex. To be able to solve it, we 
need a broad and multidisciplinary perspective, wherein philosophy has a part to play. 
What do philosophers discuss in relation to the issue of terrorism? Gerry Wallace has 
put it this way: ‘There are two fundamental philosophical questions about terrorism: what is 
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it and is it always morally wrong? There is no agreed answer to either question.’ (Wallace 
1991: 149). In my view, this pretty much sums up the philosophical discussion of terrorism. 
It also summarizes the content of this thesis. As my title suggest, I will be focusing on two 
questions, namely what terrorism is (part 2) and whether it can be morally justified (part 3). 
In this introductory section, however, my focal point will be the second sentence of 
Wallace’s quote. What is it about this topic that makes it so difficult to arrive at an ‘agreed 
answer to either question’?  
 
1.1. On the pursuit of a methodology 
Let me start by sketching out what I consider to be two methodological pitfalls. The first 
consists in failing to interpret separately the two questions, i.e. what terrorism is and whether 
it can be morally justified. Many theorists tend to confuse two aspects which I think should 
be kept apart, namely the normative aspects and the descriptive aspects, with the effect of 
describing terrorism as something unjustifiable in itself. In my view, this is not a fruitful path 
to investigate terrorism philosophically. The question of what terrorism is should be treated 
as a descriptive one, while the question of whether terrorism can be morally justified remains 
a normative one. To see what I am addressing here, it might be helpful to go back to David 
Hume’s famous ‘is-ought’-fallacy. Hume’s point was that one cannot deduce from ‘is’ to 
‘ought’, as one cannot cogently move from premises that consist only of ‘is’-statements 
(descriptive) to an ‘ought’-conclusion (normative). In relation to terrorism, it is the other way 
around: One cannot deduce from ‘ought’ to ‘is’, meaning that the claim that terrorism is 
something essentially condemnable should not be a part of the definition itself. Hence, it 
should not be considered analytically sufficient to hold that if an action ‘a’ is considered to 
be justified, then ‘a’ cannot be terrorism.  
The second pitfall to be avoided is to start with the normative discussion, without 
paying adequate attention to the descriptive level, thus failing to sort out the underlying 
premises of the argument. When it comes to terrorism, this preliminary conceptual 
clarification is particularly important, as the notion is closely related to other notions, 
creating difficult borderline cases. Did the Norwegian resistance movement engage in 
terrorism during World War II, for instance?1 They certainly did carry out sabotage missions, 
                                                 
1
 One might disapprove with these examples by emphasizing that they were committed in wartime, which could 
make a decisive difference with regards to their justification or whether they can be labeled as acts of terrorism. 
This is an important objection, I think, but at this point of the argument they are just meant to illustrate the 
difficulties that might emerge without a definition. I will return to the question of whether terrorism can be 
performed both in peace and war later. 
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as the destruction of the heavy water plant at Rjukan in 1943. Some of these sabotage 
missions even had civilian casualties. One example is the sinking of the ferry ‘Hydro’ at 
Tinnsjøen in 1944, which was carrying what remained of the heavy water, wherein 14 
Norwegian civilians were killed. Was this an act of terrorism? What about the attempt to kill 
Hitler in 1944? Can this act be described as something else than a political assassination? Is 
political assassination terrorism? What about a guerrilla war against a despot without popular 
support? Does this count as terrorism? 
The point I am trying to make here is that we should bear in mind that the concept of 
terrorism can include a diversity of different actions. Thus, what actions fall within the 
definition of terrorism might have a profound impact on the outcome of the discussion on 
whether terrorism can be justified under certain circumstances. It is not unlikely that one 
would judge the examples I have mentioned differently than more evident acts of terrorism, 
such as 9/11 or the Beslan massacre in 2004, where 344 people lost their lives, including 168 
children. Therefore, a lack of clarity on how one defines terrorism would create an 
unfortunate ambiguity to the moral discussion.  
So far I have pointed at two methodological pitfalls; to make the normative level a 
part of the descriptive level and to discuss the morality of terrorism without having a clear-
cut definition of it. Next, let me clarify how I think these pitfalls can be avoided, outlining 
the basic structure for the argument of this thesis. 
 
1.2. Grotius revisited 
When searching for a methodology to analyse the topic of terrorism, I think we should turn 
our attention to one of the classics of just war theory, Hugo Grotius, for guidance. In his most 
famous work, On the Law of War and Peace (De iure belli ac pacis) (1625), Grotius tried to 
establish an exhaustive assessment of the normative dimensions of war2. I will not go into the 
text in depth here, but will concentrate only on one important remark he makes concerning 
his definition of war  
 
I do not include justice in my definition since the very point of our investigation is to assess 
whether there can be a just war, and what kind of war is just. Indeed, a subject which is under 
investigation ought to be distinguished from the object towards which the investigation is directed 
 
 (trans. in Reichberg, Syse & Begby, 2006: 393) 
                                                 
2
 For a clarifying summery of the content of this work, I refer to the commentary to the Grotius selections in 
‘The Ethics of War. Classic and Contemporary Readings’ (Reichberg, Syse & Begby 2006). 
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The definition that Grotius is referring to is. ‘the state of those contending by force’ (ibid: 
392). In relation to the methodological question on terrorism, it is his remark on why he does 
not include justice in his definition that is important3.  
Let us start by clarifying what Grotius means by saying that ‘a subject which is under 
investigation ought to be distinguished from the object towards which the investigation is 
directed’. Grotius’ point is that the investigation consists of two elements with different 
functions in the argument: What is under investigation, i.e. the subject, is the concept of war 
in terms of a definition. What this investigation is directed towards, i.e. the object, is the 
question of whether war can be justified, and what kind of war is just. Therefore, the 
argument should consist of two operations. First, one needs to identify the subject: what war 
is. Second, this subject, once identified, should be used in the discussion on the object: 
whether, and when, war is just. The first operation is descriptive. The second is normative. 
How does Grotius’ methodological view on war relate methodologically to terrorism? 
Basically, it suggests that our investigation should be twofold: We should start with the 
descriptive level and determine the subject of our investigation; by defining what terrorism 
is. Next, we can proceed with the normative discussion of whether terrorism can be justified. 
In my view, this will consist of two operations: First, we need to clarify the normative 
premises for our discussion, namely what kind of ethical framework our discussion is based 
on. At a minimum we would have to determine what constitutes a morally just act and a 
morally unjust act in relation to some kind of ethical principle. In doing this, we have 
developed a second set of premises. The first is descriptive, and determines what terrorism is 
(and why). The second is normative, and determines what kinds of actions are considered just 
and unjust (and why). Based on these premises, we should be able to determine whether 
terrorism can be justified, which is the final stage of the argument.  
This forms the methodological skeleton of this thesis; the basic structure upon which I 
will arrange my argument. In part 2, I will focus on the definition of terrorism. This will 
constitute the premise for the discussion on whether terrorism can be morally justified in part 
3. Lastly, in part 4, I will try to relate my findings to our present situation, paying special 
attention to the ongoing ‘war on terrorism’. But before I start off with my definitional 
analysis of terrorism, it is necessary to clarify how I understand the relation between moral 
assessments and terrorism as a notion. 
                                                 
3
 It should be mentioned that Grotius is addressing Gentili’s definition of war as ‘a just and public contest of 
arms’ (Reichberg, Syse & Begby: 372), where war is defined in morally praiseworthy terms. In relation to 
terrorism, it is – of course – the other way around. 
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1.3. Why I think moral assessments should be left out of the definition.  
Due to its profound negative consequences, it is obvious that terrorism cannot be considered 
a morally neutral act, on a par with talking, writing or drinking coffee. The mere fact that 
very few either would label themselves or a group they sympathize with as terrorists, but 
rather would use other concepts, such as ‘freedom fighters’ or ‘martyrs’, implies that 
‘terrorism’ is a morally biased notion. As Gerry Adams, leader of Sinn Fein has claimed: 
‘We know the difference between a freedom fighter and a terrorist (...) Terrorism is ethically 
indefensible’ (Gerry Adams, Presidential Address, Ard Fheis Sinn Féin, 29 September 2001. 
Quoted in O’Day 2004: xi).  
Yet moral bias is a question of degree. If we take ‘torture’ or ‘rape’, for instance, 
these concepts identify acts where the aspect of immorality is already built into the meaning 
of the words. One cannot talk of ‘morally permissible torture’ or a ‘morally justified rape’. 
But one can talk of ‘morally justified killing’ and ‘morally justified wars’, for instance, even 
though the concepts of ‘killing’ and ‘war’ also have negative moral connotations connected 
to them. In definitions that include moral assessments, ‘terrorism’ is typically interpreted as 
something ‘self-evidently unjustifiable’, putting it on the same level as ‘rape’ and ‘torture’. 
In definitions that leave out moral assessments, ‘terrorism’ seems to lie closer to ‘killing’ and 
‘war’. I say ‘closer’, since they need not necessarily be put on an equal footing. The 
importance here is that the definition itself does not make the possibility of justifying 
terrorism a contradiction in terms.  
Let me present two different accounts on terrorism to illustrate my point. One makes 
the moral assessment a part of the definition (Paul Wilkinson). The other leaves it out (Jan 
Narveson), thus separating between the descriptive and the normative levels:  
 
 
What fundamentally distinguishes terrorism from other forms of organised violence is not simply 
its severity but its features of amorality and antinomianism. Terrorists either profess indifference to 
existing moral codes or else claim exemption from all such obligations. Political terror, if it is 
waged consciously and deliberately, is implicitly prepared to sacrifice all moral and humanitarian 
considerations for the sake of some political end. 
 
(Wilkinson 1974: 16-17). 
 
 
Terrorism (...) is a political action or sequence of actions. As the name implies, the strategy is to 
inspire the ‘target’ population with terror, by means of random acts of violence: meaning by 
‘random’ that they may fall upon anyone in a sizable class of persons, at any time, are done without 
specific warning, and are done in an utterly impersonal manner. 
 
 (Narveson 1991, in Frey & Morris (eds.): 119). 
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I consider Narveson’s definition to be preferable to Wilkinson’s. Consequently, I think we 
should avoid making moral assessments a part of the definition of terrorism. But why do I 
propose to create ambiguity on this issue? Would it not be better to have a clear-cut 
condemnation and avoid the ‘slippery slope’? My answer to this is twofold: 
First, there is a problem connected to the clear-cut condemnation view, namely the 
famous ‘one man’s terrorist is the other man’s freedom-fighter’ fallacy. The reason why I 
call it a fallacy is that I consider it to be a discursive deadlock. One raises a solid wall of non-
communication simply by designating the same act with two different notions that predispose 
a certain moral outcome: Freedom-fighting is just; terrorism is unjust; one act, but two 
perspectives and two moral conclusions. Now, in order to solve this discursive deadlock, it 
will be necessary to find some common ground of reference. My suggestion is that the moral 
discussion of terrorism should be distinct from the description of the notion itself.  
This leads to the second answer to why I find it analytically valuable not to make 
terrorism wrong by definition. In my view, there are some basic arguments concerning the 
possibility of justifying terrorism that should be taken seriously from an ethical point of 
view. Basically, they can be summarized as three kinds of arguments:  
• The first is utilitarian, claiming that terrorism can be justified if it creates a positive 
change on the totality of well-being for the people affected by the act, despite its 
negative consequences for the ones that have been targeted, given that there are no 
other paths of conduct that can provide the same results. 
• The second is rights-based, claiming the right to commit terrorism as a means of last 
resort when basic human rights are being severely and systematically violated.   
• The third argument questions the legitimacy of the ethical principles used to condemn 
terrorism by drawing analogies to other actions that violate the same ethical principles 
(such as the deliberate bombings of civilians in war) without being condemned in the 
same strict manner, thus claiming that one can speak of ethical inconsistency. 
I will discuss all of these at length in part 3. What is clear, however, is that if we are to 
maintain an absolute condemnation of terrorism, we should be able to dismiss these 
justification arguments: The two moral outcomes of absolute condemnation and 
circumstantial justification, mutually exclude one another – one cannot consistently hold that 
terrorism should always be condemned (because of principled reasons allowing no exception 
or exemption) and sometimes morally justified. If terrorism is always to be condemned, there 
cannot be any situation where it can be considered justified. 
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Basically, there seems to be two ways in which one can confront these justification 
arguments. The first involves a refutation at the descriptive level, by having a definition that 
makes terrorism unjustifiable in itself. In my view, this is not really a solution to the problem 
we are trying to solve. If we sweep them away categorically, there is always the possibility of 
being swept away ourselves; it all boils down to different perspectives.  
The other way of confronting the justification arguments, which I think is preferable, 
consists in attacking them on normative grounds. This implies that we cannot simply 
discredit them from the very beginning, claiming that terrorism is self-evidently unjustifiable. 
This presupposes a definition that does ‘not make moral condemnation of terrorism 
analytically true and thus trivial, nor its moral defence analytically false, a contradiction in 
terms, nor the question of its moral status a self-answering one’ (Primoratz 1997: 222).  
 
1.4. Summing up the initial statements 
Following Grotius, I hold that it is necessary to develop a three-step model for a sound 
ethical argument on whether terrorism can be morally justified: 
• First, one should define what terrorism is. 
• Second, one should establish an ethical framework that specifies what makes an act 
morally just or unjust. 
• Third, one should clarify how acts of terrorism address this ethical framework, thus 
determining their moral status as just or unjust. 
What are the gains of this methodology? Basically, it could be this: If you disagree with my 
conclusion on the morality of terrorism, it should follow that you would also disagree on one 
or more of the premises that lead to this conclusion, provided – of course – that my argument 
is sound. This might help us to take the disagreement one step further: it can move the 
discussion from the conclusions to the premises. We do not only know that we disagree, we 
also know why we disagree. Is this important? Well, maybe we might be able to break out of 
the ‘one man’s terrorist is the other man’s freedom-fighter’ fallacy, which basically is a 
discursive deadlock; where it all boils down to differences in perspectives, differences in 
points of view. Maybe we can get into the reasons for the disagreement, the premises that 
lead to the conclusions. In my view this is the only way out of making the subject of 
terrorism something entirely perspective-dependent. For maybe there is a slight hope of 
being able to find some common ground, some shared base upon which we can be able to co-
reason, and not end up in ceaseless rhetorical warfare in the trenches. 
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2. What is terrorism? 
 
 
When asking what terrorism is, it is no exaggeration to say that one enters a semantic 
minefield. There have been numerous institutional and scholarly attempts to define terrorism. 
Yet, one has never been able to reach a consensus on one definition. But even though it 
might seem impossible to reach a consensus on a definition of terrorism, I hold this 
conceptual clarification to be a crucial preliminary condition for an ethical discussion of the 
subject. Basically, there are two reasons for this: Firstly, if there is any vagueness connected 
to the issue of our investigation, how can we analyse it ethically? We have to sort out the 
underlying premises for the discussion to make it philosophically fruitful. Secondly, if one 
can point at differences in views upon the definitional question, one might also point at 
reasons for ethical disagreements on the issue.  
In this chapter I will do three things: First, I will give some preliminary thoughts on 
why terrorism is so hard to define, followed by an outline of how I will handle these 
difficulties in the forthcoming analysis (2.1.). Second, I will discuss some core definitional 
issues (2.2.). Third, I will attempt to concretise my own interpretation of terrorism in the 
form of a definition (2.3.). 
 
 
2.1. Why we need a definition 
 
Why is terrorism so hard to define? I think three reasons should be emphasized:  
• Terrorism is semantically related to other concepts, such as resistance, guerrilla 
warfare, sabotage and political assassination. This creates borderline cases where it is 
difficult to determine whether an action should be described as terrorism or not. 
• Terrorism is not a ‘neutral’ concept, but contains strong negative connotations. This 
makes it a useful polemical tool to disgrace political adversaries. Thus, to some extent 
terrorism will be perspective dependent, meaning that ‘one man’s terrorist is another 
man’s freedom-fighter’.  
• As a notion, terrorism is used within many different language contexts – ranging from 
everyday language and the media to the political and academic field – with dissimilar 
semantic norms for how the concept should be used.  
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All these factors pose challenges for the pursuit of a definition. Therefore, I find it necessary 
to make some initial clarifications on how I plan to deal with them methodologically.  
In my view, one should start out by clarifying what relevance the definition is meant 
to have (2.1.1.). This will provide guidance both to what semantic demands the definition 
ought to fulfill (2.1.2.), as well as limiting the analysis to a certain field of interest that can 
meet these demands (2.1.3.). These three clarifications will frame the discussion of the 
conceptual issues (2.2.), which constitute the main part of this chapter, where a crucial point 
will be to take a stand on some of the mentioned borderline cases.  
 
2.1.1. The contextual relevance of the definition 
As I have already mentioned, the concept of terrorism has various functions in different 
language contexts. Generally speaking, one can distinguish between wide and narrow 
meanings of the term. The latter tries to limit the reference of the notion by specifying certain 
criteria that any action labeled as ‘terrorism’ must fulfill; ‘an act of violence deliberately 
targeting civilians’, for instance. The wide meaning derives from a more metaphoric use of 
the word, where the intention is to amplify the negative effects of violence and other forms of 
abuse, such as ‘he terrorized her for ten years before she left her’.  
Here, I will pursue a narrow understanding of terrorism. The conceptual ambiguity I 
have sketched out needs not pose problems for our analysis of the definition, however. The 
reason for this is simply that the question of whether one should apply a wide or narrow 
understanding of the term will always depend on the specific context in relation to which the 
notion must be interpreted. Describing a violent man as someone who is terrorizing his wife 
in everyday language is not necessarily relevant for our present investigation, for example. 
Therefore, the question is not if, but when we need a narrow interpretation of terrorism.  
I will give a threefold answer to this question, on the basis of three discursive levels: 
1) the general discussion on terrorism, 2) the philosophical discussion on terrorism, and 3) 
the relevance of a definition for this thesis.  
1) Within the general discussion on terrorism the need for a definition that limits its 
reference to specific acts of violence is primarily related to political and institutional contexts 
(e.g. law texts). This is particularly important when it comes to counter-terrorism measures. 
Here, the lack of clarity on what kinds of activities that fall within the notion of terrorism 
make an unfortunate conceptual ambiguity that could provide an opening for a governmental 
misuse of authority. In my view, one can differentiate between two basic forms of such 
misuse. Either it can be directed towards external factors, meaning that a government in an 
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unlawful or unreasonable way utilizes instruments of power that they otherwise could not 
have employed, such as waging war against another state, under the pretence of combating 
terrorism. Or, if a state violates the civil rights of its own citizens in an unlawful manner, it 
can be an internal abuse of governmental power. Examples of the latter are to adopt an 
invasive surveillance policy against the political opposition or specific ethnic or religious 
groups, or to violate the rights of detainees through the use of torture or by depriving them of 
legal procedures. Therefore, to determine what actions fall within a definition of terrorism is 
crucial both at the national and the international political level.  
2) Philosophically, a conceptual analysis can have value in itself, sorting out how one 
phenomenon, namely terrorism, is distinguished from others. But, as I pointed out in my 
introduction, to concretise what kinds of actions the notion refers to will also be important for 
an ethical examination of the subject, as this clarifies the very premise for the discussion. I 
mentioned two basic reasons for why this preliminary conceptual clarification is essential:  
First of all, there is a semantic ambiguity connected to the concept of terrorism that 
can have a profound influence on the outcome of the ethical discussion. Even when one 
adopts a narrow understanding of the term, there will be difficult borderline cases where it is 
questionable whether they should be described as terrorism or not. 
Secondly, terrorism can be interpreted as having so strong negative connotations that 
the aspect of immorality is considered as part of its very essence. Following this view, the 
question of whether terrorism can be justified might seem like a contradiction in terms. 
Consequently, if an act is thought to be morally defensible, it must necessarily be something 
else than terrorism. As I have already pointed out, I do not consider this way of reasoning to 
be analytically stimulating. The way I see it, in order to have a fruitful discussion on the 
ethical aspects of terrorism, it will be necessary to have a definition that does not disqualify 
this discussion by predisposing a certain moral outcome.  
3) In relation to this thesis, the relevance of a definition has already been answered in 
my introduction; I find it necessary to sort out the premises of the discussion before going 
into it.  
 
2.1.2. Three semantic aims 
Based on the semantic relevance described in 2.1.1., I would like to set three aims for my 
definition: 
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1. First of all, and most importantly, the definition should be sufficiently neutral4, 
meaning that it leaves adequate room for the forthcoming investigation on the 
morality of terrorism. At a minimum, this implies that it should not make the claim 
that terrorism can be justified under certain circumstances a contradiction in terms. 
We would need to give additional grounds to show why this is the case. This stands 
in contrast to ‘definitions that either assert or recommend that moral wrongness is 
built into the definition of terrorism’ (Wallace 1993: 124). 
 
2. Secondly, the definition should not be controversial or ‘out of step’ with the 
common understanding of what terrorism is. This could endanger the relevance of 
the ethical discussion simply because the underlying premises are not accepted; it 
might be claimed that I have been discussing something other than terrorism. 
Therefore, I will stress consensus orientation, using definitional elements that 
already have some thematic resonance within the academic and the institutional 
field. 
 
3. Thirdly, the definition should be sufficiently functional, meaning that it has the 
ability to determine the status of most actions that are candidates to be labeled 
‘terrorism’. Why not all candidates? Well, ideally a definition would be exhaustive 
in relation to the phenomenon it sets forth to frame; both clarifying what falls within 
the notion and what falls outside of it. It is clear, however, that such an absolute 
demand for clarity would make any attempt for reaching a definition on terrorism 
impossible. There will always be borderline cases where it remains unclear whether 
they fall inside the definition or not. Thus, I find it acceptable that a definition on 
terrorism can have some degree of imprecision without loosing its definitional value.  
 
These three preliminary guidelines, namely neutrality, consensus orientation and 
functionality, seem to me to be core aspects that my definition should fulfil in order to make 
the discussion of whether terrorism can be morally justified most fruitful.  
 
                                                 
4
 In the literature on terrorism, this is often described as a morally neutral definition (eg. Primoratz 1997: 221; 
Corlett 2003: 120 and Wallace 1993: 124-125). However, due to the controversies surrounding this conception, 
I choose not to use it. Whether neutrality is possible – either completely or in part – is, of course, a difficult 
semantic question in itself. But if a definitional analysis is to be understood as a meaningful occupation, we 
have to assume that the concept of terrorism is not (at least) entirely perspective loaded. 
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2.1.3. Searching a point of departure 
Etymologically, ‘terrorism’ derives from the Latin word terrere – meaning ‘to cause to 
tremble’ (Juergensmeyer 2000: 5). The historical roots of the term grow out of the French 
Revolution and Robespierre’s ‘Reign of terror’ (régime de la terreur), where 40,000 
‘enemies of the people’ were executed from September 1793 to July 1794. Strangely enough, 
in relation to the contemporary picture, terror was a term the Jacobins used in proud self-
reference, describing their own vigour and ability to establish political order. It was not and 
until the Jacobins lost their power in the parliament, and Robespierre lost his head in the 
guillotine, that the notion got its negative connotations (Laqueur 2002: 6). Another point 
worth noting is that the initial meaning of terrorism was what we today would refer to as 
state terrorism. Its modern sense, where the concept primarily is related to non-state agents, 
did not emerge before the second half of the 19th century, when different anarchist and 
nationalist movements made use of assassinations and other forms of violent actions to 
pursue their political goals (Laqueur 2002: 11). 
This retrospective glance illustrates two important challenges for our conceptual 
analysis: First, it tells us that the term we are about to investigate has a profound degree of 
plasticity. Second, it tells us that this plasticity is integrated with different political interests 
that seek to ‘flavour’ the concept according to their own agenda. This makes the search for a 
definition more than just a semantic task. Quoting C. A. J. Coady:  
 
the definitional question is essentially irresolvable by appeal to ordinary language alone since 
terrorism as a concept is not ‘ordinary’ in even the way that intention, guilt and dishonesty are. 
Nor is it a technical term belonging to some science; its natural home is in polemical, ideological, 
and propagandist contexts or, less alarmingly, highly political ones. 
 
(Coady 2004a, in Primoratz (ed.): 3). 
 
 
Coady’s claim envisions that the task set before us is a difficult one. We are not only 
striving with semantics, but also polemics, ideology and propaganda. This underlines the 
importance of clarifying the concept of terrorism. In order to have a fruitful analysis, we 
need to try to ‘stay clear’ of the polemics, ideology and propaganda and strive to make 
terrorism a more technical term. Therefore, let us start by asking whether some arenas of 
discourse might be less influenced by these factors than others.  
Alex P. Schmid distinguishes ‘four different arenas of discourse’ that are relevant for 
the pursuit of a definition on terrorism: 
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1. The academic discourse. The universities offer an intellectual forum where scholars can discuss 
terrorism without being suspected of sympathising with terrorists. 
2. The state’s statements. The official discourse on terrorism by those who speak in the name of 
the state. 
3. The public debate on terrorism. The way our open societies are structured, this arena is largely 
co-extensive with the views and suggestions met in the media. 
4. The discussion of those who oppose many of our societies’ values and support or perform acts 
of violence and terrorism against what they consider repressive states. 
 
(Schmid 1992: 7-8) 
 
As pointed out by Schmid, one discursive arena stands out positively in relation to the 
mentioned demands; the academic. This is not to say, however, that I consider this arena to 
be uninfluenced by the previously mentioned problems. Nonetheless, there seem to be a 
question of degrees on this matter, and I will use the preliminary guidelines specified in 
2.1.2. as a litmus test for whether I think the definitions are relevant for the subject of 
analysing terrorism as a technical term.  
 
2.1.3.1 The blind men’s elephant 
As I mentioned in the beginning of this chapter, there have been many academic attempts to 
define terrorism. Yet, one has not been able to reach an agreement on what terrorism 
essentially is. Andrew Silke opens his article addressing this problem by narrating a 
children’s tale from India: Three blind men encounter an elephant and try to determine what 
kind of creature it is. Not being able to see it, they have to try to imagine what it is like by 
touching it with their hands. One of them clutches the trunk, and visualises a large snake-like 
animal. The other spots the tail, and perceives a thin wispish creature. The third touches one 
of the legs, and thinks that it is a huge tree-like animal. Afterwards, when discussing what 
kind of creature they encountered, they cannot come to an agreement. Each one of them has a 
different opinion of what an elephant is, but no one gets the complete picture (Silke 1996: 
12). 
Now, how does this metaphor relate to the question of defining terrorism? The point 
seems to be that the different definitions tend to concentrate too much on certain aspects of 
the phenomenon, while failing to see (or maybe even be blind to!) others. There is some truth 
in Silke’s point, but it does not cover the whole picture. Even though there are disagreements 
on how one should define terrorism, there are certainly also agreements.  
So far, the most extensive attempt to develop a consensus model for the definition of 
terrorism was carried out by Schmid. By analysing 109 definitions from a broad range of 
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publications, Schmid categorized 22 different elements that had been used to define 
terrorism. These were, in order of frequency: 
   
 Element      Frequency 
1.  Violence, force      83, 5 % 
2.  Political       65    % 
3.  Fear, terror emphasized     51   % 
4.  Threat       47 %  
5.  (Psych.) effects and (anticipated) reactions   41, 5 %  
6.  Victim-target differentiation    37, 5 %  
7.  Purposive, planned, systematic, organized action  32 %  
8.  Method of combat, strategy, tactic    30, 5 % 
9.  Extranormality, in breach of accepted rules,  
without humanitarian constraints    30 % 
 10.  Coercion, extortion, induction of compliance  28 % 
 11.  Publicity aspect      21, 5 % 
12.  Arbitrariness; impersonal, random character; 
  indiscrimination      21 % 
 13.  Civilians, noncombatants, neutrals, outsiders as victims 17, 5 % 
 14.  Intimidation      17 % 
 15. Innocence of victims emphasized    15, 5 %  
16.  Group, movement, organization as perpetrator  14 %.  
17. Symbolic aspect, demonstration to others   13, 5 % 
 18. Incalculability, unpredictability, unexpectedness  
of occurrence of violence       9 % 
 19.  Clandestine, covert nature       9 % 
 20. Repetitiveness; serial or campaign character of violence   7 % 
21.  Criminal        6 % 
22.  Demands made on third parties      4 % 
 
(Schmid & Jungman 1984: 76-77)  
 
Schmid’s categories provides an important starting point for sorting out what aspects 
there seem to be consensus about and what creates controversies. The strength of the analysis 
is that it is based on a wide spectrum of interdisciplinary publications. A possible weakness, 
however, is that its sources mainly date from the 1970s and the 1980s. Therefore, we have to 
determine whether his findings still have relevance for the subject. This is an important 
question, as it might be that definitions on terrorism have changed considerably during the 
last 20 years, especially since 11. September 2001.  
In a more recent study, Leonard Weinberg, Ami Pedahzur and Sivan Hirsch-Hoefler 
(2004) used Schmid’s categories to analyse 73 definitions published in articles from 1977 to 
2001. Their conclusion was that: 
 
elements 9 (…) and 12 (…), which emerged as important constituents of Schmid’s definition, 
received no mention at all in the relevant journal articles. Another element, 10 (...) was mentioned 
in less than 6 percent of the journal definitions. (...) The journal-based definitions were also much 
less likely to mention the arousal of fear and terror (element 3) and (...) (element 5) as important 
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components. In general, then, the journal contributors placed much less emphasis on the 
psychological aspects of terrorism (...) 
Are there aspects of the meaning of terrorism on which Schmid’s respondents and the journal 
writers actually agree? Yes; in fact high percentages of the experts in both categories (20 percent 
or more) identify terrorism as a method of combat or a tactic (element 8), involving a threat 
(element 4) of force and violence (element 1) used for a political (element 2) purpose. The pursuit 
of publicity (element 11) is mentioned somewhat less frequently but members of both groups 
seem to agree that it is part of the definition of terrorism. So it is possible to discern a consensus 
among academics who study the subject, to this extent. 
 
(Weinberg, Pedahzur, Hirsch-Hoefler 2004: 781-782). 
 
Based on the Weinberg, Pedahzur and Hirsch-Hoefler–findings, we can conclude that the 
psychological aspects (element 3, 5, 9, 10 and 12) might have lost some significance in more 
recent definitions. A part from that they confirm Schmid’s list.  
Concerning the post-2001 period onwards, however, there exists no definitional 
analysis that can be helpful to determine Schmid’s relevance. Yet, one might suspect that 
9/11 has changed the field of discussion in a radical way, with the effect of making what was 
written on the subject of terrorism prior to this incident less relevant.  
 
2.1.3.2. 9/11 – a thematic ‘ground zero’? 
I think there is little doubt that 9/11 changed our understanding of what terrorism can be. As I 
pointed out in my introduction, in terms of casualties it stands out radically from any 
preceding act of terrorism. Therefore, it does not seem unreasonable to hold that 9/11 would 
be a ‘ground zero’ for the literature on terrorism. There are also reasons for claiming that it is 
not, however. Here, I will sketch four arguments supporting this view: 
 
1. Even though 9/11 was radically different from any preceding act of terrorism in number of 
victims, there were well-documented examples of events prior to this date that could have 
been even more devastating. If the first attack on the World Trade Center (February 26, 
1993) had been successful, for instance, the number of casualties would probably have been 
six-figured, and not six5. Another example: In 1995, the Japanese cult Aum Shinrikyo 
perpetrated the worlds first act of chemical terrorism; the sarin gas attack on the Tokyo 
subway. Although the effect was not as devastating as the sect had hoped for (12 died, 5500 
                                                 
5
 The aim of the attack was to topple one of the twin towers on to the other by using large amounts of 
explosives and release simultaneously a cloud of poisonous gas (Thackrah 2004: 302). Reportedly, the 
perpetrators hoped to kill 250,000 people (Benjamin & Simon 2003: 7).   
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were injured), the outcome could have been disastrous if the sarin gas had been of a purer 
quality6.  
 
2. A definition concerns principles and not the number of deaths. To put it bluntly: whether 
three or 3,000 were killed is not necessarily a decisive matter. 
 
3. Terrorism is a strategy that consists in a broad spectrum of actions. Therefore, using 
sources written before the 9/11 attacks might also be considered a strength, and not a 
weakness, as contributions after this date might be focusing too much on this event, loosing 
sight of the plurality of the issue.  
 
4. The 9/11 attacks should be interpreted in relation to a broader historical background. In his 
article ‘The fourth Wave: September 11 in the History of Terrorism’ (2001), David C. 
Rapoport claims that we can distinguish between four waves of terrorism in modern times, 
each having distinctive features on behalf of the perpetrators, their motives and methods: 
• ‘The first wave’ (late 1870s – 1914) was waged by anarchist- and nationalist 
movements in Russia, Europe and the US. Their terrorism consisted mainly in 
assassinations on senior officials and other persons with central functions in the 
political complex.   
• ‘The second wave’ (1920s – 1960s) was perpetrated by national liberation fractions in 
former European colonies (i.e. Algeria, Cyprus, Israel and Ireland). The methods 
consisted typically in small-scale attacks on administrative organs, assassinations and 
‘hit-and-run’ guerrilla warfare against the military forces and the police.  
• ‘The third wave’ (late 1960s – early 1980s) consisted partly of Western revolutionary 
groups (Rote Armée Fraktion, Baader-Meinhof, Brigado Rosso, Action Directe), 
partly of national-separatist movements (ETA, IRA, PLO). The methods changed to a 
more indirect strategy of using civilians as means to further ones demands7, typically 
through aerial hi-jacking, kidnapping, hostage taking and bomb attacks.  
                                                 
6
 ‘The small number of fatalities was due primarily to the way the liquid sarin was packaged and to atmospheric 
conditions, neither of which favoured the rapid, even, and lengthy vaporization required for truly devastating 
results.’ (Benjamin & Simon 2003: 433). 
7
 There are also examples of terrorism that is directly aimed at political leadership, like the kidnapping and 
subsequent assassination of the Italian Prime Minister Aldo Moro in 1979.  
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• ‘The fourth wave’ (1979 – present) distinguishes from the third by being mainly 
religiously motivated, and then first and foremost Islamic8. According to the RAND-
St Andrews Chronology of International Terrorism, for instance, only two out of 64 
registered terrorist groups were described as religious in 1980. In 1995 this number 
had risen to 25 out of 58 (Schmid 2004: 210). Compared to the third wave, the 
terrorist methods are both more extreme and more complicated to perform: typically 
large-scale bomb attacks against civilian targets without any preliminary warning, 
often performed simultaneously and in the form of suicide missions.  
 
Now, what is clear is that ‘terrorism’ has had different meanings throughout history, which 
again underlines the importance of a definition. Rapoport’s view suggests that the 9/11 
attacks should be interpreted in relation to a broader historical tendency, namely ‘The fourth 
wave’. Following this argument, we might ascribe relevance to the literature from this period, 
which is relevant for most of the contributions I will bring into discussion. Concerning 
Schmid, however, we are still only half way there, for his list is based on contributions from 
both the third and the fourth wave. Does this make it irrelevant, then?  
In my view, this need not necessarily be the case. The reason is that there is a decisive 
difference in the terrorists’ methods between the first and second wave, which primarily were 
aimed directly at the political leadership and the official machinery of power, and the third 
and fourth wave, where the methods shifted into being more indirect, using civilians in a 
means-end strategy9. Therefore, whether the third wave literature can be considered relevant 
will depend on what factors one puts most emphasis on. If it is the indirect strategy, the third 
wave literature still is relevant. It should be noted, however, that there are also differences 
between the third and the fourth wave. First of all, the motives changed from being political 
/secular to religious/non-secular. Secondly, the terrorist methods employed in the fourth 
wave are generally more extreme, both in relation to the scale and complexity of the attacks 
and on the level of casualties. Therefore, when adopting Schmid’s list as a consensus model, 
one should bear in mind that the importance of some of the definitional elements could have 
changed in relation to the contemporary picture. 
                                                 
8
 Religious terrorism is not equivalent with Islamic terrorism, however. There are also examples of Christian- 
motivated terrorism, such as the Oklahoma-bombing of 1995 and numerous attacks on abortion clinics in the 
US throughout the 1990s, and Jewish-motivated terrorism, like the massacre on the Tomb of the Patriarchs in 
Hebron, 1994, where over 30 praying Muslims lost their lives. Not to forget the sarin gas attack on the Tokyo 
subway in 1995, perpetrated by Aum Shinrikyo, a new age group, inspired by Buddhism. (See Thackrah 2004) 
9
 In the literature, one usually takes 1968 as starting point for modern terrorism.  
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Summing up, then; with basis in the four arguments I have sketched, I find it 
reasonable to hold that despite its uniqueness in terms of casualties, 9/11 should not to be 
considered as a ‘ground zero’ for the literature on terrorism. It cannot be doubted that it is an 
important event for our issue, but concerning the plurality of the terrorist phenomena, making 
use of sources prior to this attack in addition to the contemporary literature could be helpful 
to get the important nuances that otherwise might be overshadowed. In this respect, Schmid’s 
list might still be a useful tool to get a picture of the core elements that have been used to 
define terrorism, even though one might suspect that some of the definitional elements in his 
list, such as political vs. religious intention, could be at odds with the contemporary 
discussion.  
 
 
2.2. In search of a definition  
 
Based on these preliminary clarifications, I can now begin my discussion of some of the core 
issues related to the definition of terrorism. I will start by presenting six philosophical 
definitions of terrorism. These serve three basic purposes for my forthcoming discussion: 
First of all, they give an introductory ‘taste’ of most of the themes I will discuss in this 
chapter. Secondly, they give an idea of which aspect there is more or less consensus about 
and what it is that creates controversies when trying to define terrorism. Thirdly, they provide 
a formal direction for my own definition, which will follow in 2.3. The selection I present is 
based on these grounds: 
• All the definitions include elements present in Schmid’s categories.  
• The definitions are sufficiently different from each other; this highlights the 
disagreements on the definitional issue and to set the ground for a rich discussion.  
• All the definitions are sufficiently ‘neutral’; by not taking a preliminary moral stance.  
• Many of the philosophers in question will play a significant role in the forthcoming 
discussion on the morality of terrorism.  
 
My discussion will concentrate on the following definitions: 
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Coady’s definition10: 
The organised use of violence to attack non-combatants (‘innocents’ in a special sense) or their 
property for political purposes. 
 (Coady 2004b: 39). 
 
Narveson’s definition: 
Terrorism (...) is a political action or sequence of actions. As the name implies, the strategy is to 
inspire the ‘target’ population with terror, by means of random acts of violence: meaning by 
‘random’ that they may fall upon anyone in a sizeable class of persons, at any time, are done 
without specific warning, and are done in an utterly impersonal manner. 
 
 (Narveson 1991, in Frey & Morris: 119). 
 
Waldron’s definition11: 
Terrorism is not just simple coercion. It looks to the possibility of creating a certain psycho-social 
condition, ψ, in a population that is radically at odds with the range of psycho-social states {φ1, 
φ2,..., φn} that the government wants or needs or can tolerate in its subject population. The terrorist 
group performs various actions – explosions, killings, etc. – which tend to put the population or 
large sections of it into condition ψ. The terrorist group does this with the aim of giving the 
government a taste of what it would be like to have its subject population in condition ψ. And it 
threatens to continue such actions, with similar effects, until the government yields to its demands. 
 
(Waldron 2003: 22) 
 
Wilkins’ definition: 
terrorism is the attempt to achieve political, social, economic, or religious change by the actual or 
threatened use of violence against persons or property; the violence employed in terrorism is aimed 
partly at destabilizing the existing political or social order, but mainly at publicizing the goals or 
cause espoused by the terrorists; often, though not always, terrorism is aimed at provoking extreme 
counter-measures which will win public support for the terrorists and their cause; terrorism will be 
perceived by its practitioners as an activity aimed at correcting grave injustice which otherwise 
would be allowed to stand.  
 
(Wilkins 1992: 6) 
 
 
 
                                                 
10
 This definition follows the main features of the definition Coady gave in his influential article ‘The Morality 
of terrorism’ (1985). Here he defines terrorism as ‘[a] political act, ordinarily committed by an organized group, 
which involves the intentional killing or other severe harming of non-combatants or the threat of the same or 
intentional severe damage to the property of non-combatants or the threat of the same.’ (Coady 1985: 52). There 
are two differences between the 1982 definition and the 2004 definition: In the latter Coady uses the word 
‘violence’ instead of  ‘intentional killing or other severe harming’, also, the emphasis on threats has been left 
out. It should be underlined, however, that Coady leaves an opening for this aspect in his subsequent 
clarification ‘If you think that plausible’ (Coady 2004b: 39). 
11
 Waldron points out that his definition should not be considered sufficient to define terrorism as phenomenon: 
‘obviously it would be a mistake to argue that the intention to create ψ is a necessary aspect of terrorism, and it 
would be an even greater mistake to suppose that any activity which promotes ψ has to be regarded as terrorism 
for that reason alone’ (Waldron 2003: 34).   
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Primoratz’ definition12: 
the deliberate use of violence, or threat of its use, against innocent people, with the aim of 
intimidating some other people into a course of action they otherwise would not take.   
 
(Primoratz 2004a, in Primoratz (ed.): 24). 
 
Honderich’s definition: 
a use of physical force that injures, damages, violates or destroys people or things, with a political 
and social intention, and whether or not intended to cause fear to people in general, and raising a 
question of its moral justification – either illegal violence within a society or violence between 
states and societies not according to international law, and smaller-scale than war. 
 
 (Honderich 2003: 15). 
 
 
As already noted, these six definitions have similarities and differences. Bearing in mind the 
preliminary guidelines I mentioned in 2.1.2., both of these features will be important for my 
investigation. The similarities suggest a consensus, and backed by Schmid’s list, they can 
provide important guidance for my aim of getting a consensus oriented definition. The 
differences provide suggestions to how terrorism should be defined, sketching issues for 
further discussion. Here, I will attach most importance to the other two guidelines, 
functionality and neutrality.  
I have chosen to arrange my argument along a what/who/why distinction. First, I will 
try to clarify what signifies terrorism as an act. Next, I will try to determine the distinctive 
features of the actors that are involved, both in relation to the perpetrators and the victims. 
Lastly, I will make an attempt to clarify what purposes and aims terrorism generally seeks to 
obtain. These three distinctions categorize the discussion in the section divisions below 
(Schmid’s categories in brackets13): 
 
Features of terrorist activity: violence, threats and incentives (element 1, 2 and 4). What 
signifies terrorism as activity? Based on the definitions I have presented, it seems obvious 
that most acts of terrorism imply violence or force (Honderich). But is violence a necessary 
condition for terrorism, or can we also speak of non-violent terrorism? What kind of violence 
                                                 
12
 Even though Primoratz’ definition includes elements that might seem morally predisposed (using ‘innocent 
people’ and not the more neutral ‘non-combatant’ (Coady) or ‘persons’ (Wilkins)) he claims that his definition 
‘does not prejudge the moral question of its justification in particular cases. For it entails only that terrorism is 
prima facie wrong, and thus does not rule out its justification under certain circumstances’ (Primoratz 2004b, in 
Coady & O’Keefe: 33)  
13
 Element 9, ‘Extranormality, in breach of accepted rules, without humanitarian constraints’ , and element 21, 
‘Criminal’, will not be included in my discussion. Regarding the former, I do not consider the immorality aspect 
to be relevant for the definitional discussion, for reasons I have given earlier. Concerning the latter, it seems to 
be self-evident – for can one imagine a terrorist act that is not considered to be criminal? 
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are we talking about in relation to terrorism? Is it only the kind of violence that inflicts harm 
on people, or can it also be directed against property or things, as Coady, Honderich and 
Wilkins suggest in their definitions? Does the violence have to be carried out, or can it also 
be performed as threats, as is indicated by Primoratz and Wilkins? Can we limit the violence 
in question by relating it to certain kinds of incentives; such as political (Coady, Narveson, 
Wilkins and Honderich); social (Honderich and Wilkins); economic or religious (Wilkins)? 
 
On perpetrators and victims (element 7, 12, 13, 15, 16, 18 and 19).   
Can we point at some distinctive features of the actors that are involved in terrorism? On 
behalf of the perpetrator; should the definition both include state and non-state actors, as 
Honderich suggests? Does it need to be tied to ‘organized groups’, as Coady and Waldron 
claim, or can terrorism also be conducted by private individuals? Second, concerning the 
victims; can terrorism be directed against any ‘person’, as proposed by Narveson and 
Wilkins, or should its reference be narrowed to a specific group, such as ‘civilians’ or ‘non-
combatants’, which is Coady’s suggestion? Should we use the term ‘innocents’, following 
Primoratz’ definition, or would this conflict with the aim of neutrality? Are victims of 
terrorism randomly targeted, as Narveson claims, or is there an important difference between 
the perpetrators and the victims on this issue?  
 
The rationale behind terrorism (element 3, 5, 6, 8, 10, 11, 14, 17 and 22). 
What is the purpose of committing terrorism? Is the intention to create a climate of anxiety 
and fear and to terrorize the targeted community, following Narveson, Waldron and 
Honderich? If so, are there specific purposes for creating this fear such as to destabilize the 
political order, to publicize goals or causes, to provoke countermeasures, such as Wilkins 
suggests? Might there also be other purposes? Are we talking about a means-end strategy, 
where the act has an aim of intimidating some other people into a course of action they 
otherwise would not take, as Primoratz suggests?  
 
In the following, I will try to provide an answer to each of these questions, showing both the 
benefits and the drawbacks of implementing the different elements that have been suggested 
in a definition of terrorism. Having discussed the issues in the section divisions above, I will 
sum up briefly and clarify how I integrate the conclusion of my discussion in my definition. 
At the end of this chapter, I will summarize my conclusions and propose a definition of 
terrorism. 
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2.2.1. The features of terrorist activity: Violence and incentives 
 
I will start my analysis by examining terrorism as an act, concentrating on three features. 
First, I will examine the relationship between violence and terrorism (2.2.1.1.). Here, two 
aspects will be discussed; whether there can be non-violent terrorism and if terrorist violence 
also can take an indirect form. Lastly, I will discuss the incentives behind terrorist violence 
(2.2.1.2.).  
 
2.2.1.1. Terrorism and violence 
It seems obvious that most acts of terrorism imply the use of violence. All the definitions I 
have presented include this element (Honderich uses both ‘force’ and ‘violence’), and 
according to Schmid’s list, there is a broad theoretical consensus on this point (83,5%).  
Schmid juxtaposes ‘violence’ and ‘force’. The connection between these concepts is a 
long debated issue in the literature on violence, far too intricate to be elaborated in depth 
here. Two important remarks should be made, though. First of all, these concepts are not 
always substitutable terms. Not all force is violent (preventing someone from harming 
themselves, for instance) and not all violence is force (exemplified by poisoning someone). 
This difference in meaning is also embedded in the etymology of the concepts, as ‘violence’ 
derives from the Latin word violentia, ‘meaning “vehemence”, a passionate and uncontrolled 
force (Bufacchi 2005: 194). Secondly, following Arendt’s argument in On violence, force 
seems to be conceived as a more neutral concept than violence is (Arendt 1970: 44). Some 
authors have suggested that violence should be considered a ‘force gone wrong’ (i.e. Dewey 
1980: 246), implying that it is a form of force that is destructive or damaging. Due to these 
differences in meaning, I choose to leave out ‘force’ from my definition of terrorism and 
focus only on violence.  
 
Non-violent terrorism? 
Is violence a necessary feature of terrorism? The simplest way of investigating this question 
is to ask whether there can be non-violent terrorism? There are philosophers who think that 
there can. Carl Wellman, for instance, claims that ‘violence is not essential to terrorism and, 
in fact, most acts of terrorism is nonviolent’ (Wellman 1979: 251)14. Wellman bases his 
argument on the possibility of committing terrorism by posing threats of violence. One of his 
                                                 
14
 Wellman defines terrorism as ‘the use or attempted use of terror as a means of coercion’ (Wellman 1979: 
250). 
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examples is blackmailing, an act he describes as terroristic, but not violent (Wellman 1979: 
252). The question we need to pose, then, is whether threats of violence are non-violent acts?  
To answer this question, we need to give some more depth to the concept of violence. 
Coady has suggested that we can differentiate between three types of definitions in the 
philosophical, political and sociological literature on violence: 
 
Wide definitions, of which the most influential is that of ‘structural violence’, (…) by including 
within the extension of the term ‘violence’ a great range of social injustices and inequalities. (…) 
Restricted definitions are typically those which concentrate upon positive interpersonal acts of 
force usually involving the infliction of physical injury. (…) The third type of definitions 
(‘legitimist’) (…) incorporates a reference to an illegal or illegitimate use of force.  
 
(Coady 1986: 4). 
 
In relation to Wellman’s argument, it is sufficient to elaborate the difference between the 
restricted and the wide definitions.  
If we stick to a restricted definition of violence, I think Wellman is partly right. For 
instance, if someone had placed a ‘dirty bomb’ (a conventional explosive with radioactive 
material attached to it) in a densely populated area and threatened to blow it up unless the 
government did not comply with their demands. Suppose the perpetrators had no actual plans 
of carrying out the attack and only intended to intimidate the government to change their 
policy, would we not call it terrorism? I think it is obvious that we would. Therefore, 
terrorism does not necessarily need to imply an actual use of violence. It can also be 
performed by threats of violence. At this point Wellman is right. The reason for why I have 
added ‘partly’ is that I think he is exaggerating the importance of this feature when he claims 
that ‘violence is not essential to terrorism’ and that ‘most acts of terrorism is non-violent’. 
These are counter-intuitive claims; I think it is quite obvious that most acts of terrorism do 
imply the use of violence, while non-violent terrorism (given Wellman’s understanding of 
this concept) remains a more marginal phenomenon.  
There is also another way of confronting Wellman’s claim, however. As pointed out, 
Wellman subscribes to a restricted definition of violence that limits the concept to physical 
acts performed with the intention of inflicting harm or injury on other persons. Wide 
definitions seek to build additional elements into the concept. Coady mentions structural 
violence in particular. Amongst the theorists fronting this view is Johan Galtung. In his 
interpretation, ‘violence is present when human beings are being influenced so that their 
actual somatic and mental realizations are below their potential realizations’ (Galtung 1969: 
168). When the violence can be traced to particular person or persons, it is direct violence. 
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When it consists in socio-structural differences creating unequal possibilities and life 
chances, the violence is structural. Although I recognize that Galtung’s interpretation of 
structural violence might be an important theoretical tool in relation to other issues, such as 
analysing poverty, I think it has little relevance when it comes to defining terrorism. The 
reason is simply that terrorism will relate to what he refers to as direct violence as it can be 
linked to a specific set of actors. Structural violence might play a crucial role when it comes 
to the justification of terrorism, however, as we shall see in part 3. 
But there are also other wide interpretations of violence that have greater significance 
for our present investigation. Here, I will bring in two such accounts: The first includes 
psychological violence. The second incorporates indirect violence, which I will return to 
shortly. In relation to Wellman’s claim, it is the understanding of psychological violence that 
is important. Wellman’s argument is based on an understanding that threats of violence are 
non-violent. But if one incorporates psychological features in the definition of violence, e.g. 
‘violence is the intentional infliction of physical or psychological injury on a person or 
persons’ (Steger 2003: 13), it seems clear that threatening someone could easily be 
interpreted as a violent act. Thus, Wellman’s suggestion of non-violent terrorism can simply 
be confronted by pointing at his definition of violence and claim that it is too narrow. 
Summing up; it seems clear that terrorism need not imply an actual use of violence, 
but also can be performed by threats of physical harm. If we choose a restricted definition of 
violence, it would be necessary to incorporate ‘threats of violence’ in the definition (such as 
Primoratz, Wilkins and Coady (see footnote 10) do). If we have a wider understanding of 
violence, that also includes psychological aspects, this can cover both the actual use of 
violence and threats of such. In relation to describing terrorist violence, I consider both the 
restricted understanding of violence and the wider interpretation which includes 
psychological aspects, to be functional15. Therefore, I choose to leave an opening for both of 
these perspectives in my own definition, arguing that terrorism is ‘use of violence (or threats 
of such)’. The reason for why I have put the aspect of threats in brackets is that it might be 
considered superfluous in relation to interpretations of violence that incorporate 
psychological aspects.  
 
                                                 
15
 In relation to the issue of terrorism, the definitions that include both psychological and physical aspects might 
be preferable to the restricted definitions of violence. The reason for this is related to the rationale behind the 
terrorist activity, namely to create a certain psychological state of mind, such as fear, within the targeted 
community, which will be discussed in 2.2.3. Yet, due to the controversies regarding restricted and wide 
definitions of violence, I choose not to limit my discussion to either one.  
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Direct and indirect violence 
I will now turn to the second form of wide definitions of violence that have importance for 
the subject of terrorism, which suggests that violence can also take an indirect form. What do 
I mean by indirect violence? While direct violence16 refers to the restricted definition of 
terrorism, where the violence in question is directed against another person, indirect violence 
address the destruction of property or other material conditions that other human beings 
make use of in their activity. This twofold understanding of violence is exemplified by 
Honderich’s definition of violence: ‘a use of physical force that injures, damages, violates or 
destroys people or things’ (Honderich 2003: 15).  
In the definitions I have presented, Coady, Wilkins and Honderich include this aspect 
in their definitions. Direct and indirect violence are subcategories to violence. Hence, not 
indicating that terrorist violence also can take an indirect form does not necessarily imply 
that one would only ascribe direct violence importance to the issue. But since Coady, Wilkins 
and Honderich specify that terrorist violence can also be indirect, while others do not, this 
indicates a difference in views upon how relevant this aspect is considered to be for the 
subject – if it merits its place in a definition, so to speak. Primoratz, for instance, 
acknowledges that certain forms of indirect violence have relevance for the subject of 
terrorism, yet he does not incorporate this feature in his definition. The reason seems to be 
that Primoratz will only grant a very limited kind of indirect violence relevant to the subject, 
namely the one that deprives someone from the necessities to sustain life, such as destroying 
irreplaceable food resources in times of famine17. Destroying a valuable piece of art would 
not be an act of terrorism, however (Primoratz 2004a, in Primoratz (ed.): 21).  
This leads us to the possible problems that are linked to Coady, Wilkins and 
Honderich’s position, for what kind of violence against property qualifies to be called 
terrorism? First of all, in Coady’s view indirect violence does not need to be life-threatening 
to be terrorism: 
 
If an armed group seized an empty civilian airliner and blew it up as a contribution to their political 
campaign for liberation or whatever, this would plausibly be regarded as a terrorist act. If Israeli 
tanks are destroying the homes of innocent people in Palestine without actually killing the 
inhabitants, then this should surely count as terrorism.  
 
(Coady 2004a: 7) 
 
                                                 
16
 This interpretation of direct violence should not be mixed with Galtung’s concept.  
17
 The question remains what kinds of resources are necessary to sustain life, however. Can this be determined 
objectively? Or does it relate to the subjective preferences of the victim? 
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Accordingly, Coady does not share Primoratz limited view on this issue. The scope is wider. 
Yet, it certainly cannot be the all-embracing Lockean understanding of property he has in 
mind, where every belonging is considered to be a continuation of the personal integrity of 
the individual. This perspective would make any action that violates someone’s property a 
possible act of terrorism, given – of course – that they fulfil the other criteria in the 
definition. Let us consider an example that might clarify the nature of the problem:  
If an environmentalist group decides to equip themselves with razorblades to cut 
scratches in the paintwork on parked cars to frighten people from driving to work, I think it 
would be counter-intuitive to describe this as terrorism. Still, the example fulfil many of the 
crucial features frequently used to describe terrorist activity; it is directed against civilians, it 
creates fear, it has a political incentive, it has an indirect form, etc. Therefore, the decisive 
point for why this act can be considered to comply with the definition of terrorism, even 
though it preferably should not, seems to be the aspect of indirect violence; the destruction of 
the paintwork of other people’s cars.  
What this anomaly tells us is that the violence in question has to have a degree of 
severity connected to it. One can certainly grant Primoratz’ example of destroying valuable 
food resources in times of famine this degree of severity, for instance. Yet I agree with 
Coady that indirect terrorist violence does not only apply to material damages that are life-
threatening. Primoratz’ account is too narrow. What if someone had placed a bomb inside the 
Pantheon, blowing it up after closing hours to prevent causing any injury to the visitors? 
Would we not call these acts terrorism, even though they are not life-threatening? I think we 
would. But where should we draw the line between these acts and the mentioned paintwork 
scratching environmentalist group? This is tough question to answer. But this problem would 
also apply to the direct form of violence, for certainly not all forms of direct violence are 
relevant to the subject of terrorism. The crucial point, then, will be to limit the violence in 
question by specifying that it must contain a degree of severity (e.g. Coady 1985: 52). I admit 
that this is not really a solution to the problem, as one always can question whether an act of 
violence is severe or not. Yet, it seems to be a better alternative than not to mention this 
aspect at all.  
Summing up, then, I think that terrorist violence can be both direct and indirect, but it 
has to be of a severe and devastating kind. The next question I will discuss is whether we can 
limit the violence in question by referring to the incentives behind these acts. 
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2.2.1.2. Incentives for terrorist violence – solely political? 
‘In November 1955, Jack Gilbert Graham placed a bomb on board a passenger plane that 
killed all 44 persons on board. Graham’s reason was simple: he wanted to collect the life 
insurance policy on one of the passengers – his mother’ (Quillen 2002: 282). Without 
anticipating the outcome of the forthcoming discussion on the definition of terrorism, it 
seems fair to suspect that placing a bomb on an airplane with the effect of killing 44 innocent 
people could easily qualify to be described as a terrorist act. According to Chris Quillen, 
however, it is not. The reason is connected to Graham’s incentives – they were purely 
egoistic; he simply wanted to collect the life insurance of his mother!  
This case tells us something crucial, namely that the incentives of the perpetrator have 
importance for whether or not we define an act as terrorism. The Graham example suggests 
that we can leave out all acts that are performed out of purely selfish incentives; street gangs 
terrorizing a neighbourhood, for instance. What we are left with, then, are acts performed for 
social reasons.  
According to Schmid, there is a considerable degree of consensus on defining 
terrorism as a political act (65 %). With the exception of Primoratz and Waldron, all the 
definitions I have presented reflect this view. In Schmid’s list, it seems like the element 
‘political’ has two meanings; it can both be interpreted in relation to the political incentives 
and political effects. In this part, I will concentrate only on political intentions, returning to 
the political effects in 2.2.3.  
The first thing we need to clarify here is that not all political violence is terrorism. A 
protest march, for instance, might be both violent and political, but it is not terrorism. Thus, 
what we are discussing here is whether terrorism should be defined as a form of political 
violence. So far we have ruled out that terrorism can be performed out of selfish incentives. 
There has to be a social incentive behind the act. But social incentives do not necessarily 
have to be political. If we take Wilkins’ definition, there are at least two other possibilities 
that need to be taken into account. In addition to the political, he mentions economic and 
religious reasons. I understand his last category, social reasons, as a more general category 
than the others, which can be further divided into at least three sub-categories of reasons; 
political, religious and economic. Therefore, let us see if we can leave out any of the 
mentioned subcategories, which would narrow the field of our definition. As specified above, 
I will only discuss ‘reasons’ as ‘incentives’ in this part of the argument, returning to the 
effects later. 
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I think the question of economic incentives can be solved by differentiating between 
two forms; individual and social. In relation to the individual economic incentives we can 
refer to Graham’s case, where we are talking about criminal acts but not terrorism. 
Concerning the social economic incentives, it seems reasonable to describe these as political. 
But what about the religious incentives? This is an important question, especially in relation 
to the shift Rapoport makes between the third and the fourth wave. In our present situation, 
should we not emphasize the religious factor over the political?  
Now, the claim that terrorist acts have a political incentive need not imply that this is 
the only motive. Thus, the easy solution is to juxtapose religious incentives and political 
ones. But, many theorists, Coady being one of them, do not. The question is, then, if what we 
often refer to as religious terrorism, Islamic terrorism in particular, is more motivated by 
politics than religion? Here, it is hard to conclude unambiguously. We are dealing with a vast 
spectre of organisations with different political and religious foundations. Held has argued 
that the most significant, Al Qaeda, should be considered political; ‘since it aims at the 
religious domination of the political, its violence is itself political’ (Held 2004a: 63). Coady 
reasons accordingly:  
 
my reference to political motivations is not meant to be so narrow as to include only secular or 
pragmatic outlooks. When religion or ideology employs violent means to undermine, reconstitute 
or maintain political structures for the further transcendent ends of the religion or ideology, then 
that counts as ‘political purposes.’  
(Coady 2004b: 41) 
 
Held and Coady’s point seems to be that one cannot differentiate between religion and 
politics if this secular division does not exist for the group in question. Thus, even though the 
incentives behind the act might be religious, we can indeed interpret them as political.  
One possible objection to this perspective is that we thereby shift focus from the 
terrorist’s incentives to our own interpretation of these incentives. I do not think this 
objection is very problematic, however. It cannot be that the actor’s own experience of 
incentives automatically should outweigh others interpretations of his or her incentives. Even 
though psychiatrists in Nazi Germany claimed that the Euthanasia-programme was executed 
out of mercy for the victims, it seems absurd if we were not able to claim that there were 
indeed other incentives lying behind these acts, such as aversion against weakness.  
We can conclude in the following terms: Is terrorism political violence? By answering 
affirmatively to this question we can exclude many other forms of violence and crime, which 
is crucial for the functionality of our definition. The challenge is that other incentives, such 
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as religion, could be considered equally significant. Basically there are two ways in which 
one can solve the question of religious motives. Either one could specify that it is integrated 
in the understanding of political motives, as Held and Coady do, or one could follow 
Wilkins’ example and juxtapose religious and political motives. For simplicity, I prefer the 
latter to the former.  
 To sum up the analysis on what features specify terrorism as an act, I have argued that 
we can restrict our definition as follows: It implies the use of violence, or the threat of such. 
The violence in question can be both direct and indirect, yet it has to contain a certain degree 
of severity. The intentions behind the act are typically political or religious. I will now turn to 
the actors involved in terrorist activity, to see if this aspect might help us to specify the 
features of terrorism further. 
 
 
2.2.2. On perpetrators and victims 
 
Is it possible to extract a specific set of actors in relation to the issue of terrorism? Initially, 
we can differentiate between two groups; the perpetrators and the victims. I will start by 
analysing the perpetrators (2.2.2.1), focusing on two questions: First, can both state and non-
state actors perform terrorism, or should we limit our focus only to the latter? Second, does 
terrorist activity have to be organized, or can lone standing individuals perform it as well? In 
relation to the victims (2.2.2.2.), I will focus on whether we can limit terrorism to the 
targeting of a specific group of people. I will concentrate on discussing three concepts that 
can specify this group; ‘civilians’, ‘non-combatants’ and ‘innocents’. Lastly, I will give some 
depth to whether victims of terrorism can be considered to be random (2.2.2.3.).  
 
2.2.2.1. Perpetrators: State and non-state actors 
A highly debated question on the issue of terrorism has been whether it applies only to non-
state actors, or if one also can talk of state terrorism. None of the authors in the passage 
reproduced above make an explicit point of this feature in their definitions. This is not to say 
that they thereby restrict their definitions to non-state actors only. On the contrary, many of 
them point out that the definition could apply both to state and non-state actors (e.g. Coady 
2004b: 40; Honderich 2003: 15-16 and Wilkins 1992: 27). Primoratz, for instance, goes as 
far as claiming that ‘[h]istorically, the state has been the biggest terrorist’ (Primoratz (ed.) 
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2004: xx). In Schmid’s list, only 26 % of the definitions he analysed excluded state terrorism 
(Silke 1996: 22). Let us ask, then, whether a definition should apply only to non-state actors?  
First, there are obvious historical reasons for saying that it should not. As I have 
already mentioned, the etymological origins of the term ‘terrorism’ are specifically related to 
state-terrorism, whereas the non-state meaning only came later. Second, there are some 
notable cases of acts that usually are described as terrorism for which state-actors have been 
responsible. A telling example is the Rainbow Warrior-affair in 1985 wherein French secret 
servicemen blew up the Greenpeace ship ‘Rainbow Warrior’, which had been demonstrating 
against the nuclear testing in the Mururoa Atoll. This resulted in the death of the Portuguese 
photographer Fernando Pereira. Despite cases such as these, some authors will still maintain 
that state-actors should not be included in the definition of terrorism. Why is that?  
Two main reasons have been given, both relating to overinclusiveness. The first 
connected to acts of war that are not normally referred to as terrorism, but have obvious 
similarities, such as the conventional mass bombings of civilian targets (London, Hamburg, 
Dresden, Tokyo, etc.) or the nuclear bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki during World War 
II. The second problem of overinclusiveness concerns state terror of the kind performed by 
the Nazi regime, which Hannah Arendt describes in The Origins of Totalitarianism (1951), 
with later equivalents in paramilitary groups in Latin American countries, such as in 
Argentine, Chile, Nicaragua and Colombia.  
Are these acts terrorism? This is a hard question to answer. On the one hand, it seems 
clear that they fulfill all the core features that designate a terrorist act (although some of them 
remain to be discussed). On the other hand, they might seem to be ‘a bit on the side’ to what 
we normally would refer to as terrorism. This has to be elaborated further, but in order to do 
this we need to provide some more clarity both to what terrorism is and to what bombings of 
civilians in war and state terror implies. Consequently, I cannot conclude on this issue at this 
stage of the argument. We will have to return to it at a later stage (i.e. part 3.3.). As a 
tentative conclusion, I hold that terrorism is performed by both state and non-state actors.  
 
Organized or individual? 
A second question that needs to be sorted out is whether terrorism necessarily needs to be 
tied to some organization, or if there can also be private terrorism. The problem of including 
the latter is related to the Graham example and the claim that terrorism cannot be performed 
out of selfish incentives alone. As I have already stated, terrorism should be related only to 
political or religious incentives. Hence, one might think that private terrorism would 
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somehow conflict with this view. I disagree with there being a conflict here. It seems 
perfectly possible for a lone standing individual to act out of political or religious incentives. 
A well-known example being the Unabomber, who stopped his letter bomb campaign after 
his 35,000 word long ‘manifesto’ was published in the Washington Post (Thackrah 2004: 
277). Accordingly, an organized group might also perform acts that are similar to terrorism 
but out of purely selfish motives. Thus, even though terrorism usually is performed by 
organized groups, it seems clear that private individuals can also indulge in terrorist activity. 
Hence, I choose to leave out this aspect from my definition. 
  
2.2.2.2. Victims: Civilians, non-combatants, persons or innocents? 
Many theorists consider that the hallmark of terrorism to be the deliberate targeting of people 
who normally have immunity from being attacked. To cite Primoratz: ‘the defining feature of 
terrorism, and the reason why many of us find it so extremely morally repugnant, is its failure 
to discriminate between the innocent and the guilty, and its consequent failure to respect the 
immunity of the former and to concentrate exclusively on the latter.’ (Primoratz 2004a, in 
Primoratz (ed.): 20). Both Coady and Primoratz make this a decisive aspect in their 
definitions, whereas Wilkins, Waldron, Honderich and Narveson leave it out. Thus, in 
relation to the definitions I have presented, there seems to be a disagreement on this issue – a 
tendency that also is confirmed in Schmid’s list.  
I will start out by drawing some preliminary distinctions between four notions; 
‘civilians’, ‘non-combatants’ (Coady), ‘persons’ (Wilkins) and ‘innocents’ (Primoratz). 
‘Civilians’ will apply to all persons that are not a part of any military organization. The same 
group are also included in the notion ‘non-combatants’, in addition to military personnel who 
are not in a combat situation. ‘Persons’ implies both military personnel and civilians. 
‘Innocents’ is the antonym of ‘guilty’ and differs from the other three by having moral 
connotations. Which of these notions should be used to describe the victims of terrorism? I 
will start with the term ‘innocents’, since this notion stands out from the other three.  
 
Innocents 
Primoratz gives the following account of ‘innocents’:  
 
What is the sense in which the direct victims of the terrorist are ‘innocent’? They have not done 
anything the terrorist could adduce as a justification of what he does to them. They are not 
attacking him, and thus he cannot justify his action as one of self-defence. They are not engaged in 
war against him, and therefore ha cannot say that he is merely fighting in a war himself. They are 
not responsible, in any plausible sense of the word, for the (real or alleged) injustice, suffering, 
deprivation, which is inflicted on him or on those whose cause he has embraced, and which is so 
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enormous that it could justify a violent response. Or, if they have, he is not in a position to know 
that. 
 
 (Primoratz 2004a, in Primoratz (ed.): 17-18) 
 
Hence, the term ‘innocents’ refers to those people who are not considered ‘guilty’ for the 
cause that provoked the terrorist attack. More specifically, ‘this includes all except members 
of the armed forces and security services, those who supply them with arms and ammunition, 
and political officials directly involved in the conflict’ (Primoratz 2004b, in Coady & 
O’Keefe (eds.): 33). But what perspective is this interpretation of guilt and innocence based 
on? Is it the victims’ view upon innocence Primoratz has in mind? Is it some kind of 
‘objective’ moral standard? Primoratz meets this objection by arguing that ‘the terrorist’s 
victim is innocent from the terrorist’s own point of view, i.e., innocent even if we grant the 
terrorist his assessment of the policies he opposes’ (Primoratz 2004a, in Primoratz (ed.): 18), 
as the victim has no personal responsibility for the cause of the action (ibid: 18). The persons 
who bear this responsibility are the ‘officials’ and in Primoratz’ view, attacks on this group 
should be labeled ‘political assassination’, and not terrorism (ibid: 19).  
In my view, there are two problems connected to Primoratz’ account. The first 
concerns whether it is possible to draw an absolute demarcation line between innocents and 
guilty, which is a necessity to grant Primoratz’ view analytic value.  Primoratz seems to think 
that there are two ways in which one can be considered guilty. One is when being a decision 
maker that has some kind of responsibility for the cause, ‘c’, to which the terrorists oppose. 
This addresses the political establishment and the officials. The other way in which one can 
be considered guilty is when participating in the perpetration of ‘c’, either directly, which 
goes for the armed forces and the security services, or indirectly, by providing arms and 
ammunition. But do these interpretations of guilt provide a clear-cut answer to how to 
distinguish between the guilty and the innocent? Who are the decision makers that bear the 
responsibility? Is it the government, the parliament, or the political establishment as a whole? 
What about the electorate that put the government responsible for ‘c’ in power? It is certainly 
not implausible to say that this group shares the responsibility for ‘c’ and therefore can be 
considered guilty, especially not when Primoratz claims that his argument is based on ‘the 
terrorists’ own point of view’. To push it even further; what if the terrorists consider a whole 
culture complex, such as the Western world, as guilty for ‘c’? In this perspective, any person 
participating in this community will be considered a legitimate target for an attack.  
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Primoratz’ response to this objection is that this all-embracing understanding of guilt 
will efface the difference between guilt and innocence (Primoratz 1997: 224). There is some 
truth in this, but I do not consider this response to be sufficient to overrule the difficulties of 
‘where to draw the line’. Concerning the Nazis’ attempt to exterminate the Jews, for instance, 
I think it would be wrong to claim that the German people had no collective guilt. As an 
electorate, many of them participated in putting the Nazis in power in 1933 election, for 
instance. This leads us to the other problem that is related to Primoratz’ account of 
innocence, namely whether guilt only addresses those that actively participate in ‘c’, or if 
omitting to try to change ‘c’ also could make you guilty. Returning the Nazis’ attempt to 
exterminate the Jews, many would argue that neglecting to oppose this policy would make 
you a tacit accomplice.  
To sum up, then; it seems like Primoratz’ conceptualisation lacks fine-tuning, it fails 
to grasp the complexity related to the issue of guilt and innocence. Coady gives the following 
grounds for why one should use the notion ‘non-combatants’ instead of ‘innocents’: ‘In 
traditional and contemporary discussions of the morality of warfare the category of “the 
innocent” usually collapses into that of “non-combatant” partly in order to avoid being 
sidetracked into a largely fruitless debate about mental states to which attributions of guilt or 
innocence are to be attached.’ (Coady 1985: 54). If we concede Coady’s point that 
‘innocents’ more or less would refer to the same group as ‘non-combatants’, the semantic 
gain of using the former seems to be minimal, whereas the costs in ambiguity are 
considerable. Therefore, let us turn to the other concepts I have mentioned and see whether 
these are more suitable for a definition. 
 
Civilians, non-combatants and persons. 
I think it is self-evident that civilians are included in the victims group. It would certainly be 
absurd to claim that terrorism should only apply to military personnel. Accordingly, the 
question I will address here is whether terrorism only concerns the deliberate targeting of 
‘civilians’ or if it can also include other groups. 
Let us start by asking what we mean by ‘military personnel’? Here we can make a 
distinction between those who might take active part in warfare as combatants and those who 
are a part of a military organisation, but without bearing arms or taking any part in warlike 
activity. The question is if we can leave out the latter group. Let us consider an example: 
Would it be reasonable to claim that the 9/11 attack on the US Pentagon should not be 
considered a terrorist act since it was directed against the US Defence Department? Of 
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course, the attack also claimed the lives of many civilians, such as the passengers and crew 
on the plane, employees not part of the military staff, etc., so we would have to twist the 
example slightly: If the plane had been empty except from the hijackers and that the crash 
only had killed US army personnel, should we consider this act a terrorist attack simply 
because it did not claim any civilian casualties? I think not. To put it bluntly; the fact that you 
receive your paycheck from the US army does not automatically make you a legitimate 
target.   
Thus, our third consideration concerns only the part of the military force that could 
participate in warlike activity as combatants. Here we can make a distinction between those 
that actually take part in acts of war, and those that do not (but potentially might). If the 
victim aspect should merit its place in a definition, it ought to have an excreting value. 
Therefore, I think it is clear that soldiers in combat situations should not be included in the 
victims group specified in a definition of terrorism. This would be an important definitional 
tool to differentiate between terrorism on the one side and guerrilla warfare and resistance 
movements on the other18. It should be mentioned, however, that there are philosophers who 
questions if combatants should be considered more legitimate targets than civilians:  
 
many members of the armed forces are conscripts who have no choice but to be combatants. Many 
conscripts in the Israeli army, for instance, may disapprove of their government’s policies. Many 
others of those who participate in armed conflict, in the U.S. armed forces for instance, have been 
pressed into service by economic necessity and social oppression. 
 
  (Held 2004a: 66).   
 
Even though Held’s point might pose some interesting questions, such as whether a 
warmongering civilian might be more morally culpable than a young soldier that joins the 
army out of economic necessity, it seems as we would be striving with the same problems as 
with Primoratz’ suggestion of ‘innocents’.  
Let us therefore turn our focus to whether we might leave out the other group; namely 
soldiers that do not participate in war. Here, I think one can make a distinction between 
soldiers that are a part of a country’s regular national defence army and soldiers that 
participate in missions abroad. It seems clear that if someone were to blow up one of the 
barracks of the Norwegian Home Guard, we could certainly label this a terrorist act, even 
                                                 
18
 This is not to say, however, that guerrilla and resistance movements cannot indulge in terrorist activity. If 
they were to target civilians or non-combatants deliberately, they are, of course, adopting terrorist methods. 
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though it only killed soldiers. Concerning the soldiers that participate in missions abroad, 
however, the picture is more complex.  
On the one side, it seems clear that participating in actions outside own territory need 
not necessarily make you a legitimate target. One example being soldiers in peacebuilding 
operations under the UN flag. But, between this group and soldiers indulging in regular 
warfare there is an area where it is harder to determine whether the soldiers should be granted 
non-combatant immunity or not. If we consider the recent attacks on US troops in post-war 
Iraq19, for instance, I think it is questionable if these acts should be labeled terrorism even 
though they are labeled as such by the US administration. For even though it is true that the 
soldiers are not participating in regular fighting20, they would still be an occupying force, at 
least until the established Coalition Provisional Authority transferred sovereignty to the Iraqi 
interim government in end of June 200421. The point I am trying to make here is that there 
also are difficulties related to the notion of non-combatants. While it seems clear that 
‘civilians’ is to narrow, with the effect of being underinclusive, ‘non-combatants’ might be 
too broad, as we are striving with overinclusiveness due to the difficulties surrounding 
whether one should be considered a combatant. 
  To sum up: First of all, by specifying that terrorism implies the deliberate targeting of 
civilians or non-combatants, we have a distinct characteristic that might sort out a number of 
borderline examples, such as guerrilla warfare and armed resistance. Therefore, I think we 
should not include attacks on combatants in the definition of terrorism. This leaves out 
Wilkins’ suggestion that terrorism targets ‘persons’ (in general). Secondly, to have a 
functional definition of terrorism, we should reject Primoratz’ suggestion of designating the 
victims of terrorism as ‘innocents’. Thirdly, based on my discussion, the term ‘civilians’ is 
underinclusive, as there are agents within the military system that should be granted non-
combatant immunity. My suggestion, then, is that we should designate the victims of 
terrorism as ‘non-combatants’, even though this might be over-inclusive in some respects 
(e.g. the US troops in post-war Iraq).  
 
                                                 
19
 Another example is the British Security Forces in Northern Ireland. 
20
 Officially, the war in Iraq ended on 1st May, 2003, when President Bush declared ‘the end of major combat 
operations in Iraq’ under the ‘Mission accomplished’ banner at the aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln. 
21
 Thus, whether these attacks should be considered as guerilla war, or if it should be labeled terrorism, seems to 
be a question of what perspective the Iraqis have upon the US forces’ presence. In a recent poll conducted by 
the Program on International Policy Attitudes (January 31, 2006), ‘What the Iraqi Public Wants’, 47 % of the 
respondents said they approve of ‘attacks on US-led forces’ and 87 % approved an endorsing timeline for US 
withdrawal (http://www.pipa.org/OnlineReports/Iraq/Iraq_Jan06_rpt.pdf). Other polls have reflected the same 
tendency.  
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2.2.2.3. On randomness 
One aspect that often is brought up to define terrorism is that it strikes randomly. In the 
definitions I have presented, it is Narveson that puts most emphasize on this aspect: ‘by 
random acts of violence: meaning by ‘random’ that they may fall upon anyone in a sizeable 
class of persons, at any time, are done without specific warning, and are done in an utterly 
impersonal manner.’ (Narveson 1991: 119). On the basis of Narveson’s definition, we can 
extract two possible interpretations of ‘random’: 
1.  It can designate the time and place of the attack (‘at any time, are done without 
specific warning’). This goes for element 18 in Schmid’s list: ‘Incalculability, 
unpredictability, unexpectedness of occurrence of violence’. 
2. It can describe the victims of the terrorist attack (‘may fall upon anyone in a sizeable 
class of persons (...), are done in an utterly impersonal manner’), echoing element 12 
in Schmid’s list: ‘Arbitrariness; impersonal, random character, indiscrimination’ 
(21%).  
I will now discuss the relevance of both of these interpretations. 
 
1. Intuitively, it might seem obvious that terrorism is an act that strikes randomly in 
time and place. It is the feature of unpredictability that makes it hard to defend oneself 
against terrorist attacks, and this is what makes it an efficient tactic against an adversary that 
most often is superior in military strength. But even though this aspect can appear to be a key 
element in the logics of terrorism, it comes out fairly low on Schmid’s consensus list (9%). 
Why? I think the most important reason for this is that randomness in time and place will be 
dependent on what perspective we have in mind. On behalf of the victims or the society that 
is attacked, it is an adequate description in so far as they could not have ‘seen it coming’ at 
the time of the attack. But if one takes the terrorists perspective, it is the other way around; 
‘terrorists do not strike blindly and pointlessly, left and right, but rather plan their actions 
carefully, weighing the options and trying for the course of action that will best promote their 
objective at the lowest cost to themselves.’ (Primoratz 2004a, in Primoratz (ed.): 17). 
But even when specifying that randomness in time and place only is related to the 
perspective of the victims, or the society that has been attacked, there are other problems 
connected to this view. First of all, there have been examples of acts we normally would refer 
to as terrorism where the perpetrators have warned about the attack in advance to limit the 
number of civilian casualties. The second problem is that the risks of terrorist attacks are in 
fact not totally random, but considerably higher in some places of the world than elsewhere. 
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According to the RAND’s ‘Terrorism knowledge base’, from the 1st of May 2003, when 
president Bush officially declared that the war in Iraq was won, to15th December 2005, 3020 
of the 4510 recorded terrorist attacks took place in Iraq, claiming 8391 of totally 9302 
victims22. Thus, it seems fair to say that for a citizen of Baghdad, the chances of being 
targeted in a terrorist attack would be considerably higher than for someone living in 
Honningsvåg.  
 
2. What about randomness in relation to victims, then? Again, there are problems concerning 
the differences of perspectives between the victimized society and the terrorists. If we take 
the 9/11 attacks, it is obvious that the targets were not random: The attack on the Pentagon 
was directed against the US Defence Department, the Twin Towers represented the 
American global economical dominance23, whereas the last plane allegedly had Capitol Hill 
or The White House as target, i.e. the political establishment. The question is, then, whether 
the people inside these buildings can be considered to be random victims? The way I see it, 
there are three things that challenge this view:  
First of all, the victims of a terrorist attack are often targeted because they represent a 
specific social group. The Madrid bombs in 2004, for instance, were directed at Spanish 
civilians and not Italians. Thus, even though there is a degree of individual randomness 
concerning who the terrorists actually victimize within the specific group they attack, the 
group they choose to target is not random.  
Secondly, the effect of a terrorist attack might vary considerably according to who the 
victims are: ‘Terrorism clearly does not have to be indiscriminate, in the sense of random or 
irrational, since terrorists may carefully weigh the worth of the victims they target for 
achieving the purposes they have in mind’ (Coady 2004a: 7). If the 9/11 hijackers had chosen 
to crash their planes into an apartment building in the poor quarters of New York, for 
instance, it is not certain that the effect of the attack on the American society would had been 
the same, even if we imagine that the death tolls had been equally high. 
Thirdly, on behalf of the terrorists, it might also be a part of the strategy that the 
victims appear to be random with respect to create the desired effect: ‘Rather than 
                                                 
22
 http://www.tkb.org/IncidentRegionModule.jsp  
It should be mentioned that there are problems connected to these figures, as RAND’s definition of terrorism 
also counts in attacks on US troops.  
23
 At the opening day of the stock market after the 9/11 attacks, the Dow Jones index lost 7, 1 % of its value and 
it continued to fall the succeeding days (Waldron 2003: 22). Burton M. Leiser has estimated that the damage 
inflicted upon the US economy by the 9/11-attacks’ add up to about $285 billion (Leiser 2004, in Primoratz 
(ed.): 194).  
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“deliberately choosing victims at random,” terrorists attempt to give the impression that their 
targeting is random (...) to create the climate of fear’ (Mickolus 1987: 56). 
To conclude; whether randomness, either in time or space or on behalf of the victims, 
should be a part of a definition of terrorism is a difficult question. First of all, it is clear that 
unpredictability is a part of the logic of terrorism, creating a sentiment of vulnerability in the 
targeted society, and for the society that is attacked, an act of terrorism would typically occur 
suddenly and without warning. But if we take the terrorists’ perspective, we are talking about 
a carefully planned act, directed against a specific group of persons to create a certain desired 
effect. Secondly, terrorist attacks are not happening out of an absolute randomness, meaning 
that the terrorists can hit anyone at any time at any place. Certain groups of people have a 
higher probability of being attacked than others. In sum, this makes me leave out this aspect 
in my own definition.  
 
 
2.2.3. Purposes and aims – the rationale behind terrorist activity 
 
As I have pointed out, terrorism is not an incidental act based on the terrorist’s perspective. 
Most often, it is a carefully planned and highly conscious act, balancing when, where, how 
and against whom one should commit an act of terrorism. What do the terrorist hope to 
achieve, then?  
The definitions in my selection give the following answers to this question:  
• ‘the strategy is to inspire the ‘target’ population with terror’ (Narveson).  
• ‘the aim of intimidating some other people into a course of action that they otherwise 
would not take’ (Primoratz). 
• ‘to put people in general in fear’ (Honderich)’. 
• ‘partly at destabilizing the political or social order, (...) mainly at publicizing the 
goals or cause espoused by the terrorists; often (...) aimed at provoking extreme 
countermeasures which will win support for the terrorists and their cause’ (Wilkins). 
• ‘the possibility of creating a certain psychosocial condition, ψ, in a population that is 
radically at odds with the range of psycho-social states {φ1, φ2,..., φn} that the 
government wants or needs or can tolerate in its subject population’ (Waldron). 
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The way I see it, one can differentiate between three basic approaches to the motivation for 
terrorist activity in this selection: Narveson, Honderich and Waldron focus on the aim of 
creating psychological effects (terror, fear, ‘ψ’), Wilkins concentrates on the concrete aims 
that the terrorists hope to achieve by their acts, whereas Primoratz puts an emphasize on 
affecting a third party. These three approaches are not excluding one another; concrete aims 
might be the result of psychological effects, for instance. I will start my discussion on the 
psychological effects. In continuation of this, I turn to the concrete aims. Lastly, I will 
discuss the view of affecting a third party. 
 
2.2.3.1. Psychological effects  
According to Schmid’s list, there seems to be a considerable degree of consensus that 
terrorism seeks to spread fear and terror (51 %) or other sorts of psychological effects or 
anticipated reactions (41,5 %). It is worth noting that ‘fear and terror’, which can be 
interpreted as a subcategory to ‘psychological effects and anticipated reactions’, has a greater 
range of impact than the latter. One obvious reason for this lies in the semantic roots of the 
term. Many theorists hold this aspect to be the most essential feature of terrorism as 
phenomenon; i.e. ‘we will look pretty silly if we do not mention terror in our account of 
terrorism’ (Teichman 1989: 511). Therefore, I will start my investigation by analysing 
whether this subcategory has sufficient explanatory value. 
In Schmid’s list, ‘fear’ and ‘terror’ are juxtaposed. It should be noted that these 
concepts often are thought to have a slightly different meaning. Hannah Arendt, for instance, 
describes terror as a deeper and more extensive condition than fear: ‘under conditions of total 
terror not even fear can any longer serve as an advisor of how to behave’ (Arendt 1973: 441). 
Hobbes also makes an interesting remark concerning the difference between the notions, 
defining terror as ‘Feare, without apprehension of why, or what’ (Hobbes, Leviathan: 42). 
Primoratz considers terror to be a condition of ‘extreme fear’ (Primoratz 2004a, in Primoratz 
(ed.): 16). If we conclude that there is a difference between the two concepts, namely that 
‘terror’ is a somewhat deeper sentiment than ‘fear’, both concepts still seem to be relevant for 
the subject of terrorism. If we consider 9/11, for instance, the citizens in downtown 
Manhattan might have been in a condition of ‘terror’, yet ‘fear’ might be more relevant as 
concept for designating the sentiments of US citizens living outside New York City. 
Therefore, in order to avoid the difficulties that might emerge by using just one of these 
concepts – ‘terror’ being to narrow and ‘fear’ being too wide – I choose to use both in my 
own definition, to designate the borderland between the two.  
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But why is it that half of the definitions in Schmid’s list leave out this aspect? Given 
the etymological background of the word, it seems surprising that the consensus on this point 
is not higher. In fact, it might even be much lower than Schmid’s list suggests, bearing in 
mind that Weinberg, Pedahzur & Hirsch-Hoefler concluded that psychological aspects had 
lost significance in the definitions they examined. What are the reasons for not implementing 
the fear/terror aspect in a definition of terrorism?  
Coady gives three grounds that are worth discussing: 
 
In the first place, stress upon this effect tends to preclude any serious concern with the more 
intrinsic issue of the type of methods used (as it may be) to generate the fear. (...) Secondly the fear 
effect seems to some degree associated with all uses of political violence, including open warfare 
where civilian populations are involved though not directly attacked. Thirdly, intimate as the fear 
effect may be, it does nevertheless seem possible that terrorist attacks should give rise, not to the 
spread of fear and demoralization, but to defiance and strengthening of resolve.   
 
(Coady 1985: 53). 
 
Are the objections Coady mentions strong enough to disallow the fear/terror element from a 
definition?  
 
1. Coady’s first objection to the threat/terror-element, namely that it might preclude 
other and more important features of the phenomenon, is twofold. First, it suggests that we 
should limit the number of elements in the definition, focusing only on core aspects. This 
point is a question of methodological preferences, and it certainly does not disallow other 
authors to think differently upon the definitional issue.  
The second part of Coady's first objection is a specific criticism of the explanatory 
value to the fear/terror–aspect. There might be some truth in this, as we shall see in the 
forthcoming discussion, but one should underline that this objection in itself – that is; as a 
statement that is not backed by additional grounds – cannot be considered sufficient to 
disallow the fear/terror-element. Even though Coady holds that stressing upon the effects is 
less relevant for a definition of terrorism, this certainly does not exclude others from having a 
different point of view. Thus, Coady’s first argument on why the fear/terror aspect should be 
disallowed is not very convincing.  
 
2. Coady’s second objection is that the element of fear/terror risks overinclusiveness, 
as warfare and other forms of political violence might be included in the definition. 
Principally speaking, this needs not to be decisive for leaving out the fear/terror-aspect, 
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however. As Coady himself has stated: ‘Mathematical exactitude is not indeed to be expected 
in the clarification of political concepts. They will always have fuzzy edges and will be 
subject to contentious interpretations generated by other concepts used in the clarification’ 
(Coady 2004a, in Primoratz (ed.): 3). A definition of terrorism is no exception on this matter; 
it will necessarily be somewhat imprecise. What we need to ask, then, is whether the 
examples of overinclusiveness that Coady mentions are severe enough to suggest that we 
should leave out the fear/terror aspect entirely? 
Coady bases his argument on the fact that there are other actions that create the same 
psychological effect without being terrorism. Yet fear/terror is seldom the only element in a 
definition on terrorism, and if we designate terrorism as a politically or religiously motivated 
act of severe violence that deliberately targets non-combatants to create fear/terror, we can 
exclude most of the examples Coady refers to. There will still be examples that pose 
difficulties, however. In relation to the issue of war, one might point at acts of war that 
deliberately target non-combatants, such as the nuclear bombings of Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki, and the conventional bombings of German and British cities during WWII. But 
does the element of fear/terror make the difference on this matter? Suppose we left it out, 
would this example not have been included anyway? Taking Coady’s definition, for instance; 
‘The organised use of violence to attack non-combatants (‘innocents’ in a special sense) or 
their property for political purposes’, it seems like we still will be striving with the same 
problem. Accordingly, I do not consider Coady’s second argument to be dismissing the 
fear/terror-aspect either.   
 
3. Coady’s third objection is that terrorism does not necessarily need to create fear. It 
might just as well create anger or repulsion, with the effect of strengthening the moral or 
unwillingness to comply with the terrorist demands. Now, I grant Coady that such situations 
might erupt. After the bombings in London 2005, for instance, Londoners reportedly made a 
point of carrying on with their daily habits. The question is, then; would we consider an act 
that fulfilled all other demands in a definition except the fear/terror aspect as something else 
than terrorism? I think it is fair to say that it we would not. What we are striving against, 
then, is a problem of underinclusiveness; there are actions that fall outside the definition that 
should be labeled terrorism.  
One way of meeting this objection is to link the fear/terror-element to the intentions 
of the terrorists, and not the effects on the targeted society. But terrorist activity could 
certainly be motivated by other incentives than to create fear/terror; revenge being one 
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possibility. Therefore, the argument I have suggested against Coady’s third objection is 
unsatisfying. To quote Coady: ‘we would surely call the bombing slaughter of a busload of 
schoolchildren ‘terrorist’ even if the perpetrators intended to spread anger rather than fear, 
believing that an angry population and government would act foolishly and play into their 
hands’ (Coady 2004a: 6).  
I hold Coady’s third objection to the fear/terror aspect to be his strongest. But does it 
really refute it? On the one hand, I think it should be recognized that fear/terror is a crucial 
feature of most terrorist activity. On the other, Coady is right in claiming that terrorism can 
also create other effects or be based on other motives than to create fear/terror. Therefore, we 
could use the wider category ‘psychological effects’. The core feature of Waldron’s 
definition, is to use the neutral symbol ‘ψ’, which might be any potential psychosocial 
condition. Yet, this category might easily be overinclusive. Even though every act of 
terrorism is not connected to the aspect of fear/terror, we might suspect that most of them are. 
If we want to maintain the aspect of fear/terror in our definition, it seems necessary to use the 
notion ‘often’ or ‘frequently’, thus implying that there might be other effects or other motives 
than fear/terror. In my own definition I will favour this strategy. Yet I will also grant 
Waldron’s suggestion importance. The point of using a wider concept, such as psychological 
effects’ is to draw the attention to what might come out of this condition. This forms the link 
to the next theme of discussion, namely the aims of terrorist activity. 
 
2.2.3.2. Concrete aims 
Let me repeat that terrorism is performed in order to further certain aims. Yet, in the 
definitions I have presented above, only Wilkins makes this a part of his definition. He 
mentions three specific aims; destabilizing the political or social order, publicizing the goals 
or cause espoused by the terrorists; provoking extreme countermeasures which will win 
support for the terrorists and their cause. All these aims seem to be plausible explanations for 
why terrorists carry out their attacks. But why is it that only that Wilkins mentions such 
aims? There are two basic problems of making the concrete aims of terrorist attacks a part of 
the definition. First of all, it is always possible to be underinclusive in leaving out other 
possible aims. In addition to the aims Wilkins mentions, Waldron specifies five other 
possible aims for terrorist activity (Waldron 2003: 24 – 33): 
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• To perform an act of war (asymmetric warfare)24 
• Retaliation / Punishment 
• Therapy for the predator (the Fanon-argument25) 
• To set an example/send out a message to the targeted population. 
• Seeking compliance to certain ethical principles / moral awakening26.  
One could also extend this list even further by pointing at other possible aims, such as: 
• To destabilize the existing political or social order.  
• To put pressure on the political leadership to change their policies or to 
change a political process (the Madrid bombings).  
• To expose vulnerability. 
• To show own strength. 
• To create negative extended effects (social, economical, e.g.) 27. 
Therefore, there is a practical problem connected to making this aspect a part of the 
definition of terrorism; one cannot possibly cover all the possible aims in a definition without 
making it absurdly long. 
Waldron has suggested that there is also another problem; namely that it endangers 
overinclusiveness: ‘I think it would be a mistake to try to define terrorists in terms of their 
characteristic ends, because those ends are many and varied and they are often capable (at 
least in principle) of being pursued also using non-terroristic means’ (Waldron 2003: 24).  
To conclude, then, on the one hand it seems clear that terrorist acts have specific 
aims. On the other, it seems problematic to specify what these aims are in a definition of 
terrorism. How should one bring these two together in a definition, then? Well, to me it 
seems that we should follow up on Waldron’s definition, taking a more general stance toward 
the concrete aims of the terrorist acts.  
 
2.2.3.3. Terrorism as a means-end strategy 
If we maintain that terrorism is done for a specific purpose, why would one deliberately 
attack non-combatants? In his definition, Primoratz suggests that the aim of the attack is not 
                                                 
24
 Osama Bin Laden has numerous times described terrorist attacks as acts of war against the US and the 
Western civilisation  (see Miller 2004, in Coady & O’Keefe (eds.): 43-57). 
25
 In Les damnés de la terre (‘The Wretched of the Earth’) (1960), Fanon argued that violence against 
oppressors could restore the self-respect of the oppressed, making the revolutionary violence something self-
purifying for the perpetrator. 
26
 This is Honderich's basic argument for justifying terrorism, which I will elaborate at length in part 3. 
27
 As a result of the Palestinian suicide bombings in second Intifada (2000 - ) the tourist trade in Israel declined 
with more than 50 % (Waldron 2003: 22). 
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really the victims, but a third party, as terrorism has ‘the aim of intimidating some other 
people into a course of action that they otherwise would not take’. He elaborates: ‘Terrorism 
has a certain structure. It has two targets:  the primary and secondary. The latter target is 
directly hit, but the objective is to get at the former, to intimidate the person or persons who 
are the primary target into doing things they otherwise would not do’ (Primoratz 2004a, in 
Primoratz (ed.): 24).  
What Primoratz is describing here is an indirect strategy, where the victims are not 
the primary aim of the attack. This differentiates from a direct strategy, where the victims are 
the primary target. If we turn to Schmid’s list, this aspect has resonance in many of the 
categories. The basic structure is included in element 6: Victim-target differentiation (37, 
5%), but also the elements 10: Coercion, extortion, induction of compliance (28%), 11: 
Publicity aspect (21, 5%), 14: Intimidation (17%), 17: Symbolic aspect, demonstration to 
others (13, 5%) and 22: Demands made on third parties (4%) are related to the same line of 
reasoning. In the definitions I have presented, it is especially Primoratz, Waldron and 
Wilkins that put emphasize on this issue. But why does terrorism have this indirect structure? 
I have already clarified that terrorism aims at creating a certain psychological effect in 
the targeted society. Following Waldron, the purpose of creating this effect is to provoke a 
certain change of conduct within an audience. Sometimes this change of conduct can be 
related to a social group, namely the people within the targeted population, which is 
Waldron’s view. Primoratz’ proposition is that the aim is to promote a change of conduct 
within a third party, namely the political machinery of power that stands in relation to the 
targeted group. Schematically, this can be described as follows: 
 
Political instance (end)  Social group (means)                  Terrorist 
 
The obvious example of such a means-end strategy is the Madrid bombings in 2004. The aim 
of this attack was supposedly to affect the outcome of the general election and make the 
Spanish authorities pull out their military forces from the US led coalition in Iraq. If the 
Madrid bombings really were decisive for the outcome of the elections, it illustrates that 
terrorists are, in fact, capable of changing the political discourse to their own benefit. By 
using the victims as a means to create a certain political climate within the electorate, they 
were able to produce political consequences.  
An important feature of this strategy is to use the media as a ‘loudspeaker’ to generate 
this effect. To describe the basics of this strategy, I will quote a passage from Schmid: 
 45 
 
Unlike the guerrilla, the terrorist does not occupy territory on the ground. However, if engaging in 
a well-orchestrated campaign, he might succeed in occupying our minds by creating a climate of 
fear, thereby manipulating target audiences at the emotional level. To the extent that these 
audiences are not direct witnesses of the terrorist deed, ‘[t]he success of a terrorist operation 
depends almost entirely on the amount of publicity it receives’, as Walter Laqueur put it. If 
audiences are the target, the terrorists are the star performers and the public space where they 
create a violent reality becomes the stage of their theatre from which they amaze and shock the 
public. 
 The media and the terrorists interact in a peculiar way. While it is true that everybody tries to 
use the media, the terrorists do so by spilling people’s blood, mostly the blood of innocents. The 
purposeful creation of bad events by means of terroristic violence can assure them free access to 
the news system. Expressed somewhat cynically: Some people have to perish at the hands of 
terrorists so that the editors will publicize the existence, demands, and goals of terrorists. Where 
terrorism is predominantly media-oriented – and a great deal of it is – editors can become 
accessories (often unwitting accessories) to murder. So far, the division of labour between the 
terrorist as fear generator and the unwitting editor as fear amplifier and transmitter has not been 
fully perceived and absorbed by all those responsible for the media. 
  
(Schmid 2004: 207-8) 
 
The logic behind the media strategy is this, then: The terrorist, ‘T’, has a specific aim; 
namely to influence a political decision-maker, ‘P’. However, ‘T’ does not possess the 
appropriate means to affect ‘D’. In order to do this, ‘T’ has to produce a certain large-scale 
sosio-psychological effect, ‘e’, which will have an impact on ‘D’. The only way ‘T’ can 
succeed in creating ‘e’ is by reaching a broad audience. This can only be done through prime 
time coverage in the mass media. To get this kind of coverage, the ‘T’ must perform an act 
that has a certain dramaturgical structure; it must be something extraordinary28.  
Thus, the rationale goes as follows: 1) The terrorists commit an extraordinary act of 
violence in order to 2) get prime time media coverage 3) with the aim of creating a certain 
psychological effect 4) to create a change of conduct, in either 4a) the targeted community, 
or 4b) the political authorities.  
Is this strategy a common feature of terrorism? I think it is clear that it has relevance 
for some of the most spectacular acts of terrorism, such as 9/11 and the Madrid bombings. 
But then we must ask if these are typical terrorist acts? As I have already mentioned, there 
are few acts of terrorism that have had more than 100 casualties. Even if we were to lower 
the definition of large-scale terrorism to 25 casualties, there have only been 76 incidents 
during the second half of the 20th century (Quillen 2002: 282)29. According to RAND's 
‘Terrorism knowledge base’, the number of Terrorist Incidents from 1968 to 01.01.2000 is 
                                                 
28
 Here, I will not discuss the normative aspects of whether the media should respond differently to terrorism 
than they do.  
29
 ‘In those attacks a total of 5,690 persons were killed for an average killed per attack of nearly 75 people’ 
(Quillen 2002: 282). 
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11,16230. Despite the mentioned difficulties that are connected with these figures (see 
footnote), they still tell us that the spectacular large-scale acts terrorist attacks are of limited 
importance for the issue in general. Therefore, the relevance of the media strategy aspect will 
depend on what we are trying to define. If we address to the large-scale terrorist attacks, it 
seems to be a highly relevant feature. If one tries to grasp the totality of the terrorism issue, it 
might turn out to be a more marginal phenomenon. This does not leave out the indirect 
strategy as such, however, for using non-combatants as a means does not necessarily need to 
include a prime time media strategy. If one takes the terrorist attacks in post-war Iraq, for 
instance, the rationale behind these acts is closely integrated with the aim of destabilizing the 
political order.  
To conclude, then; I hold that the indirect strategy suggested by Primoratz to be an 
essential feature of the logics behind many acts of terrorism. If we focus only on the most 
spectacular large-scale terrorist attacks, I take it to be highly essential. This aspect is highly 
essential to understand the logics behind why terrorists deliberately attack non-combatants; 
they serve as a means to another end. 
 
 
2.3. A definitional attempt 
 
I have tried to discuss some core definitional elements related to the issue of terrorism. A 
general problem connected to each of these elements is related to the problem of under- and 
overinclusiveness: There will always be acts that are either left out of the definition that 
should have been covered, or acts that should have been covered by the definition that are 
left out. As I mentioned in the preliminary discussion to the analysis, I think it is fair to say 
that any definition of terrorism will encounter these problems. The important thing, then, is 
that the definition be functional: It should determine the semantic core of the notion. My 
choice to use the word ‘core’ here is not random. When trying to grasp a notion as terrorism, 
one might say that it has a hard core and a looser periphery. The hard core consists in acts 
that are clearly integrated in the notion (the Beslan massacre, 9/11, the bombings of London 
                                                 
30
 http://www.tkb.org/IncidentRegionModule.jsp 
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and Madrid, for instance). The looser periphery, however, consists in acts that are more 
difficult to get a hold on (political assassinations, sabotage, etc)31. 
 In my discussion, I have focused on three aspects: What signifies terrorism as 
activity, the distinctive features of the actors involved, and the rationale behind terrorist acts. 
I will sum up the conclusions I have made during this discussion. Afterwards, I will 
concretise this in a definition of terrorism, which I will use in the forthcoming discussion on 
whether terrorism can be justified. 
 In 2.2.1., I concentrated on the relationship between terrorism and violence. I 
concluded that terrorism can both be an act of violence or threats of such. The violence in 
question can both be direct (directed against other persons) and indirect (directed against 
things), but it has to contain a degree of severity. In addition, the violence in question cannot 
be performed out of purely selfish incentives. It must be carried out for social reasons. I 
concluded that these will either be political or religious.  
 In 2.2.2, I discussed the role of the actors that are involved in terrorism. First, I 
focused on the perpetrator, and made a tentative conclusion that both state and non-state 
actors can perform terrorism. I also decided that both organizations and private individuals 
can perform terrorism. Second, I concentrated on the victims. Here, I argued that it would be 
most fruitful to describe this group as ‘non-combatants’, even though this concept might be 
overinclusive in some respects. The reference of  ‘civilians’ was found too narrow and the 
use of ‘innocents’ lacked functional value. I also determined that we should not make 
randomness a part of our definition, as this aspect is perspective-dependent.  
 In 2.2.3., the scope of my discussion was to clarify the rationale behind terrorist 
activity. First, I discussed the element of fear/terror. My conclusion was that this is not a 
necessary condition for terrorist activity since neither the intentions behind the attack, nor its 
effects, needs to be the creation of fear/terror. Yet, since this aspect is an important feature of 
most acts of terrorism, I decided to specify that it is a frequent, and not a necessary, feature. 
Next, I clarified that there were practical problem connected to making concrete aims a part 
of the definition of terrorism, as it could always be underinclusive. Lastly, I pointed out that 
terrorism is to be understood as a means-end strategy, where the victims have an instrumental 
function to influence an audience. I concluded that this strategy could take two forms. Either 
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 G. Wallace has a similar understanding, differentiating between ‘hard terrorism’ (the deliberate targeting of 
innocent people) and ‘soft terrorism’ (Wallace 1991: 150)   
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it could be related to the people within the targeted community or the decision-makers that 
are related to them. 
When summing up these conclusions in a definition of terrorism, it is essential to 
underline that some of them are more important than others. To illustrate my point: If one 
was to compose a colour, it will consist of different base colours, but these base colours are 
not equally important for the finished result. Thus, removing one base colour might have 
larger effects for the outcome of the composition than another. What I am trying to illustrate 
here is that some of the definitional elements are more important than others when it comes 
to defining terrorism. In my view, three should be emphasised in particular:  
Terrorism is 
• an act of severe violence (or threats of such) with political or religious 
incentives. 
• a strategy of deliberately targeting non-combatants 
• an instrumental strategy (means-end differentiation). 
 
Less important features, but nonetheless relevant ones, are that the attacking of non-
combatants are done to create a psychological effect, which again has a certain aim of 
provoking a certain conduct, either in the targeted group or in third parties. Lastly, I think it 
should be noted that both state- and non-state actors, and both by organisations and private 
individuals could perpetrate terrorism. Concerning the previously mentioned borderline-
cases, I choose to leave out all forms of guerrilla warfare, armed resistance, sabotage 
missions, and political assassinations, insofar as these acts do not have a deliberate aim of 
attacking non-combatants, from my definition. In sum, this leads to the following definition 
of terrorism: 
 
Terrorism is a deliberate act of severe violence (or a threat of such) against 
non-combatants, which is carried out with a political or religious intention. 
Most often, the purpose behind this act is to use the victims as a means to 
produce a certain psychological effect (generally fear and terror) within the 
targeted society. This effect can consist in generating a certain change of 
conduct, either within the targeted society a third party, or both, that is 
thought to be of benefit to the perpetrators. 
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3. Can terrorism be morally justified? 
  
Coady has argued that in a moral discussion on terrorism, the interesting question is not 
whether it is generally wrong but whether it is sometimes permissible (Coady 2004b: 58). I 
agree with him on this. The question I will focus on in this part is whether terrorism is always 
wrong, allowing no exceptions or exemptions. As I have pointed out earlier, I think that we 
can separate between three types of justification arguments: 
 
• Utilitarian arguments, which hold that an act of terrorism can be justified if its 
positive effects outweigh its negative costs, and if there are no other alternative routes 
of action that could have better effects on the totality of well being than this act. 
 
• Rights-based arguments, which claim that terrorism can be morally justified in 
situations where a group of people are systematically and unjustly being deprived of 
their basic human rights, and where the use of terrorism can change this situation for 
the better.  
 
• Analogy arguments, which draw an analogy between terrorism and war and claim that 
they both violate the same ethical principles (such as deliberately targeting non-
combatants). Since we sometimes justify the violation of these ethical principles in 
war, we must also grant terrorism the same possibility of being justified, as a matter 
of consistency. 
 
It is my understanding that these three categories cover most of the ethical arguments that 
seek to grant terrorism justification. In this respect, my discussion has an aim of clarifying 
three common strategies that are used to give justification to terrorism. 
Here, it should be mentioned that categorising ethical reasoning implies extracting 
some factors over others, often with the effect of cultivating and emphasising the differences 
rather than the similarities. This brings attention to a possible drawback with my 
methodological choice: When speaking of ethical categories such as ‘utilitarian’ and ‘rights-
based’, it is important to bear in mind that most contemporary ethical thinkers tend to fall 
somewhat in between these categories. Thus, even though I will discuss the contributions 
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under different ethical headings, this does not necessarily imply that they are purely 
utilitarian or purely rights-based. It is, of course, a question of degree. 
For the forthcoming discussion, two important remarks should be made:  
First, I will only consider two possible outcomes to the question of whether terrorism 
can be justified: Absolute condemnation and circumstantial justification. I understand these 
two outcomes to mutually exclude one another – one cannot consistently hold that terrorism 
both should always be condemned and sometimes morally justified.  
Second, as I have pointed out before, I do not support the view that terrorism is 
unjustified in itself. To claim that it is unjustified, we have to provide moral grounds for our 
view. In this discussion, this means that to maintain an absolute condemnation of terrorism 
we have to meet the mentioned justification arguments with moral counterarguments. If 
successful, I consider this to be a considerable argumentative gain in relation to the 
‘condemnable in itself’-version, for reasons I have given earlier. If we do not succeed in 
providing such counterarguments, however, it seems that we have to disallow the absolute 
condemnation view, and grant terrorism the possibility of circumstantial justification.  
The outline for this chapter is as follows: In 3.1., I will examine arguments within the 
utilitarian tradition, paying special attention to the argument of Honderich. In 3.2., I turn to 
rights-based arguments for justifying terrorism, focusing on Wilkins and Held. Lastly, in 3.3., 
I will discuss the analogy arguments, where the contributions of Wallace, Coady, Primoratz, 
and Walzer will play a crucial role. 
 
 
3.1. Utilitarian arguments for justification 
 
Within the utilitarian perspective, an action is given ethical value in accordance with its 
ability or intent32 to produce positive effects for a specific reference group. Honderich 
describes this position in the following terms:  
 
[To] judge the balance of well-being over distress likely to be caused by each possible action or 
policy, and do the action or adopt the policy likely to have the best total – the greatest balance of 
well-being or the least balance of distress. Following the instruction may very often satisfy our 
moral convictions, but we can have no guarantee that we will not sometimes act unfairly or 
unjustly (...) It may be that the greatest balance of satisfaction can be secured only by way of the 
                                                 
32
 A morally right action does not necessarily need to be the one that actually turns out best, but ‘the one which 
at the time would rationally have been judged as the one giving rise to the best state of affairs’. (Honderich 
2003: 135) 
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victimising of minorities or individuals. For example, it may be that the greatest balance of 
satisfaction can be secured only by way of victimising of minorities or individuals. For example, it 
may be that the greatest balance of satisfaction in a society will be produced by certain 
punishments which are certainly intolerable. This will be so, roughly speaking, when the 
alternative to the given punishments, although it consisted in a loss of satisfaction or even a great 
total of dissatisfaction, would be so shared out that it was bearable to particular individuals.  
 
(Honderich 2003: 41-42). 
 
Honderich’s interpretation forms a suitable point of departure for the discussion on whether 
terrorism can be morally justified or not within a utilitarian perspective. The crucial point is 
that ‘[i]t may be that the greatest balance of satisfaction can be secured only by way of the 
victimizing of minorities or individuals’. If we adopt this view in relation to terrorism, we can 
describe the utilitarian approach to justification as follows:  
 
An act of terrorism could be justified if, and only if,  
1) the positive effects that are being produced by the terrorist act, ‘a’, outweigh 
the negative ones, 
2) there are no alternative routes of action that could produce a greater total of 
well-being. This would be the case either if action ‘b’ achieves the same positive 
effects as ‘a’, but produce less negative effects than ‘a’, or if action ‘c’, despite 
achieving less positive effects than ‘a’, creates less negative effects to that extent 
that the total effect of ‘c’ creates more well being than ‘a’.  
 
Are there any situations where both 1) and 2) are fulfilled? I will concentrate my discussion 
on one account: Honderich’s justification argument in Terrorism for humanity (2003). 
 
 
3.1.1. Honderich: Terrorism for humanity 
 
Honderich describes Terrorism for humanity as a subcategory of terrorism (Honderich 2003: 
107). What distinguishes this form of terrorism from terrorism in general, and therein makes 
it justifiable, is its connection with the Principle of Humanity. Therefore, I will start my 
presentation of Honderich’s argument by clarifying this concept. 
The Principle of Humanity ‘derives from a conception of categories of desire 
fundamental to all our lives’ (Honderich 2003: 6). Honderich concretises six such categories 
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of desire (Honderich 2003: 84-85), where the first is the most fundamental. Concerning the 
categories 2 – 6, there is no intention of creating a hierarchic ranking: 
 
1. Most primary is the desire of subsistence, with respect both to one’s own existence 
and other persons to whom one is closely related to (children, partner, family, etc.). 
To subsist, a minimum of food and shelter is required. 
2. The desire for further material goods, referring to all material goods that exceed the 
necessities for subsistence, but nonetheless are important for the quality of life (a 
home, a reasonable environment, consumer goods, a level of safety, etc.). 
3. The desire for freedom and power, both in the political and private (individual) 
meaning of the term. 
4. The desire for respect and self-respect, meaning the ability to have a meaningful life 
and not feel worthless (e.g. the possibility to work or to be useful), and to be given an 
equal standing in terms basic rights, regardless of race, gender, class, etc. 
5. The desire of personal and wider human relationships, ranging from intimate family-
life and friendship to being a part of a community and experience fraternity. 
6. The desire for the goods of culture, understood in the wide meaning of the term, such 
as knowledge, education, religion and tradition. 
 
For Honderich, a good life is one that satisfies all these desires. I will not question whether 
these categories are sufficient to concretise human well-being in general or if being deprived 
of one or more of them necessarily implies a bad life. The crucial point for our forthcoming 
investigation is that Honderich considers subsistence as our most fundamental desire, and 
that all other desires are conditioned by the fulfilment of this desire. Objecting to the validity 
of this statement seems far-fetched. Even though some individuals commit suicide, it cannot 
be doubted that most of us desire to stay alive. 
If we connect this interpretation of desires with a utilitarian perspective, the moral 
value of an action will rely on its aspiration (or ability) to fulfill these desires, and thereby 
creating human well-being for the largest amount of people within the reference group. 
Honderich determines this to be the entire human race. Thus, to determine the moral value of 
an action, one must count in the effect it would rationally be thought to have for the general 
level of well-being. Since subsistence is the most fundamental factor for human well-being, 
we get the following interpretation of ideal moral conduct: An act that aspires (or achieves) 
to sustain life for the maximum amount of people. 
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If we turn to the empirical facts of the world, Honderich finds that we are in 
disproportion to this ideal. The average life expectancy for someone born in Sierra Leone is 
38 years, for instance, whereas people living in the US or Britain have an average lifetime of 
77 years – twice as long as the Sierra Leoneans (Honderich 2003: 11). Therefore, we can talk 
of two kinds of human existences: half-lives and full-lives.  
Thus, on the one hand we have a universal moral ideal, the Principle of Humanity. On 
the other hand have the state of the world, which contrasts with this ideal by creating half-
lives and full-lives. A morally just act is one that moves the state of the world towards the 
ideal, creating more well-being and less unhappiness in general.  
According to Honderich, the difference in lifetimes is due to material inequality: One 
group of people, the better-off, has much too much material wealth. Another group of people, 
the worse-off, has much too little – even when it comes just to staying alive. If the better-off 
was to give some if its material excess to benefit the worse-off, and therein assure their 
subsistence, this would create a greater total of well-being. This constitutes the core of 
Honderich’s interpretation of The Principle of Humanity, namely ‘to make well-off those 
who are badly off, by way off certain policies’ (Honderich 2003: 100), meaning by ‘policies’; 
to transfer means from the better-off to the worse-off. But this policy lacks sufficient support 
amongst the better-off, with the result of an ongoing misery for the worse-off.  
The follow-up question is: What means would it be morally acceptable to use in order 
to change this situation? Could one go as far as employing terrorism?  
Honderich starts off by examining whether there is a moral difference between letting 
people starve to death by ignoring the effects of material inequalities and killing people in a 
terrorist attack. Both of these acts produce victims. Yet, we interpret them differently: While 
being immensely sensitive for victims of terrorism, ‘we feel less than we might about the 
facts of inequality, much less, simply because we are ignorant of them’ (Honderich 2003: 
19). Why are we ignorant to the facts of inequality? According to Honderich, the main reason 
is that we are alienated from its effects. We are at distance from its suffering agents. But even 
though ‘both categories do not exist for us in the same way (…) they do both exist in the 
same real way’ (Honderich 2003: 24). Therefore, we cannot morally differentiate between 
the victims on the basis of our own sentiments and experience. A dead person is a dead 
person, and a half-life is a half-life, regardless of what caused it.  
Another suggested difference Honderich disallows is that we can consider the victims 
of terrorism differently because they suffer a more ‘unnatural’ death than the victims of 
starvation do: ‘It surely cannot be that the ‘natural’ death of a child or the murder of a man 
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has a significantly different value in virtue of there being many or few such deaths, many or 
few murders’ (Honderich 2003: 24-25).  
According to these two statements, we can conclude in the following terms: On 
behalf of the victims, there is nothing that distinguishes terrorism from the facts of 
inequalities. Even though we experience them differently – because of closeness and 
distance, ‘us’ and ‘them’, or because dying from starvation is more common than being 
killed in a terrorist attack – this would not make a morally relevant difference concerning the 
severity of the deaths. They are both equally grave.  
What about the actor? Is there not a moral difference between neglecting the victims 
of inequalities and committing an act of terrorism? This question addresses whether there is a 
morally relevant difference between acts (committing terrorism) and omissions (ignoring the 
facts of inequality). In Honderich’s view ‘there is in fact no entirely general difference 
between acts and omissions that gives rise to a differences in rightness’ (Honderich 2003: 
131). The reason for this is that Honderich advocates a clean-cut consequentionalist 
approach: ‘The kind or degree of intentionality of an action makes no difference to its 
rightness or wrongness. (…) Whatever is to be said of the agent, an act is not made right by a 
good intention or wrong by a bad one.’ (Honderich 2003: 136). And since the consequence of 
dying from hunger is not essentially different from dying in a terrorist attack, as both implies 
that someone is being deprived from life, ‘there is no relevant way in which our ordinary 
conduct is different from that of the terrorists, no difference which makes our conduct right 
and theirs wrong’ (Honderich 2003: 145-46). Thus, we can conclude that in Honderich’s 
view, committing a terrorist attack is no principally worse than being a better-off  and 
ignoring the facts of inequality.  
Having clarified that there is no moral difference between these acts in terms of 
principles, we can now turn to Honderich’s argument for why terrorism for humanity is 
justified: If terrorist activity towards the better-off could provoke a change to this groups 
policy towards material redistribution in a way that is beneficial to the worse-off, many 
people would have been saved from starvation. Therefore, killing a few to save the many 
would be morally justified. But why would terrorism create such a change? Honderich’s 
answer is that we are extremely sensitive to this specific kind of victims; ‘3000 were killed at 
the Twin Towers and the Pentagon? On that day, if deaths by starvation for 2001 were spread 
evenly throughout the year, 23,000 people died of hunger’ (Honderich 2003: 23-24). And 
since we have this strong sensitivity for the victims of terrorism, this sentiment could be used 
a means to invoke a change in the better-off ‘s policy towards the worse-off, regardless of 
 55 
whether this happens out of fear for more terrorist attacks or through a ‘moral awakening’ on 
behalf of the better-off. Thus, despite the sufferings and deaths caused by the terrorist attack, 
the act would be morally justified, as the overall situation of well-being would have been 
changed to the better: Less people would die from hunger, and the general level of well-being 
would increase. 
We can sum up Honderich’s view as follows: 
 
An act of terrorism could be justified if, and only if, it rationally might be judged 
to produce a change of conduct in a certain group of actors in such way that it 
strengthens the will to comply with The Principle of Humanity. This principle 
implies to adopt certain policies through which the material gap between the 
better-off and the worse-off diminishes to the extent that the worse off can be 
capable of having full-lives. In consequence this would create a greater total of 
well-being, despite the negative effects caused by the terrorist act. 
 
 
3.1.2. Is terrorism for humanity justified? 
 
Terrorism for humanity suggests that terrorism could be justified as a means to produce a 
change of conduct amongst the better-off, wherein they oblige to a policy that benefits the 
worse off. As an effect of the act, there will be a greater total of well-being. Thus, what is at 
issue here is what I have previously referred to as ‘a means-end strategy’: By victimizing one 
group of people (means) one can change the conduct of another group of people with the 
effect of increasing the totality of well-being in society at large (end). In my view, 
Honderich’s justification argument is based on two assumptions that need further 
examination. First, we need to discuss whether Honderich is right in holding that there is no 
difference between committing terrorism and omitting to act for changing the misery of the 
worse-off. Second, I will cast doubts on the realism behind Honderich’s claim that terrorism 
can succeed in changing the policies of the better-off in a way that they would favor a more 
equal material distribution.  
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3.1.2.1. To kill and let die 
Is there not a difference between committing terrorism and omitting to change redistributive 
policies to end the misery of the worse-off ? Given Honderich’s view, I think this can be 
interpreted as a question of whether there is a difference between killing and letting die. On 
behalf of the victims, I think Honderich’s point is not implausible. Being killed in a terrorist 
attack need not to be considered worse than dying from starvation. In fact, if there is a 
difference, it might just as well be to the deficit of the hunger death: Having the choice of 
being blown to pieces and starving to death, many would surely prefer the former, choosing a 
quick death rather than a slow one.  
In relation to the juxtaposition of actors who commit terrorism and actors who ignore 
the facts of inequalities, I find it more difficult to comply with Honderich’s approach. There 
are two basic reasons for this: I think 1) we do differentiate between omissions and acts when 
it comes to moral evaluations, and 2) there are differences in role responsibility between an 
omitting better-off and a terrorist committing an attack. 
1) Principally, I agree with Honderich that omissions can be moral violations. Driving 
past a car accident without offering assistance would, undoubtedly, be an omission that 
merits moral condemnation. But when speaking of omissions, I think one would have to 
differentiate between those that are carried out intentionally and those that are done 
unintentionally. If one drove passed the car accident without noticing it, this would not be as 
morally blameworthy as if one did take notice of it, but chose not to stop. I will argue that 
this difference of intentionality is an important feature to determine whether our omissions to 
the wretchedness of the worse off are equally condemnable as committing acts of terrorism, 
as Honderich suggests. If we consider these omissions to be fully intentional, I think it would 
be easier to comply with Honderich’s argument that there is no significant difference 
between these acts and committing an act of terrorism33. If these omissions are considered to 
be unintentional, however, I think his claim would be counter-intuitive. In utilitarian ethics, 
there is a strong tradition of striving to be in accordance with common sense. But I think 
most people would hold that there is a moral difference between intentionally killing 
someone and unintentionally omitting to save someone’s life. If I am right in claiming that 
Honderich’s juxtaposition of the two is counter-intuitive, this would be in conflict with an 
important feature of the ethical framework Honderich addresses.  
                                                 
33
 I say ‘easier to comply with’, as an act usually still will be considered graver than an omission. To follow up 
on my example: If the car accident was a result of reckless driving, the driver’s conduct would have to be 
considered more immoral than the omission of the passer-by. 
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The problem is, however, that it seems difficult to provide a clear-cut answer to 
whether our omissions to the wretchedness of the worse-off are either fully intentional or 
unintentional. In my understanding, they are neither. Or perhaps both, meaning that the 
answer lies somewhere in-between: It cannot be doubted that most of us (here speaking on 
behalf of the better-off) are familiar with both the material inequalities in the world and the 
misery of starvation. Conceivably, many might also agree with Honderich that there is a 
connection between the two, by acknowledging that our own wealth is, at least to some 
extent, causing this situation. But this does not imply that our omission to change the facts of 
inequality is fully intentional. It might be considered to be thoughtless, or even reckless. But 
is it fully intentional? I find it dubious to claim that this is the case. If one modifies this 
aspect by describing it as ‘partly intentional’, it might be considered to be a more reasonable 
description. But then we talk of something else than an omission that is fully intentional. In 
my view, this makes an important difference from acts of terrorism, which can hardly be 
described as something else than fully intentional acts According to Honderich’s approach, 
however, even if there was a difference in intentionality between the two, this will not have 
any impact on their moral value: ‘The kind or degree of intentionality of an action makes no 
difference to its rightness or wrongness.’ (Honderich 2003: 136). The reason for this being 
that Honderich mainly focuses on the actual effects of the actions (both acts and omissions), 
since the victims are being put at a morally equal footing. The motivations or intentions of 
the actors that execute the victimization is not considered to be a differentiating factor. 
But is not this counter-intuitive? Is there not a relevant moral difference between 
killing someone and to neglect someone’s basic material desires with the effect of causing 
their death? Honderich argues that there is no difference since they boil down to the same 
effects for the victims. But what about the persons related to the victim? Would it not be 
interpreted differently if someone you loved was killed by another person, than if he or she 
died of hunger? Honderich’s answer is that if there is a difference, it might just as well be in 
disfavour of dying of hunger: ‘Would we have our children hungry for life?’ (Honderich 
2003: 26). Once again, Honderich is addressing the relation we have for the sufferings of the 
victim, and not our antipathy towards the intentions of the perpetrator. But is it not 
reasonable that both of these aspects are relevant for our moral judgment, and that loosing a 
child in starvation might bring about other sorts of feelings than if it was killed in a terrorist 
attack? Is it not so that our sentiments of moral condemnation towards the perpetrator of the 
latter act might be stronger? Honderich answers this by claiming that our sentiments are not a 
moral issue. The fact that we feel less anger for the former is not relevant because the 
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consequences are the same. For reasons mentioned above, I find it hard to comply with this 
view. 
 
2) Another problem regarding Honderich’s juxtaposition of terrorism and omissions 
to diminish the level of material inequality is whether the different roles in these sets of 
action are morally comparable. Generally speaking, an action consists of a multitude of roles, 
both in relation to the actor, the recipients (here: the victims) and the audience. Here I will be 
focusing only on the differences in moral commitments in relation to the actor’s role.  
On the one side, we have a fully intentional act of violence based on a means-end 
strategy. Its victims are random and their ‘guilt’ consists in being a part of the better-off. At 
the other, we are talking of an unwillingness to comply with certain policies of redistribution, 
causing wretchedness amongst the worse off; an omission that I think is partly intentional, at 
best. To what extent can these be considered as equals?  
If we were to accept Honderich’s claim that our material excess is causing the misery 
of the worse off , it is evident that not all individuals amongst the better off have the same 
level of responsibility for this situation. Children cannot be accounted the same degree of 
accountability as adults, for example. And, following Honderich’s path of reasoning, ‘the 
best off’ of the better off might be thought to have a greater moral responsibility for the 
material inequalities than ‘the less off’ of the better off – a point that Honderich also 
recognizes (Honderich 2003: 12). So, if we were to accept that an omission of this kind can 
be capable of being as culpable as an act of terrorism, I think it would be necessary to have a 
more fine-scaled approach, distinguishing between different actors in the better off-group.  
What kind of actor role can be thought to justify this analogy, then? In my view, the 
role responsibility must be of such a nature that it somehow requires positive action. But 
here, we cannot just address the level of intentionality. We must also count in the mere 
possibility to do something decisive about it, which suggests that the actor role must have a 
great amount of power connected to it. When talking about a complex issue as poverty, 
where the problem is structural, it is difficult to sort out the roles that would require positive 
action. One could point out certain actors, such as the leader of the World Bank or the US 
president, but this would certainly limit the relevance of the analogy to the extreme, making 
it pointless in any reasonable way. Therefore, when it comes to the actor roles of a terrorist 
and an omitting better-off, they are in no practical way analogous. Honderich might disagree 
with this, claiming that on behalf of the victims there is no difference in dying from hunger 
because of structural causes and being killed in a terrorist attack. Even though the actor of the 
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latter case is more ‘personified’, the consequences for the victims are nonetheless the same 
(see Galtung, p. 24). He might also say that we can do something about it, and that it is our 
unwillingness to do so that is at issue. To some extent, I would agree with Honderich on this. 
Saving the worse-off from dying in starvation is not practically unfeasible. Even as 
individual agents, there are possibilities to make some minor contribution to do something 
about it, like paying a certain sum to the Red Cross or to vote for political parties that support 
more foreign aid. But this is not to say that our omission to do so is just as grave as to carry 
out a terrorist act.  
Now, I must admit that my criticism against Honderich’s argument in Terrorism for 
Humanity is founded on a non-consequentialist approach to ethics, focusing on intentionality 
and role responsibility. Therefore, it might be argued that I have failed to acknowledge the 
theoretical foundation for Honderich’s clean-cut consequentialist view, which puts focus on 
the effects of the action. I do not find it reasonable that Honderich only should be met by 
critique immanent to his own ethical framework, however; that he alone should set the 
premises for the discussion, so to speak. Having said this, it is important to underline that 
even when adopting a consequentialist approach to ethics, this does not necessarily imply 
that the intentions of the actor are morally irrelevant. Honderich also seem to acknowledge 
this, as he is not (only) referring to the effects of the acts when determining their value. As I 
have mentioned before, a morally right action does not necessarily need to be the one that 
turns out best, but rather ‘the one which at the time would rationally have been judged as the 
one giving rise to the best state of affairs’ (Honderich 2003: 135). Of course, there is an 
important difference between Honderich’s understanding of intentionality, as rational 
judgement upon the consequences of an act, and my position, which is based on the 
differences in intentionality and role responsibility. Nonetheless, there is, I believe, a possible 
overlap between these views. In utilitarian ethics, what is considered to be ‘rational’ needs 
not necessarily to be related only to the consequences of isolated acts. It might also consist in 
more generalized propositions on moral conduct, by creating binding rules and principles. 
Here I am addressing to the difference between act-utilitarianism and rule-utilitarianism. 
Whereas Honderich seems to be closer to the former, one could also adopt the latter view, 
claiming that terrorism can be condemned on principle grounds as it generally violates basic 
rules of conduct that are beneficial for the general level of well-being. 
Yet, based on the possible claim of being ethically predisposed, my first objection to 
Honderich’s argument needs not to disallow it. Therefore, I will try to challenge his position 
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from a purely consequentialist angle, focusing on the possible lack of realism in his 
argument.  
 
3.1.2.2. Can terrorism for humanity be successful? 
It is important to emphasize that Honderich’s justification argument is based on the 
assumption that it can produce a certain change of conduct within the better-off in a way that 
moves the state of the world towards the Principle of Humanity. It is not a question of 
legitimate revenge. Neither is it similar to Frantz Fanon’s reasoning in Les damnés de la 
terre, where a terrorist act is considered to have a liberating effect on behalf of the oppressed. 
His claim is that terrorism can be justified in relation to its ability to produce a greater total of 
positive effects, echoing Machiavelli’s claim: ‘When the act accuses, the result excuses’ 
(Machiavelli, The Discourses I :ix). Therefore, it seems fair to ask if there is any empirical 
support for this view. Is it possible that terrorism can have such an effect in real life? 
One of the few patterns that has been constant in the history of terrorism (bearing in 
mind the differences in methods, motives and actors described by Rapoport (see pp. 16-17) is 
that it ‘has seldom been politically effective, that it frequently brought about the opposite of 
what it wanted to achieve (that is to say, greater repression rather than liberation)’ (Laqueur 
2002: viii). This lack of empirical support does not necessarily disallow Honderich’s 
argument in itself, however. He could claim that his position is purely hypothetical, arguing 
that if there was a situation where terrorism either had caused, or could rationally have been 
thought to cause, a general compliance with the Principle of Humanity, it would have been 
justified. Yet, in ascribing ethical value to the consequences of an act, utilitarian ethics often 
use empirical arguments to support their view. Accordingly, the lack of empirical support is a 
crucial deficit for Honderich’s position. To Honderich’s defence, it should be mentioned that 
there are also historical examples where terrorist methods have been successful, such as the 
creation of the state of Israel in 1948 and the toppling of the Apartheid regime in South 
Africa in the early 1990s. Yet, it remains dubious whether it was terrorism that created these 
effects and if not other aspects were more important for the outcome. 
But if we, for the sake of argument, were to hold that the empirical lack of support 
does not necessarily refute Honderich’s position, there is another problem connected to his 
argument. As terrorist activity has profound negative effects, it would be preferable to use 
other means that could reach the same positive consequences. In this respect, terrorism could 
be interpreted only as a last resort – a policy one should only adopt when no other means are 
available. Other means can both be non-violent means, i.e. protest marches, boycotts and 
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other forms of peaceful political revolt, and violent means that have less negative results than 
terrorism; i.e. sabotage actions, guerrilla warfare, and armed revolution. Let us ask then; 
under what circumstances might terrorism become a last resort? Wallace gives the following 
account: 
 
If terrorism is to be a last resort the people or community involved must be confronted by an evil 
and powerful oppressor immune to moral argument, passive resistance and any form of opposition 
short of terrorism. So quasi-military responses such as guerrilla warfare or armed resistance must 
be ruled out as impossible or pointless; otherwise, they are to be preferred as morally better 
alternatives. But in these circumstances, how can a campaign of terrorism have any likelihood of 
ending the oppression? 
 
(Wallace 1995: 310) 
 
Wallace concludes that the chances for this to happen are ‘extremely unlikely’ (Wallace 
1995: 310), given the conditions that would be necessary to argue that terrorism is indeed a 
last resort. The nature and power of the oppressor would make it implausible that any 
positive effects might come about as a result of the terrorist attacks.  
Thus, if terrorism is to be considered as an efficient tactic, this conditions that the 
governing authorities have sensitivity for civilian casualties. In a totalitarian state, this seems 
unlikely to occur. Therefore, for terrorism to be an efficient tactic, it must target a democratic 
society. But then, one can always question whether terrorism really is a means of last resort: 
‘Where terrorism is a possible strategy for the oppositional movement (in liberal and 
democratic states, most obviously), other strategies are also possible if the movement has 
some significant degree of popular support’ (Walzer 1988, in Luper-Foy (ed.): 240). What 
we must ask then, is whether the positive effects Honderich claims that terrorism is capable 
of producing, which founds the underlying rationale for his justification argument, can even 
be theoretically plausible. Given Wallace account, if terrorism is to be an effective strategy, it 
must attack a democratic society. But then, it would also be possible to use other means to 
reach the same end. And when it is possible to use other means, we must ask whether the 
terrorists would have had any chance of gaining support for their cause. On the contrary, it 
would probably have been counter-productive, strengthening the will not to comply with the 
terrorists’ demands, rather than increasing the will to take action for redistribution to benefit 
the worse-off.  
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3.1.3. Concluding remarks 
 
There is an interesting scene in Albert Camus’ play Les Justes (The Just Assassins) (1950), 
based on an actual episode in Russia early in the 20th century. A group of revolutionaries are 
about to assassinate Grand Duke Sergei, who has been personally involved in the suppression 
of political radicals. When approaching the carriage with a bomb under his coat, the assassin 
realizes that the Grand Duke has two small children on his lap. In consequence, he abandons 
the attempt to kill the Grand Duke.  
 This story tells us something crucial, namely that terrorism might be easier to perform 
when being at distance to its victims. If blowing up a time scheduled bomb, with the effect of 
killing two small children accidentally passing by, one can always say that one did not intend 
to do so. But throwing a bomb at them, with the knowledge that they will be killed, is another 
thing.  
This points to an important problem connected to Honderich’s argument in Terrorism 
for Humanity. Generally speaking, I think it suffers from one basic flaw; far-sightedness. His 
perspective lies in the statistics, the numbers that speak of injustice, of the better-off and the 
worse-off. But when approaching the moral dilemma at a closer distance, when confronted 
with the life stories of the victims, it does not help us much. Our vision gets blurred, 
unfocused, disturbed. Why? We are not numbers. We are not living as graphs in statistics. 
We are individuals – each and every one of us.  
Actions might be performed of collective reasons; there might be grave injustices 
embedded in social systems that one would be justified in fighting against. Yet, when 
performing violent acts against this system one does not only target the system that causes 
this injustice. It harms people, individuals, bearers of exceptional life stories, each and every 
one of them being the focal points of their own life. In my view ethical theory must also say 
something about this side of morality. It cannot only stay at distance, pointing at the figures.  
This general criticism of Honderich’s ethical perspective enables us to understand 
why he argues that it can be morally justified to kill someone if it saves the life of others. 
Honderich is at distance. He sees the numbers. Yet, he fails to see the individuals, showing 
astonishingly insensitivity on behalf of the terrorists’ victims. They remain means, a sacrifice 
necessary to reach a higher end. But, to quote Arthur Koestler’s Rubashov in Darkness at 
Noon; ‘twice two is not four when the mathematical units are human beings’ (Koestler 1968: 
125). There is more to ethics than just numbers.  
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Having said this, I do not think that Honderich’s contribution is without value. Just as 
there is more to ethics than just numbers, there is also more to ethics than just closeness. Our 
ethical perspective needs both. What I think we can learn from Honderich’s argument is that 
we all share a commitment to limit the suffering of others on the basis of human fellowship. 
When failing to comply with this commitment, we also share the moral blame. Here, 
Honderich addresses a crucial problem in ethics; namely how one should make a moral 
approach to the questions of structural problems that cause severe harm for a group of 
people. Our theoretical tools seem more suitable to grasp the actions of individuals than the 
actions of collectives, which I will discuss further in the forthcoming section. If one 
understands Honderich’s argument more metaphorically (although I certainly do not think 
that this is his wish!), it tells us that neglecting to change our policies towards the 
wretchedness off the worse off might be just as bad as committing terrorism – an act that 
most of us will have strong negative moral connotations towards. This might be helpful to 
put our commitments in perspective. Yet, I do not agree with his ‘kill some to save 
thousands’ view. Neither do I comply with his moral juxtaposing of omnipotence and acts. It 
fails to grasp the nuances of intentionality that are vital when addressing the complexity 
connected to the question of guilt and innocence. Consequently, I do not comply with 
Honderich’s justification argument in Terrorism for Humanity. It suffers from a grave lack of 
moral sensitivity on behalf of the victims of terrorism and a considerable debit of fine-tuning 
in relation to the question of guilt on behalf of the agent.  
 
 
 
3.2. Rights-based arguments for justification 
 
There are two important reasons for why terrorism generally gets condemned within a rights-
based perspective: First of all, it violates the basic rights of its victims; most importantly the 
right to life or not to be harmed. Secondly, it uses a group of people as mere means for some 
end, an obvious violation of Kant’s second maxim in Groundwork of the Metaphysics of 
Morals: ‘So act that you use humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any 
other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means’ (Kant, AK 4: 429)34. But 
despite the fact that terrorism both violate the rights of its victims and use them as mere 
                                                 
34
 The citation is based on the standard pagination of Kant’s works. Here: Vol. 4 of the Academy (AK) edition. 
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means, some theorists within the rights-based tradition still maintain that one has the right to 
perform terrorism under certain circumstances, namely in situations where the basic rights of 
a group of people are being gravely and systematically violated.  
The question of whether terrorism can be morally justified within the rights-based 
tradition is related to a conflict of rights; i.e. the right not to be killed or harmed on the one 
hand, and the right to revolt against severe and systematic violations of basic rights on the 
other. In situations where both of these rights cannot be fulfilled at the same time, the 
question is which one we should grant superiority. Thus, our concern is related to the 
hierarchical structuring of rights. Therefore, let us start by clarifying that the rights-based 
argument for justifying terrorism does not apply to the right to commit terrorism in general. 
Our concern here are the exceptions from a principle, or to be more precise; when one form 
of rights makes it justifiable to violate other forms of rights that otherwise should not be 
violated. This addresses a widely discussed theme in contemporary moral philosophy, often 
referred to as the ‘dirty-hands’-tradition35. Here, the basic idea is that there are situations 
where it is necessary to violate widely acknowledged moral principles, such as the immunity 
of non-combatants, in order to reach a morally valuable end. 
It should also be specified that our present discussion will be based on non-
consequentialist considerations; it asks whether there are situations where one has the right to 
perform terrorism. We are not addressing the utilitarian justification of terrorism, where the 
argument was related to the positive effects of the act. Therefore, whether the act itself brings 
about any positive effects is not essential – we are focusing on a principle 
 Previously, I have argued that terrorism is carried out for specific reasons. Terrorists 
have an understanding of a value – either real or imagined – that they seek to obtain, be it a 
just human society, homeland liberation, or the victory of the one true faith. For terrorism to 
be justified in a rights-based tradition, it is clear that the cause of the terrorist act must be a 
just one36. Therefore, I will leave out any act of terrorism that has an unjust cause, such as the 
imposing of a religious tyranny on infidels or the creation of a fascist regime. In the 
following, I will examine two accounts of allegedly just causes: one is based on self-defence 
(Wilkins) and one is related to deprivation of basic civil rights (Held).  
                                                 
35
 Referring to Sartre’s play Les mains sales (‘Dirty Hands’) (1948), where the theme is whether revolutionaries 
can violate moral principles, which otherwise should not be violated, to further their just cause.  
36
 Of course, I realize that what constitutes a just cause will be perspective dependent. Yet, it does not seem to 
be more far-fetched to use this concept in relation to terrorism than to just war theory, for example. We might 
agree that self-defence, for instance, is a just cause. Or, to fight against an oppressor – be it an occupying force 
or a system of segregation where one group of people lacks basic rights that is granted to another group of 
people. 
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In order to give the rights-based arguments for justifying terrorism the possibility of 
being valid, I will take two things for granted:  
1. If someone are being severely oppressed and deprived of basic rights, they have the 
right to use violence.  
2. If a political system unjustly and systematically deprives a group of people from basic 
rights, they would have the right to participate in organized violence or warlike 
activity (revolution, resistance movements, guerrilla warfare, etc.) against this 
political system. 
 
 
3.2.1. Wilkins: Terrorism and self-defence 
 
Would it be justifiable to perform terrorism in self-defence? To answer affirmatively to this 
question one condition must be taken for granted; namely that one can do violence to 
innocents37 in self-defence. In Wilkins view, there are situations where we normally answer 
affirmatively to this question, such as double-effects in war. One example is the previously 
mentioned sabotage mission at Tinnsjøen in 1944, where 14 Norwegian civilians were killed 
– a regrettable, but nonetheless necessary, double-effect in order to sabotage the transport of 
the heavy water to Germany. Even though there are serious moral questions connected to this 
aspect, I will – for the sake of the argument – grant Wilkins right in that there might be 
situations where the killing of innocents can be justified as a self-defensive measure. The 
follow-up question is whether we can use the same argument in relation to terrorism, where 
the question is related to deliberate attacks on innocents. 
Wilkins argument concentrates on a specific historic example: the Jews in Nazi 
Germany. In relation to the aspect of self-defence, this example needs no elaboration: Faced 
with the prospect of extermination and genocide, it seems obvious that the Jews in Nazi 
Germany had the right to defend themselves. The question we need to address, then, is if they 
also would have been justified in using terrorism against German civilians? 
Our answer to this question is embedded in our interpretation of collective guilt 
(Wilkins: 19). Wilkins seeks guidance from two accounts on this issue, namely Joel Feinberg 
and Karl Jaspers. Here, I will concentrate only on his interpretation of the latter, quoting a 
rather lengthy, yet important, passage: 
                                                 
37
 Personally, I prefer ‘non-combatants’, but I will use this concept in accordance with Wilkins. 
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Karl Jaspers in his brilliant book, The Question of German Guilt, distinguished four kinds of guilt: 
criminal guilt, political guilt, moral guilt, and what he called ‘metaphysical guilt’. According to 
Jaspers, criminal guilt involved the violation of national and international laws and would be 
determined by trials of accused individuals in courts of law, including most conspicuously the 
Nuremberg trials; political guilt is necessarily collective and involves the liability of the German 
nation, a liability which, however, does not establish moral guilt; moral guilt concerns individuals 
who must answer in their own conscience the question of whether they lived in moral disguise, or 
with false conscience, or in self-deception, or in a state of inactivity during the Hitler period; 
metaphysical guilt is defined as the lack of ‘absolute solidarity with the human being as such’ and 
found its expression in the feeling of guilt at being alive when one’s Jewish neighbours were being 
taken away. Having made these distinctions, Jaspers warns against their misuse: political liability 
requires the German nation to make material reparations, but it does not establish moral guilt in the 
individual; criminal guilt, well, yes, but this affects only a few; moral guilt, here only my 
conscience can decide, and my conscience won’t be too hard on me; metaphysical guilt, well, that’s 
‘a crazy idea of some philosopher’ – there’s no such thing, or, at least as the philosopher himself 
admits, no one can charge me with it. Jaspers replies in part that there can be no radical separation 
of moral and political guilt, the reason for this being that there is no absolute division between 
politics and human existence: ‘There is a sort of collective moral guilt in a people’s way of life 
which I share as an individual, and from which grows political realities.’ 
 
(Wilkins: 21-22).  
 
This passage shows that the concept of guilt is a multi-faceted phenomenon. Therefore, we 
should not ask whether guilt is either individual or collective – it is both. In relation to 
criminal guilt, it is individualised. In its political sense, it is collective38. The tricky part, 
which is our concern here, concerns the moral interpretation of guilt, which lies somewhere 
in between these two: It is clear that moral guilt exceeds the reference of criminal guilt. Yet, 
it seems also wrong to say that all Germans were morally guilty for the atrocities committed 
by the Nazis. Clearly, many of them were morally culpable; those that participated in the 
persecution of the Jews, are obvious candidates. One should also count in those that that 
were active in bringing the Nazis to power; both the party members of NSDAP and the 
voters that put them into power in 1933 might be argued to have a collective moral guilt for 
the events that took place. We could also include those who were not actively initiating the 
birth of the Third Reich, but who were caught by the collective spirit of nationalism and 
anti-Semitism on a later stage. But still, given that we have reached a majority of the 
German population by giving these specifications, which might be questioned, there will at 
least be a large minority of the German people who fall outside our category of collective 
moral guilt. One group we surely can count out are the Germans that opposed the policy of 
the Nazis. Equally children and other groups not capable of opposing the Nazis’ policy 
would have to be left out. The crucial group of which moral status we have not yet 
                                                 
38
 After the WWII, the newly established West German government acknowledged an obligation on behalf of 
the German people to pay $ 715 million to Israel as a reparation for their crimes (Wilkins: 20-21). 
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considered are those that remained ‘neutral’ throughout the political shift. Those that ‘do no 
evil, see no evil and hear no evil, or if they do hear aren’t listening or dismiss what they hear 
as rumor?’ (Wilkins 1992: 30). Was this group culpable?  
This question is a tough one. One might argue, as Wilkins does, that under such 
extreme political conditions, it is neither permissible nor possible to stay neutral. Thus, not 
working against the Nazi rule would make you a passive accomplice since ‘no systematic 
persecution of significant numbers of innocent persons can continue over long periods of 
time if the ‘silent majority’ is awakened from its lethargy or preoccupation with the details 
of its daily existence’ (Wilkins 1992: 30). This seems also to be what Jaspers is saying in the 
above quoted passage when he states that ‘There is a sort of collective moral guilt in a 
people’s way of life which I share as an individual, and from which grows political 
realities’. Following Jaspers’ and Wilkins’ understanding, we can claim that this group also 
has moral guilt making the vast majority of German citizens morally culpable, with the 
exception of those who were actively fighting or were incapable of fighting against the 
regime. Accordingly, Wilkins’ concludes that moral guilt is tightly linked to political guilt 
(Wilkins 1992: 25), and since the German collective is to be considered morally 
blameworthy, one might say that they have lost their right not to be attacked. 
 
The persecution of the Jews by the Nazis was so heinous that, it seems to me, terrorism on the part 
of the Jews would have been a morally justifiable response, meeting terrorism with terrorism. What 
I have in mind is not terrorism thought of in terms of vengeance or even retribution but terrorism 
regarded as an instrument of self-defense on the part of the Jews.  
 
(Wilkins 1992: 26) 
 
Based on this, Wilkins’ gives two conditions for when terrorism is justified: 
  
terrorism is justified as a form of self-defense when: (1) all political and legal remedies have been 
exhausted or are inapplicable (as in emergencies where ‘time is of the essence’); and (2) the 
terrorism will be directed against members of a community or group which is collectively guilty of 
violence aimed at those individuals who are now considering the use of terrorism as an instrument 
of self-defense, or at the community or group of which they are members. 
 
(Wilkins 1992: 28)39 
 
 
                                                 
39
 Wilkins also specifies that terrorism might be justified in relation to separation, dispossession or exploitation, 
if the wrongs in question could merit the claim of self-defence: ‘there may be other acceptable moral rules 
which would justify the use of terrorism, for example in cases where an entire people have been dispossessed of 
their homeland, or where one part of a country is occupied by a foreign power which prevents its being reunited 
with the country of which it is historically and culturally a part, or where one economic class or one race 
systematically exploits another economic class or race.’ (Wilkins 1992: 28) 
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He specifies condition (2) in three important remarks:  
 
First, the terrorism should be limited to the members of the community which is collectively guilty 
of violence (…) Second, as far as possible terrorism should be confined to ‘primary targets,’ and 
where this is not possible the terrorist should pick a ‘secondary target’ who is as guilty or nearly 
guilty, in the sense of being responsible for initiating or participating in the violence which can be 
said to have ‘started it all’ and which is continuing. (…) Third, the terrorism in question should be 
directed initially at the perpetrators of violence and then at their accomplices in such a way as to 
reflect the part they played in the violence. 
 
(Wilkins 1992: 29-30) 
  
My disagreement with Wilkins’ argument for justifying terrorism as a self-defensive 
measure is twofold: First of all, I think that there are problems connected to his 
understanding of collective guilt. Secondly, there are doubts connected to whether terrorism 
could be an effective self-defensive measure.  
An important feature related to the moral question of guilt/innocence is that anyone 
is innocent from their starting point. To quote Walzer; ‘the theoretical problem is not to 
describe how immunity is gained, but how it is lost. We are all immune to start with; our 
right not to be attacked is a feature of normal human relationships’ (Walzer 2000: 145). 
Basically, one can be guilty of having done something one should not have done (active) or 
of not having done what one should have done (passive).  
Wilkins’ argument has two levels; the individual and the collective. Individually 
speaking, the guilt of the German people is both related to its activity and its passivity. 
Wilkins acknowledges that there is a difference between the individual that take active part 
in the wrongdoing and the individual that fails to take action against the wrongdoing in 
terms of individual guilt. Yet, this difference is not relevant at the collective level. Here, the 
Germans are collectively guilty of being a part of an active wrongdoing. Therefore, even 
though one might be guilty only of passivity on the individual level, one can by guilty of 
active wrongdoing at the collective level in, by being a member of the community that 
performs these morally condemnable acts: 
 
there is such a thing as collective guilt, but (…) it is not membership in a particular community per 
se but membership in a community or group which is collectively guilty of wrongdoing that is 
morally relevant; to regard community membership otherwise would involve a relapse into an 
unacceptable barbarism.  
 
(Wilkins 1992: 32) 
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My objection to Wilkins’ is related to how he integrates the individual in the collective level 
of wrongdoing. While it is true that collective action consists of individual acts and choices, 
some individuals’ acts and choices have more impact on the collective action than others.   
Wilkins seems to imagine the collective as a subject that is performing different acts. 
Let us imagine this subject as a body. The body consists of different individuals – we might 
imagine them as cells – which have diverse functions in order to make this body functional. 
Some are located in its brain, some in its spinal tap, and some in its limbs, etc. Together they 
co-function and perform different acts. Wilkins’ view suggests that when this body is guilty 
of wrongdoing, all of its cells are guilty of it. They act as a whole, and should be morally 
judged upon as a whole. But I think it is clear that some of the cells, i.e. individuals, play a 
more important role than other cells for the wrongdoing of the body. A cell in the brain 
would have more impact on the wrongdoing than a cell in the bellybutton, for instance. What 
I am trying to say here is that Wilkins’ understanding of collective evildoing does not 
acknowledge that the different individuals inside the collective do not stand at equal height in 
relation to the collective outcome. They have different functions and different qualifications 
as individuals, and accordingly; they should not share the guilt equally as individuals inside 
the collective. Some of them bear more responsibility for the collective acts in doing what 
they did or not doing what they should have done based on what role they played within their 
society.  
Let me underline that my point here is not to return to the individual level. Rather, I 
attempt to understand the question of collective guilt in relation to the individual level, 
arguing that collective actions are produced by individuals, and that some individuals share 
more responsibility for the collective results and therefore should be ascribed more guilt for 
the collective outcome than other individuals. Accordingly, I would like to sustain the 
collective level of guilt, but at the same time distribute this unequally to the individuals that 
are inside the collective, based on the role they played in the German society.  
One might argue that my understanding of collective guilt gets too fine-grained and 
that my attempt to distinguish between the different individuals in relation to the 
responsibility for the collective acts changes the issue of the discussion. I am aware that my 
attempt to build a bridge between these two levels of guilt lacks functional value. There are 
certainly grey areas where it is hard to determine the question of how much part of the 
collective guilt one should ascribe one person. Yet, this is just meant to be a thought-
experiment, another way of understanding collective guilt than that proposed by Wilkins. I 
admit that my own interpretation has practical problems connected to it, but I think that there 
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are problems connected to Wilkins’ understanding as well. He ends up with an ‘either guilty 
or innocent’ dichotomy, leaving little space for the neutral in-between, which I think is much 
too rough for an ethical analysis of a phenomenon as complex as collective guilt.     
In relation to the individual level of guilt, we need to raise another question, namely 
whether there was a situation of free choice. Can people be considered culpable for not doing 
anything, when the political climate was of such a character that it would cause great risks of 
being caught? Participating in any oppositional movement against Nazi Germany implied 
taking considerable risks. Being caught would most often result in a one-way ticket to a 
concentration camp. It is a high price to pay and a praiseworthy sacrifice, but can we blame 
the ones that did not? Is it right, as Wilkins’ view seems to suggest, that the neutrals were 
passive accomplices? I think not. If we consider this group to be culpable, would we not also 
have to limit the heroism of those that did fight against the Nazi-regime, with the imminent 
danger of having to pay the ultimate price, simply be claiming that they only did what they 
ought to have done?  
In sum, I consider Wilkins’ interpretation of guilt to be too strict, both at the 
individual and the collective level and this questions the moral foundation for his argument 
that one can be justified in performing terrorism, meaning deliberately targeting civilians.  
Another problem related to Wilkins’ view is concerns the efficiency of terrorist 
activity. Even though Wilkins’ argues from a non-consequentialist position and only focuses 
on the Jews’ rights to carry out terrorism, there remain serious doubts connected to whether 
such acts would have been helpful to the Jews’ cause. Of course, one might disapprove with 
this objection claiming that it is irrelevant for the issue, as it is a consequentialist one. Yet, 
Wilkins’ himself states a claim that at least can be interpreted as consequentialist, namely 
that terrorism ‘might become morally appropriate and tactically necessary, as a remainder 
that no one is safe until the injustice in question is ended’ (Wilkins 1992: 31). Here, Wilkins 
argues upon the tactical value of the effects of the terrorist attack, and not in relation to the 
right to perform it.  
Let us suppose, for the sake of the argument, that Wilkins is right in claiming that the 
Jews would have been justified in using terrorism. Yet they did not. Why? Wilkins addresses 
this question as well, and gives the following suggestions; 1) they did not think of it; 2) they 
did not want to ‘sink to the level of’ their oppressors, 3) they feared of making matters even 
worse. (Wilkins 1992: 27). Subsequently, he disallows suggestion 2) and 3): 2) because it 
would not make them sink to the same level; they did it out of self-defence, 3) because it 
might indeed have done matters better, as it ‘might at least have helped to focus German and 
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especially world attention on what was happening in Germany’. Yet, as he points out in the 
follow-up line: ‘Even if terrorism by the Jews had done nothing to improve matters, striking 
out in self-defense is, I believe, a morally legitimate action on the part of anyone who has 
been condemned to death.’ (Wilkins 1992: 27).  
Here, I will only focus on Wilkins’ explanation of the third suggestion. For reasons I 
have given earlier (3.1.3.), it remains doubtful whether Wilkins is right in claiming that 
terrorist on behalf of the Jews might have changed matters for the better. For a terrorist attack 
to be successful, a necessary condition is that the government is sensitive of civilian 
casualties. Yet there are doubts whether this condition is met in a totalitarian regime such as 
Nazi Germany. Wilkins has another suggestion, however; namely that the terrorist attack 
might have been helpful to ‘awaken’ the attention of the world. But this feature remains 
equally doubtful. It might just as well have turned out to be counter-productive in the sense 
that the Nazis could have used these acts in propagandist ways to justify their own cause.  
Summing up, I do not find Wilkins’ interpretation of self-defensive terrorism very 
fruitful. There are two reasons why I think so. First, I disagree with his understanding of 
collective guilt, which is the underlying premise for why he considers deliberate attacks on 
German civilians to be justifiable. Second, there are doubts connected to whether terrorism 
could have been an effective self-defensive measure in relation in the example of the German 
Jews, even though this is consequentialist objection that is not disallowing Wilkins’ rights-
based argument for justification as such. 
  
 
3.2.2. Held: Terrorism and rights-violation 
 
Virginia Held’s argument has a slightly different approach than Wilkins’. She seems to agree 
that terrorism does indeed violate the basic rights of its victims, which Wilkins tries to avoid 
by claiming that the victims are guilty by being a part of a wrongdoing collective40. Yet, she 
argues that the terrorists might be justified in committing these violations as a last resort if 
                                                 
40
 The reason why I use the term ‘seems’ here is that she also argues that civilians might loose their immunity. 
In Held’s view, this especially applies to democracies, ‘where citizens elect their leaders and are ultimately 
responsible for their government’s policies, it is not clear that citizens should be exempt from the violence those 
policies may lead to while the members of their armed services are legitimate targets. If a government’s policies 
are unjustifiable, and if  political violence to resist them is justifiable (…) then it is not clear why the political 
violence should not be directed at those responsible for these policies.’ (Held 2004a: 67)  
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they are part of a group of people that are systematically being deprived of their rights within 
a political system. Basically, she argues from a perspective of comparing rights-violations: 
 
In a defective society (…) where rights are not in fact being respected, we should be able to make 
comparative judgments about which and whose rights violations are least justifiable. Was it more 
important, for instance, for blacks in South Africa to gain assurance of rights to personal safety 
than for white South Africans to continue to enjoy their property rights undisturbed? While blacks 
are denied respect for their most basic rights, it seems worse to continue these violations than to 
permit some comparable violations of the rights of whites participating in this denial. 
 
(Held 2004b, in Primoratz (ed.): 70)  
 
What this quote describes is a conflict of rights. At the one side we have the rights of the 
black population to gain the same social and political rights as the white population enjoys. 
At the other we have the rights of the white civilian population not to be attacked. How 
should these be weighed in relation to each other if one cannot fulfil both at the same time? 
Now, I am not saying that both cannot, as a matter of principle, be fulfilled at the same time. 
They can, of course. Therefore, the conflict of rights is only related to a specific situation, a 
status quo, which has been constructed by the (white) political leadership. Therefore, what 
the terrorists seek to obtain by their attacks is to force the political leadership to change status 
quo. Would this be morally acceptable?     
 
Let us specify two situations. In the first, S1, the members of group A have a human right to x and 
they enjoy effective respect for this right in a given legal system, while the members of group B 
also have a human right to x, but suffer a lack of effective respect for this right. In situation S2, in 
contrast, both the members of A and the members of B have a human right to x and they enjoy 
effective respect for that right. Obviously S2 is a morally better situation than S1. It is the process of 
getting S1 to S2 that is in question. 
 
(Held 2004b, in Primoratz (ed.): 72)  
 
As Held has specified, our concern is related to what kinds of acts we would consider 
justifiable in relation to change S1  to S2. Held starts out by emphasizing that non-violent 
methods are morally superior to violent methods. Yet, if these non-violent methods turn out 
unsuccessful, as well as other violent methods that are morally preferable to terrorism, such 
as armed resistance, sabotage, etc., would the black population be justified in using terrorism 
as a last resort? Held argues as follows: ‘Alternative 1 is to maintain S1 and refrain from 
terrorism; alternative 2 is to employ terrorism and to achieve S2. Both alternatives involve 
rights violations. The questions are: Can they be compared and can either be found to be less 
unjustifiable?’ (Held 2004b, in Primoratz (ed.): 74). Held’s argument is connected to the 
proposition that the terrorist act ‘is likely to achieve S2 (…) and that no other means can do 
so’ (Held 2004b, in Primoratz (ed.): 74). She concludes that, given these circumstances, ‘on 
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grounds of justice, it is better to equalize rights violations in a transition to bring an end to 
rights violations than it is to subject a given group that has already suffered extensive rights 
violations to continued such violations, if the degree of severity of the two violations is 
similar’ (Held 2004b, in Primoratz (ed.): 74–75). In consequence; ‘terrorism cannot 
necessarily be ruled out as unjustifiable on a rights-based analysis, any more than it can on a 
consequentialist one’ (Held 2004b, in Primoratz (ed.): 76). 
 I find Held’s argument stronger than Wilkins’. There are two reasons for this. First of 
all, she grants that the victims of terrorism are subjects to rights-violations. Accordingly, she 
stays clear of the difficulties of collective guilt, which I have discussed above. Secondly, the 
example she makes use of in her argument, the black community in South Africa, gives her 
argument an empirical strength that Wilkins’ example of the Jewish Germans lacks. The 
ANC did perform sabotage on industrial installations, oil refineries, communications, etc., 
political assassination and attacks on the administrative organs, police stations and military 
targets, through its military wing, MK (Umkhonto We Sizwe), especially during the 1970s 
and early 1980s. And even though these acts are somewhat in the periphery of my own 
definition (we might call it ‘soft’ terrorism, as Wallace does (see p. 47, footnote 31), they 
also carried out explosions in city centres and public areas, and attacks on white farmers and 
blacks that assisted the white government; acts which clearly would fall inside my definition 
(Thackrah 2004: 246–248). Therefore, Held’s example both includes terrorism and what I 
have referred to as ‘violent methods that are morally preferable to terrorism’. In addition to 
this, the black community’s fight against the Apartheid regime did result in a change to the 
benefit of the black population. Beginning in 1990, with the release of Nelson Mandela, who 
had been imprisoned for 30 years, and eventually the end of the Apartheid regime when the 
first genuine elections were held in 1994 and Mandela was elected president. Thus, the South 
African case is indeed a suitable litmus test for Held’s argument. 
 So, should we conclude that Held is right in her claim that terrorism could be 
considered justified under the given conditions? Although I am more sympathetic to Held’s 
argument than to that of Wilkins, I have two objections. First, one might question whether 
the ANC could have gained the same result only by the use of sabotage, guerrilla warfare, 
assassination, etc. – that is; violent actions that are not deliberately aimed at the civilian 
population. Even though the use of terrorism was a part of the ANC’s struggle against the 
Apartheid regime, it is not given that this policy was decisive for the outcome. One might 
also point at other factors, such as the immense pressure the international community put on 
the Apartheid regime to end their policy, through diplomatic and economic sanctions. 
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Second, if terrorism was indeed a decisive factor for the outcome in South Africa, there are 
also many examples where the use of terrorism to end rights violations has turned out to be 
counter-productive. Therefore, one might ask whether Held’s example is more the exception 
than the rule.  
 
 
 
3.2.3. Concluding remarks 
 
What is it that makes terrorism so morally repugnant? As I have already pointed out, a 
primary reason is its failure to discriminate between the innocent and the guilty, and its 
failing to grant immunity to the former. The deliberate targeting of non-combatants, people 
we would normally grant immunity for being attacked, leaves a heavy burden of moral 
justifiability on the perpetrator. Yasser Arafat has once suggested that ‘no degree of 
oppression and no level of desperation can ever justify the killing of innocent civilians’ 
(Coady 2004b: 39).  
In this chapter I have considered two accounts of grave violations of basic rights; the 
black community under the Apartheid regime in South Africa and the Jewish community in 
Nazi Germany. Both have one thing in common, namely that they are deprived of human 
dignity and rights because of their race. The justice of their cause is undeniable. There is also 
no doubt that there is a collective reason for their misery; anti-Semite and racist feelings that 
were not only deeply embedded in the leadership of the social systems but also in the minds 
of many ordinary citizens of Nazi Germany and Apartheid South Africa. Why should one not 
be able to commit terrorism against these people, bearing in mind their collective guilt? 
Although I consider this moral dilemma to be extremely challenging, I will still claim 
that terrorism cannot argumentatively be justified, even when performed in these extremely 
unjust social situations. There are four reasons for this:  
• Even though a society might have a collective guilt for grave atrocities, there would 
always be many individuals within this society that cannot be held sufficiently 
accountable for these atrocities. When committing a terrorist attack, one can never 
know whether one harms the innocent or the guilty.    
• The terrorists have no crystal ball that enables them to foresee the effects of their 
actions. There remain serious doubts as to whether terrorism is an effective strategy to 
end the misery of the group whose rights have been violated. Often, the outcome is 
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counter-productive, creating an even graver situation for the people the terrorists are 
acting on behalf of. Therefore, one should use other means to end the deprivation. 
• One can always ask whether the aspect of last resort is fulfilled. Quoting Walzer: ‘It 
is not so easy to reach the ‘last resort.’ To get there, one must indeed try everything 
(which is a lot of things) and not just once’ (Walzer 1988, in Luper-Foy (ed.): 239).  
• If we dispel the general condemnation of terrorism and grant someone right to 
perform it in some cases, we have broken a demarcation line. The moral absolute 
makes an important and unbreakable limit. By opening up for the exceptions, we 
might be facing slippery slope problems.  
 
Having said this, I find it important to clarify that even though I consider terrorism to 
be principally unjustifiable, this does not necessarily mean that I consider the grounds for the 
acts to be unjust. In just war theory, which I will discuss in the forthcoming chapter, there is 
a distinction between jus ad bellum, which refers to the justifiability of the cause of the war, 
and jus in bello, which is related to whether wars are fought in just or unjust manners. A war 
might be fought for a just cause, but in an unjust manner. In relation to terrorism, I think one 
should reason equally; one must differentiate between the acts that are performed for a given 
cause and the cause itself. Accordingly, even though someone performs terrorist acts, we 
should grant their cause the possibility of being just. What we need to do, then, is to examine, 
whether the demands of the dissatisfied, i.e. the terrorists, are morally just or not. If they are, 
we must ask if the lack of complying with these demands is morally defensible. Another 
question we should also ask ourselves is why someone would indulge in terrorist methods. 
Leila Khaled commented the rationale behind the Palestinian hijackings in the 1970s, of 
which she had been an active part of in, as follows: ‘Before we were dealt with as refugees. 
We yelled and screamed, but the whole world answered with more tents and did nothing.’ 
(Held 2004a: 69). Have the terrorists tried other means without being granted attention? Why 
would they not use non-violent measures to front their cause? Is there a flaw in our own 
political system that needs to be improved? Here, I will leave these questions open, but I will 
have more to say about this in my conclusion in part 4.  
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3.3. Analogy arguments for justification 
 
The third kind of justification arguments I will consider draw analogies between war and 
terrorism, claiming that terrorism is not worse than war, or certain acts of war, and when 
justifying one we should also justify the other, as a matter of consistency.                               
 
 
3.3.1. Terrorism and war 
 
The orthodox view is that war can sometimes be justified, while terrorism is always 
condemnable. Basically, there are two views that oppose this opinion. One is the pacifist 
view, which claims that both war and terrorism are condemnable as both involve the use of 
violence. The other, which I will refer to as the analogy view, claims that terrorism is no 
worse than war, and accordingly; if war is considered justifiable, so is terrorism.  
The analogy view takes two basic forms. One draws the analogy between terrorism 
and war in general. I will name this the general analogy view (e.g. Trotsky, in Primoratz (ed.) 
2004: 40, and Held 2004a: 68). The other limits the analogy to specific acts of war, namely 
those that deliberately target civilians. I will refer to this as the limited analogy view (e.g. 
Coady, in Primoratz (ed.) 2004: 8, and Primoratz 2004: xx). First, let us consider how the 
general analogy position opposes the orthodox position. 
In the orthodox view there is one crucial factor that morally distinguishes war from 
terrorism. Embedded in the ethics of war, there is a longstanding tradition in favour of non-
combatant immunity. Even though most wars have non-combatant casualties, they are 
typically referred to as collateral damage, double-effect or unintended consequences. Any 
policy of deliberately targeting non-combatants, as terrorists do, would be a violation of the 
ethics of war, worthy of condemnation and legal punishment. Therefore, the orthodox view 
suggests that there is an important moral difference between terrorism and war.  
 The general analogy view (in addition to the pacifist) meets this claim by pointing at 
the hard realities of war. Even though there might be a distinction in deliberateness between 
the killing of non-combatants in terrorism and war, this is not sufficient for claiming that 
there is a moral difference between the two. The effect on the victims is the same and 
historically, the number of civilians killed in terrorist attacks remains modest in comparison 
with the multitude that have been killed in war. During the 20th century, it has been estimated 
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that war related killings exceeded 105 million people, including 62 million civilian victims 
(Steger 2003: xiii). And with the development of modern warfare, there has been an 
increased tendency of killing non-combatants. In WWI only 5 % of the casualties were 
civilians, in recent wars the civilian proportion has risen to 80 % (Pérez de Cuéllar & Cho 
1999. vol. V: 330). Another important point is that modern warfare is not only fought on the 
battlefield. It is most crucial to compromise the opponent’s ability to wage war by draining 
its economy and resources, not only affecting its war waging ability but also its civilian 
population, lacking food supplies, medicines and other necessities. Accordingly, if our 
concern is to save the lives of non-combatants, it would be much more productive to 
condemn war than terrorism. When failing to do so, the orthodox view is based on double 
standards; it uses one moral argument in relation to terrorism, but fails to recognize that the 
same moral argument also would disallow war in general. 
 The orthodox view has an answer to this objection, however: There is no doubt that 
war has caused unbearable suffering throughout history, both to combatants and non-
combatants. In an ideal world, there would be no wars. Yet, our world is not ideal; war and 
hostilities have been part of the history of mankind. Therefore, we must differentiate between 
wars. Some are carried out in situations where the alternative of not raising arms would be 
much worse. One such example being the allied war against Nazi Germany. Even though the 
humanitarian costs were both grave and massive, resigning to Nazi lead European dominance 
would have been much worse – plausibly creating more human suffering than the war did.   
 Even though there are many more things to be said in relation to both the pacifist 
view and the general analogy view, I choose not to push this discussion any further. For the 
sake of the argument, I will accept the orthodox view that war can sometimes be justified, 
and that this perspective does not conflict with a general condemnation of terrorism. 
Therefore, let us narrow the scope of our investigation only to the limited analogy view, the 
one that focuses on acts of war that deliberately target non-combatants.  
Let me start by giving some preliminary clarifications on the features that distinguish 
a just war from an unjust one. In the just war tradition this is concretised in two sets of 
principles: Jus ad bellum principles, that concern the conditions under which war can be 
justified. By contrast, jus in bello principles are related to how warfare should be conducted 
in order to be morally acceptable.  
 
Jus ad bellum commonly consists in the following five conditions: War should 
• be declared and waged by a legitimate authority. 
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• be waged for a just cause. 
• be a last resort. 
• have a reasonable prospect of being successful. 
• use a level of violence that is proportional to the wrong it is resisting. 
 
In jus in bello there are primarily two governing principles: 
• The principle of discrimination, which limits both the kind of violence one might 
make use of and what targets can be legitimate.  
• The principle of proportionality, that specifies that the defensive measures one makes 
use of should be proportionate, i.e. not inflicting more damage, than the original 
offense it is responding to. 
 
How does the deliberate targeting of non-combatants relate to these principles? Most 
importantly, it violates the principle of discrimination, where a crucial feature is that non-
combatants should merit immunity from deliberate attacks. The usual way of defending the 
death of non-combatants – here I am addressing only the non-deliberate deaths – is to point at 
the principle of double effect, ‘as a foreseen, but unintended side effect of an otherwise 
legitimate act of war’ (Coady 2004d, in Coady & O’Keefe (eds.): 14). The rationale behind 
this principle is that it would have been impossible to engage in any activity of war, 
including the ones we consider justified, if soldiers cannot in any circumstances put the lives 
of non-combatants at risk. If we adopt an absolutist approach to the non-combatant immunity 
principle, in most circumstances we would have to take a pacifist approach, as no such war 
can be fought – at least not in the way they are fought today. 
Yet, the analogy does not concern deaths of non-combatants as such, but only the 
deliberate targeting of non-combatants in war. Should this be labeled terrorism? In part 2 I 
left this question unanswered. As I mentioned, there are obvious similarities between these 
acts. Yet, there are also dissimilarities. The question is, then, if the dissimilarities are big 
enough to outweigh the similarities, making it possible to distinguish the two sets of actions 
from each other? Some theorists, such as Walzer41, obviously think that they are big enough, 
where he claims that the deliberate targeting of non-combatants in war can be justified in 
supreme emergency (Walzer 2000: 254), while ‘every act of terrorism is a wrongful act’ 
(Walzer 1988, in Luper-Foy (ed.): 238). In order to grant Walzer’s claim validity, we have to 
                                                 
41This view has also been endorsed by Rawls (Rawls 1999: 565–572). 
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point to a specific feature that makes a relevant moral difference between the two. If there is 
no such relevant moral difference, there is no reason for claiming that one set of acts can be 
justified while the other cannot. Accordingly, we have a case of double standards: Two 
actions that are morally indifferent from each other are judged differently in terms of 
justifiability. As a matter of consistency, both kinds of actions should be considered 
unjustifiable or justifiable.  
As I have already said, the deliberate targeting of non-combatants is a violation of the 
ethics of war. Why does Walzer consider it to be justified, then? In order to explain Walzer’s 
argument, we have to make some initial clarifications on the relationship between the two 
sets of principles that govern the just war tradition. In Walzer’s words, the jus ad bellum and 
jus in bello principles are ‘logically independent’ (Walzer 2000: 21). This means that we can 
sketch four basic possibilities in relation to the justifiability and unjustifiability of wars. 
When both the jus ad bellum and the jus in bello principles are fulfilled, the war is clearly a 
just one. When both the jus ad bellum and the jus in bello principles are violated, the war is 
an unjust one. The tricky part is the remaining two possibilities, namely when jus ad bellum 
is violated, but jus in bello is fulfilled, and when jus ad bellum is fulfilled, but jus in bello is 
violated. Our concern here will be only the latter kind of situations.  
I take Walzer’s view to imply that the jus ad bellum principles are somewhat superior 
to the jus in bello principles. This means that strong jus ad bellum arguments can outweigh 
violations of jus in bello principles in cases of supreme emergency. But what is supreme 
emergency? There are two criteria that need to be met in order to claim supreme emergency; 
there must be an imminent danger of defeat and the consequences of this defeat must threaten 
the very existence of a community. If either of the above is limited, there is no supreme 
emergency (Walzer 2000: 252).  
Now, before I elaborate Walzer’s view any further, it should be mentioned that this is 
a controversial claim within the just war tradition. Most just war theorists consider the 
principle of non-combatant immunity an absolute moral prohibition, no matter how strong 
the ad bellum principles might be (Coady 2004b: 58). Yet, my purpose here is to try to draw 
an analogy from Walzer’s justification of deliberate targeting of non-combatants in war in 
supreme emergency to terrorism. To do this, I will try to do three things: First, I will strive to 
make Walzer’s point as strong as I can. Second, I will discuss whether there is an analogy 
between Walzer’s interpretation of deliberate killing of non-combatants and terrorism, as the 
limited analogy view suggests. Third, I will discuss whether I think Walzer is right in his 
claim that the deliberate bombing of non-combatants can be justified. If I grant him right, and 
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if the limited analogy view proves to be valid, we can conclude that terrorism can be justified 
as a matter of ethical consistency. 
 
 
3.3.2. Drawing an analogy 
 
Walzer’s justification argument for the deliberate bombing of non-combatants has a specific 
historical point of departure, namely the British bombing of German cities in late 1940. First, 
I will give a brief summary of the historical background for this policy: 
 
The British army had been forced to quit mainland Europe at Dunkirk. The invasion of Britain was 
still a possibility. (…) German submarines were destroying large numbers of Allied ships, 
threatened food and military supply lines. So acute were these difficulties at sea that Churchill 
thought the Navy might actually loose the war. If Britain was to avoid defeat and eventually have a 
chance of winning the war, the onus was on the Air Force to play the leading role.  
However, it was not well placed to do so. The number and types of bombers available to it 
were such that the raids had to be undertaken at night; by day German fighters had little difficulty 
in destroying them. But such raids proved largely ineffective because of deficiencies in nocturnal 
navigation and bomb-aiming systems. (…) If Bomber Command was to hit targets they would have 
to be very big targets. (…) In the circumstances, if Bomber Command was to be relied on to do any 
damage the target would normally have to be a German town. 
The decision to adopt a policy of area bombing was in part, therefore, the result of the very 
restricted range of military possibilities open to Britain in 1940-41. It was a last resort in desperate 
circumstances. There were also other important factors at work. At the time the Luftwaffe was 
causing considerable damage to British towns (…) and the targeting of German cities came to be 
seen as the best way of reducing the morale and will of the German people. Area bombing became 
Bomber Command’s priority. 
(Wallace 1989: 5) 
 
Now, considering this interpretation of the historical setting, were the British justified in their 
decision to bomb German cities, with the inevitable effect of deliberately attacking non-
combatants? Clearly, this would be a violation of jus in bello. Therefore, for Walzer to be 
right in his claim that the British were justified in their decision, there would have had to be a 
case of supreme emergency. As I mentioned above, two important conditions must be met in 
order to make this claim. First, the opposing danger of defeat must be imminent. Second, the 
consequences of this defeat must be disastrous for own population. Walzer is obviously right 
on the latter. If there has been any historical example this condition can apply to, Nazi 
Germany in 1940 would be an obvious candidate.  
 What is left to consider, then, is whether the threat was an imminent one. This 
criterion seems to be met by the description Wallace gives in the above cited passage: First of 
all, Nazi Germany was on the offensive and Britain was facing a possible invasion. In 
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addition, the Luftwaffe performed regular bombing raids on British towns, causing severe 
harm on British non-combatants. Secondly, the military means the British had at their 
disposal to confront the German war machine were severely limited. Based on these 
assumptions, it does not seem unreasonable to claim that the situation the British found 
themselves in was one of imminent threat. There is more to be said on this issue later, but at 
this point of the argument, we can sum up Walzer’s view in the following way: The 
importance of combating Nazism was so crucial that the British were justified in using any 
possible means – even those implying violations of jus in bello principles, such as the 
deliberate killing of non-combatants, as a last resort.  
Here, I find it necessary to clarify an important feature of Walzer’s argument. He 
strictly underlines that his justification argument only applies to the early stages of the war. 
The reason is that the supreme emergency had passed by mid 1942 (Walzer 2000: 261). At 
this stage, the US had entered the war, strategic bombing in daylight was technically feasible, 
Germany was in retreat, and there was no immanent danger of invasion. According to 
Walzer, the arguments for bombing German cities between 1942 and 1945 had become 
utilitarian in character42. It was based on the assumption that in order to end the war sooner, 
and minimize the sufferings it caused on people in general, killing a limited amount of 
civilians through air campaigns on cities was justifiable (Walzer 2000: 261). But these 
arguments are not strong enough to legitimise deliberate bombing of non-combatants: ‘The 
greater number by far of the German civilians killed by terror bombing were killed without 
moral (and probably also without military) reason’ (Walzer 2000: 261). Therefore, Walzer’s 
justification argument is not addressing to the bombings of Dresden in 1945, where 100,000 
people were killed, or the bombings of Hamburg and Berlin, which, in Walzer’s words, were 
‘attacked simply for the sake of terror’ (Walzer 2000: 261).  
In relation to our question of whether there is an analogy between the deliberate 
targeting of non-combatants and terrorism, this statement is well worth noting. On the one 
hand, Walzer labels the deliberate bombings of non-combatants in the later stage of the war 
as terrorism43.  Yet, he obviously does not consider the same acts performed in the early 
stages of the war to be terrorism, as these are considered justified. And since Walzer claims 
that ‘every act of terrorism is a wrongful act’ (Walzer 1988, in Luper-Foy (ed.): 238), it 
                                                 
42
 To illustrate this claim, consider Churchill’s words for justifying the nuclear bombings of Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki: ‘To avert a vast, indefinite butchery ... at the cost of a few explosions.’ (Walzer 2000: 266-267). 
43
 Walzer uses the word ‘terror’, and not ‘terrorism’, in the quote. Therefore, I would like to specify, that he 
uses the word ‘terrorism’ designate the city bombings at another point: ‘there is no way for the bombers to 
search out the right people. And for all the others, terrorism only reiterates the tyranny that the Nazis had 
already established.’ (Walzer 2000: 260-261)   
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follows that he must consider them to be something else than terrorism. This needs further 
examination. How can it be that Walzer designates exactly the same acts differently in 
relation to whether they were performed early or late in the war (mid 1942 being the 
demarcation line)? 
The only explanation I can think of is that Walzer has made the assumption that since 
the bombings in the early stages of the war were justified, they cannot be terrorism. This 
brings us back to the first of the methodological pitfalls I mentioned in my introduction, 
where the normative aspects and the descriptive aspects are confused, with the effect of 
describing terrorism as something unjustifiable in itself. As I pointed out earlier, I disagree 
with this understanding, and given my own interpretation of how terrorism should be 
defined, i.e. in leaving out the moral assessments, it seems clear that we can indeed draw the 
analogy. Yet, for the purpose of argument, I will try to show that even when adopting 
Walzer’s view, it is possible to make an analogy. Here, I will only concentrate on the moral 
assessments between deliberate bombings of non-combatants and terrorism. 
  
3.3.2.1. The moral analogy 
Let us suppose that a community finds itself in an equally grave circumstance as the British 
were in late 1940. Certainly, this is not unthinkable. One might, for instance, argue that the 
Jewish community was in such a situation in the late 1930s and early 1940s in Nazi 
Germany. Could they have been justified in adopting terrorism?  
I have considered this example before, but our object here is different. In part 3.2., the 
question was whether these acts could be justified in relation to a rights-based discussion. 
Here, my subject is whether two kinds of actions, namely the deliberate bombings of German 
cities in the early stages of the war and a hypothetical example of Jewish terrorists, are 
morally analogues. If they are, both should be considered justified as a matter of consistency. 
Walzer’s view suggests that there is viable ethical difference between terrorism and 
the British bombing of German cities. What might this difference be, then? If we go back to 
the just war principles I have mentioned above, I think it is clear that the actions we consider 
do not differ in relation to the jus in bello principles. Both imply the deliberate targeting of 
civilians, and in relation to the principle of proportionality, the supposed Jewish terrorists 
would certainly not be violating this principle more than the British did. Therefore, if there is 
a difference, it must be related to the ad bellum principles. In my view, there is no relevant 
difference in relation to whether the cause was just (they were fighting the same enemy) or 
whether the violence was proportional (the Jewish terrorists facing genocide and systematic 
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persecution). Therefore, if there is a difference between the two examples, it must be 
embedded in one of the other three principles; legitimate authority; last resort and prospects 
of being successful.  
 
The question of legitimate authority 
The most obvious difference between the hypothetical Jewish terrorists and the British 
bombing campaign is that the former lacks a legitimate authority. As I have clarified earlier 
(see chapter 3.2.), I do not think the right to use violence for political purposes should only 
apply to state actors. This would imply that all kinds of warlike activity that was not 
officially backed by a state actor, such as resistance movements, partisan activity and 
guerrilla warfare, would be considered illegitimate per se. For example, if a liberation group 
was fighting a ruthless despot without any popular support, both in compliance with jus ad 
bellum44 and jus in bello principles, it would indeed seem awkward if we disallowed the 
justifiability of this war by pointing at the lack of a legitimate authority, here understood as a 
state actor. Therefore, I hold that wars or warlike activities need not necessarily be connected 
to state actors to be just. And accordingly, it will not make a moral difference whether the 
deliberate targeting of non-combatants is performed by state or non-state actors. 
Coady has argued that there is a ‘pro-state bias’ built into Walzer’s claim that area 
bombing and terrorism cannot be considered analogues (Coady 2004c: 782). There are clear 
indications in Walzer’s text that suggests that he is right: ‘Can soldiers and statesmen 
override the rights of innocent people for the sake of their own political community? I am 
inclined to answer this question affirmatively, though not without hesitation and worry (...) 
communities, in emergencies, seem to have different and larger prerogatives.’ (Walzer 2000: 
254). I take it for granted that Walzer is not talking about any political community in this 
respect, but that he is referring to situations of supreme emergency where one political 
community is superior to another in terms of basic values, such as the British democracy 
versus the Nazi Germany dictatorship in WWII. Yet, I am not convinced that this makes a 
difference when it comes to justifying area bombing. It certainly cannot be that we should 
comply with Max Weber’s famous dictum of the state’s monopoly over the legitimate use of 
violence on this question. One thing is legitimacy; another is the question of being morally 
just and unjust.  
 
                                                 
44
 With the possible exception of legitimate authority. 
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The question of last resort 
The next question is whether non-state actors can perform violent acts that violate jus in bello 
principles, such as terrorism, on the basis of supreme emergency. Following Walzer, this 
supposes an imminent danger of a disastrous outcome. Compared with the situation of the 
British, it would be absurd if the Jewish population of Germany, who were facing a political 
policy of extermination, were not to be granted the same degree of imminent and disastrous 
threat45. The question of state or non-state actors does not make a difference on this matter. 
Therefore, I agree with Coady that ‘[w]e should conclude that the attempt to restrict the 
supreme emergency exemption to states is unpersuasive. Either it applies more generally or it 
does not apply at all.’ (Coady 2004c: 787). Accordingly, I do not think that the there is any 
difference between the British and the Jewish community in relation to the issue of supreme 
emergency.  
 
The question of prospects of being successful 
The last question is related to whether terrorism could have had any chance of being 
successful in the case of the Jewish terrorists. As I have already pointed out in part 3.1., there 
are serious doubts connected to whether terrorism has the ability to generate positive effects 
against totalitarian regimes. It is hard to see how the hypothetical Jewish terrorists in Nazi-
Germany could be an exception on this matter; retaliation, mass deportations and violent 
countermeasures would most likely have been the outcome. As Wallace has pointed out: If 
terrorism is to be an effective tactic, it is necessary that the oppressor it targets does not feel 
indifferent toward the victims. In a totalitarian state, this seems unlikely to occur.  
But why should this aspect only apply to terrorism? The area bombing of the British 
was directed against exactly the same totalitarian state. Why would Wallaces point not apply 
to these acts? It cannot be the aspect of being indifferent toward the victims, as this would 
apply equally to both terrorism and area bombing. Therefore, there must be other reasons for 
why the prospects of success can be considered bigger for the latter kinds of acts than the 
former.  
First of all, the aerial bombing campaign against German cities caused serious 
destruction to German society – the scale of the attacks would clearly be different from any 
                                                 
45
 Coady has argued that ‘Palestinian resistance groups, for example, can mount a strong case that they face a 
hostile power bent upon subordination and dispossession to a degree that threatens not only their lives but their 
way of life. The danger is clearly imminent and many of the militants would argue that terrorism is the only 
means overcoming it.’ (Coady 2004c: 783).  
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sporadic act of terrorism. To put it bluntly: the hypothetical Jewish terrorism might not have 
been destructive enough and killed enough people to have the same effect as the area 
bombing. But if the capability of massive destruction is the sole difference between area 
bombing and terrorism, it would certainly be absurd to claim that this is what makes one 
morally justified and not the other. Yet there is more to be said on this issue, for there 
remains serious doubt as to whether the bombings of German cities really had any impact on 
the German war-waging ability. The British Bombing Survey United, established after the 
war to study the military effectiveness of the area offensive, concluded that ‘[t]here is no 
evidence that they [i.e. town area attacks] caused any serious break in the morale of the 
population as a whole’ (Quoted in Garrett 2004, in Primoratz (ed.): 153, my specification in 
brackets). And even though one might argue that this assessment is made after the fact, and 
that the strategy seemed as a workable strategy for the British at the time, the same argument 
could have been applied for the hypothetical Jewish terrorists: It could have seemed like a 
workable strategy at the time. Accordingly, one might argue that neither the supposed 
terrorist acts nor the area bombing differ on this matter.  
In my view, the sole factor distinguishing the two sets of acts is the possibility of 
violent retaliations in the aftermath of the attacks. As mentioned, the hypothetical Jewish 
terrorism would most probably have been counter-productive, creating an even worse 
situation for the Jewish community. In the case of the British city bombings, the chances of 
retaliation were not as imminent. But if this aspect is the sole differentiating feature between 
the two sets of actions, would it be right to grant one of them justifiability, and not the other? 
I think not. Bearing in mind that there is no evidence that the attacks actually caused any 
break in the morale of the German population, what we are left with is the British possibility 
to bomb without fearing grave retaliation measures.  
  
3.3.2.2. Was the area bombing justified? 
As I have argued above, I think that there is no relevant distinguishing factor between the 
area bombing of the British in WWII and terrorism. Therefore, I will grant the limited 
analogy view validity. The next question we need to address is whether Walzer is right in 
claiming that the British were indeed justified in bombing German cities in late 1940. If we 
agree with this claim, I think terrorism should be acknowledged with the same degree of 
justifiability, as a matter of consistency.  
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Basically there are three aspects we need to discuss. First, was there indeed a danger 
of imminent defeat?  Second, was area bombing a last resort? Third, were other motives than 
supreme emergency crucial for the decision?  
Was there a danger of imminent defeat for the British in late 1940? Stephen A. 
Garrett has argued that if there ever was a supreme emergency, it peaked in the summer of 
1940, after the British had to quit continental Europe at Dunkirk in great haste, leaving most 
of their equipment behind. In consequence, only two fully armed divisions remained to resist 
a German attack (Garrett 2004, in Primoratz (ed.): 149). According to Garrett, after 15. 
September 1940, when Fighter Command inflicted heavy losses on the Luftwaffe and, in 
practical terms, won the war of the skies, the threat of a German invasion had passed. Shortly 
after, Hitler suspended the plans for an invasion, focusing his efforts on the Eastern front. 
Therefore, there are historical doubts connected to Walzer’s claim of an imminent threat of a 
German invasion. One should also bear in mind that Walzer holds mid-1942 to be the crucial 
demarcation line for when the British case for supreme emergency ended. There are two 
events in the beginning of December 1941 that dramatically changed the situation in the war 
that makes this claim doubtful. First, the Wehrmacht suffered its first major defeat on the 
Eastern Front, when the Soviet Union launched its first massive counteroffensive. Second, 
the US entered the war after the bombings of Pearl Harbor (Garrett 2004, in Primoratz (ed.): 
150).  
Was area bombing a last resort? As I have already noted, it remains unclear whether 
the area bombing had any importance on the outcome of the war (Coady 2004c: 782). This 
casts retrospective doubts on the legitimacy of these acts; they caused serious harm to 
German non-combatants, but arguably little harm to the German war machine. Many military 
experts believe that the war might have ender sooner if the British air power had 
concentrated on other targets, such as oil refineries (Walzer 2000: 258).  
 If there was no supreme emergency in late 1940, either in relation to lack of 
imminence or last resort, Walzer’s justification claim is severely weakened. Yet, it might be 
argued that this retrospective doubt on whether there was a supreme emergency is irrelevant 
for the moral question. It is easy to be wise after the event, but at the time the British 
Supreme Command had to make their decision on whether to bomb German cities or not, it 
might have been considered necessary, bearing in mind the extreme conditions they were 
facing. Therefore, let us – for the sake of the argument – accept that the ‘wise after the 
event’-doubts of whether there was a supreme emergency cannot refute Walzer’s claim of 
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justification in itself. But there are also additional aspects to consider, namely that there were 
other motives than supreme emergency that were more crucial for the decision. 
The justification argument is based on the presumption that the bombing policy would 
have a demoralising effect on the German people, creating a war fatigue that would have a 
negative impact on the Third Reich’s war-waging ability. As I have already mentioned, the 
prospects of getting such a result were unrealistic. Being one of the clearest examples of a 
totalitarian state in history, Nazi Germany seemed far from having the sensitivity for civilian 
sufferings that would have been necessary for this tactic to be successful. Therefore, one 
might ask whether Walzer is right in claiming that this really was the underlying reason for 
deciding to bomb German cities. It certainly would not seem improbable that there could 
have been other motives lying behind, such as a reprisal for the German bombing of British 
cities. In international law one differentiates between two forms of retaliation; deterrent and 
punitive. Only the former of these is admitted. In the following, I will argue that the British 
decision was of the punitive kind. In a radio broadcast in 1941, for instance, Churchill said 
that they were giving ‘the German people taste and gulp each month a sharper dose of the 
miseries they have showered upon mankind’ (Walzer 2000: 256). The fact that the British 
continued their air attacks on German cities throughout the war might easily be taken for an 
indictment for this. In fact, ‘by early 1942 aiming at military or industrial targets was barred’ 
(Walzer 2000: 255-256). What we must ask then is whether the possible retaliatory aspect 
could serve as a justifying factor on behalf of the British Supreme Command. In a nutshell; 
do two wrongs make a right? I think not, and my hunch is that Walzer agrees with me at this 
point. Whatever answer one would like to give to this question, however, it is clear that this 
is not equal to the claim of collective self defence. 
 To sum up, then: Was the British decision to bomb German cities justified? I think 
there are many reasons for claiming that it was not: First of all, there were other options, such 
as bombing oil facilities. Secondly, there remains serious doubt of whether the city bombings 
had any military importance for the outcome of the war. Thirdly, there are strong reasons for 
suspecting that collective self-preservation was not the only motive, or even the most 
important motive, for the decision of the British. We might just as well point at other 
incentives, such as punitive reprisal for German bomb attacks on British cities. Fourthly, one 
might argue that the British decision might just as well have been counter-productive, 
creating increased support for the Nazi Party within the German population and not the war 
fatigue they presumably hoped for. Fifthly, if the British had decided not to bomb German 
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cities, they would have made a strong moral statement on what differentiates democratic 
values from totalitarian ones, leaving an important footprint for the conduct of war.  
For my own part, the deliberate killing of non-combatants should be considered a 
moral absolute. Whether there can be exemptions to this claim, under the pretence of 
supreme emergency, seems to be extremely unlikely. In my view, the situation of the British 
in late 1940, perhaps the strongest case for supreme emergency in modern history, did not 
outweigh the moral absolute for the above mentioned reasons. I admit that my argument 
relies on hypothetical claims. We do not know if the outcome of the war would have been 
otherwise if the British had decided not to bomb German cities. Yet, Walzer’s argument for 
justification is equally hypothetical. We do not know whether the outcome of the war would 
have been any different if the British had decided not to bomb German cities neither.  
But, if we suppose that area bombing was the only response the British actually had 
as an option and that if they had not done it, the Germans would have succeeded both in 
invading England and in winning the war, would the British have been justified in bombing 
German cities? I am inclined to answer yes to this question, even though I must say that I am 
extremely uneasy with it. Does this mean I am giving a case for supreme emergency? My 
answer – even though I realize that this might seem self-contradictory – is negative. The 
reason is that I think one would have to differentiate between two sets of argumentation. The 
first is retrospective, granting an act moral rightness in relation to its effects. The second is 
related to the position of the decision-maker, balancing the pros and cons for whether one 
should act in one way or the other.  
Starting off with the latter, in order to be justified in deliberately killing non-
combatants under the pretence of supreme emergency, it should follow that the agent has an 
absolute certainty that there really is a case of supreme emergency. This would imply: First, 
that the only viable action left is the deliberate killing of non-combatants, not only 
intelligibly but also as a matter of fact. Second,, that this action has the actual effect of 
creating a situation that is desirable for the overall well being of humanity, again not only 
intelligibly but as a matter of fact. I think no actor can possibly fulfill these demands. 
Accordingly, there is no situation where the supreme emergency can be justified, which in 
itself rules out the possibility for the practical value of this principle 
In relation to the retrospective case: To grant a case of supreme emergency rightness, 
one would have to show that the choice of acting against the moral prohibition was the 
decisive factor for the creation of a situation that is desirable for the overall well being of 
humanity, again as a matter of fact and not only intelligibly. Consequently: It is not sufficient 
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to point at the positive effects that supposedly came out of the act, one must also show that 
this situation could not have been created by any other and less morally violating means.  
What we are left with is the retrospective ‘with hindsight’, where the actual choice of 
not breaking the moral absolute has created a situation of tremendous despair. Where the 
choice of violating the non-combatant immunity principle possibly could have had the effect 
of creating an overall better situation for humanity in total, despite its negative effects on the 
people it would have affected.  
Thus, I admit that what remains of my interpretation of supreme emergency is merely 
a ‘quasi principle’. If ‘x’ is ‘the deliberate targeting of non-combatants’ and ‘S’ is ‘the 
present situation’, this can describes accordingly: My interpretation of supreme emergency 
does not have any practical function, applying to the ‘if I do not do x, then S’-interpretation 
(the Churchill case). Neither does it have an apologist function, the ‘if I had not done x, then 
S’-version (the Walzer-version). The sole purpose it serves is for the retrospective regret of 
omitting to act out of supreme emergency; the ‘if I had only done x, then not S’-
interpretation of supreme emergency.  
Accordingly, even if there is an analogy between the deliberate bombing of non-
combatants and terrorism, I do not think it leaves much room for the possibility of justifying 
terrorism. The burden of proof that is needed to morally justify the overruling of the non-
combatant immunity principle is simply too overwhelming. It claims absolute certainty on 
behalf of the decision maker. Strong reasons to believe will not be sufficient, which makes it 
implausible to grant the possibility of justification any value in practical life. My conclusion, 
then, is that even though I consider the analogy claim to be valid, it does not provide an 
opening for justifying terrorism, as the deliberate targeting of non-combatants cannot be 
justified, even in supreme emergency. 
 
 
3.3.3. State terrorism? 
 
As I mentioned in the beginning of this chapter, there is one question concerning the 
definition on terrorism that is unanswered; whether the deliberate bombing of non-
combatants and the Arendtian interpretation of state terror can be labeled terrorism. Starting 
with the former, I have already proposed a number of arguments that seek to disallow the 
analogy between these acts and terrorism, concluding that they were all unsatisfying. If we 
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compare with my definition, there seems to be no diverging factor in which the two sets of 
actions differ substantially from each other: It is a deliberate act of severe violence (or a 
threat of such) against non-combatants; it is done with a political intention; the purpose 
behind these acts is most often to use the victims as a means to produce a certain 
psychological effect (generally fear and terror) within the targeted society; the rationale is to 
generate a certain change of conduct, both within the targeted society and the third party, 
which is thought to benefit the perpetrators. Thus, being truthful to my own definition, it 
seems like I have to conclude that deliberate attacks on non-combatants are indeed acts of 
terrorism.  
I am aware that this might seem counter-intuitive. In ordinary language, these acts are 
commonly described as something else than terrorism, and therefore my definition endangers 
to be interpreted as being ‘out of step’ with what is commonly understood to be the meaning 
of the term. If the reader disagrees with me on this matter, I would like to stress that lack of 
consensus on this matter will not conflict with the ethical argument I have made up to this 
point. So far, my discussion has only been focusing on examples other than the bombing of 
non-combatants by state actors. It should also be mentioned that within the philosophical 
discourse on this subject, there is no agreement on whether the deliberate bombing of non-
combatants should be labeled terrorism or not. As mentioned, with the exception of the 
Britishs area bombing in the early stages of the war, Walzer himself refers to the deliberate 
targeting of non-combatants as ‘terrorism’ (Walzer 2000: 260). Coady has argued that there 
is  
 
a certain hypocrisy in much common indignation about terrorism. Those who think that the state 
terrorism of the World War II saturation bombing raids was justified by some argument of 
necessity, or other overriding moral considerations, cannot refuse to look at such arguments when 
mouthed by revolutionaries. 
(Coady 2004a, in Primoratz (ed.): 8).   
 
And, as I pointed out in earlier, Primoratz argues that ‘[h]istorically, the state has been the 
biggest terrorist’ (Primoratz 2004: xx). Therefore, the lack of consensus is not that obvious. 
Yet, bearing in mind the controversy on this question, I find it necessary to explain why I 
have chosen not to change my definition in order to leave out these acts.  
Suppose I was to exclude the deliberate bombing of non-combatants from my 
definition, I think that there are two ways of doing it:  
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The first is to limit the definition only to non-state actors. But, bearing in mind that 
only 26 % of the definitions Schmid analysed excluded state terrorism (Silke 1996: 22), I 
would still be at odds with my aim of consensus orientation. Accordingly, I will rule out the 
possibility of excluding state actors altogether. 
The second way of excluding the deliberate bombing of non-combatants is to limit the 
definition of terrorism only to acts that are performed in peacetime. Schmid seems to endorse 
this view, and has suggested that terrorism can be designated as ‘the peacetime equivalent of 
war crimes’ (Schmid 2004: 203). In relation to the first option, there are two important 
benefits with this strategy. It does not exclude acts such as ‘the Rainbow Warrior affair’ and 
it does not rule out the possibility of ‘the Arendtian form’ of state terror, which I will discuss 
in a short while. Yet, there are also problems connected to this strategy. If we limit our 
definition of terrorism to acts performed in peacetime only, we would exclude acts that bear 
all the essential trademarks of terrorism performed in wartime. Consider the following 
example: On April 16, 2006, the Sunday Times reported that ‘Iran has formed battalions of 
suicide bombers to strike at British and American targets if the nation’s nuclear sites are 
attacked. According to Iranian officials, 40,000 trained suicide bombers are ready for 
action’46. Let us suppose that the ongoing international crisis on the Iranian nuclear 
programme results in a British and US led missile attack on Iranian nuclear installations. As a 
consequence of these attacks, the Iranian government declares war. Some of the trained 
suicide bombers are already living undercover on British and US soil. In the aftermath of the 
missile attacks, they perpetrate a series of suicide attacks on British and American cities. 
Would we consider these actions to be something else than terrorism just because they are 
performed in times of war? I think we would not. Accordingly, if limiting terrorism to acts 
performed in peacetime, we might still be facing the same problems of being at odds with the 
common understanding of the concept.  
One might argue that these suicide attacks would have a more retaliatory character 
and are not aiming at creating fear/terror, and therefore should be designated as something 
else than terrorism. Yet, as I have argued earlier, in lines with Coady’s argument (see pp. 41-
42) I do not think terrorism only should apply to acts that are performed for the sake of 
creating fear/terror. Another thing I would like to clarify is that I do not think it makes a 
difference whether one drops the bomb from high altitude or carries it in a bag or around 
                                                 
46
 ‘Iran suicide bombers “ready to hit Britain” ’, by Marie Colvin, Michael Smith & Sarah Baxter, The Sunday 
Times, April 16, 2006. (http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,2087-2136638,00.html) 
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one’s waist. The object of the act is the same nonetheless and we certainly cannot have a 
definition of terrorism that echoes the poem of Roger Woddis: 
  
Throwing a bomb is bad, 
Dropping a bomb is good; 
Terror, no need to add, 
Depends on who’s wearing the hood. 
 
(Roger Woddis: ‘Ethics for Everyman’, quoted in Coady 1985: 47) 
 
The last point I want to make on why I decide to leave out the peacetime emphasis is 
that in love and war, all is not fair. While it is true that states of war and peace contains 
different rules of conduct, one must also stress that war does not make every act permissible. 
There are certain rules that have to be followed, not only morally speaking, but also in legal 
terms. Therefore, one might argue that the difference between wartime and peacetime does 
not make any difference on this matter. The deliberate targeting of non-combatants is a 
serious offence, both morally and legally, regardless of whether it is performed in war or in 
peace.  
In sum, even though I consider ‘the peacetime emphasis’ alternative of why the 
deliberate targeting of non-combatants in war should fall outside the definition of terrorism 
to be preferable to the ‘non-state actor’ alternative, I choose to stick to my proposed 
definition. Let me return to the case of the British decision to bomb German cities in WWII, 
and try to give some more depth to why I think these acts should be labeled terrorism. 
There is a story of when Sir Arthur Harris, the head of the British Bomber Command, 
was pulled over by a policeman for speed driving. The policeman pointed out that his 
reckless driving might have killed someone. Harris answered: ‘Young man, I kill thousands 
of people every night.’ (Garrett 2004, in Primoratz (ed.): 156).  
In total, the RAF launched about 390,000 sorties against Germany during the war, 
dropping one million tons of bombs. Area attacks accounted for approximately 70 percent of 
these sorties, killing some 500,000 German civilians and seriously injuring about 1,000,000 
(Garret 2004, in Primoratz (ed.): 142). Only a small minority of the victims were German 
soldiers (Lackey 2004, in Primoratz (ed.): 130). In 1943, when the American Eight Air Force 
arrived in England to coordinate the air attacks on Germany with the RAF, the British 
rejected taking military facilities as targets. In 1945, ‘Harris argued ferociously against 
shifting the bombing campaign from German cities to quasi-military targets like oil 
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refineries’ (Lackey 2004, in Primoratz (ed.): 129). According to Lackey; ‘[n]o document or 
memorandum can be found that indicates that the British, in their targeting choices, made any 
effort to minimize civilian casualties’ (Lackey 2004, in Primoratz (ed.): 129). ‘By the end of 
1944, around 80 percent of German urban centers with populations of more than 100,000 had 
been devastated or seriously damaged’ (Garrett 2004, in Primoratz (ed.): 142). In spring 
1945, 40 percent of the British bombing was still directed against city targets in Germany 
(Garrett 2004, in Primoratz (ed.): 142) and ‘about 80 percent of all the bomb tonnage 
dropped on Germany by the Allied air forces came during the last ten months of the war’ 
(Garrett 2004, in Primoratz (ed.): 154). At this stage, the outcome of the war was given. After 
the dreadful bombing of Dresden on February 13, 1945, claiming some 100,000 lives (the 
estimates vary from 35,000 to 200,000 (Garrett 2004, in Primoratz (ed.): 145), Churchill 
wrote the following to the chief of the Air Staff: 
 
It seems to me that the moment has come when the question of bombing of German cities simply 
for the sake of increasing the terror, though under other pretexts, should be reviewed. (…) I feel 
the need for more precise concentration upon military objectives such as oil and communications 
behind the immediate battle-zone, rather than the mere acts of terror and wanton destruction, 
however impressive. 
(Garrett 2004, in Primoratz (ed.): 145). 
 
It is worth noting that Churchill himself describes the bombing of German cities as ‘mere 
acts of terror’, done ‘simply for the sake of increasing the terror’.  
The American bombing of Japanese cities was equally devastating. In total, about 
500,000 Japanese civilians died in these attacks, which endured for nine months, about the 
same number of civilians that had been killed in the allied air strikes on Germany during the 
entire war (Lackey 2004, in Primoratz (ed.): 132).  
 I think I have made my point; the allied bomb campaigns against cities can indeed be 
considered as acts of terrorism. Bearing in mind Churchill’s own words, they were performed 
‘simply for the sake of increasing the terror’. For my own part, even though I consider the 
wars against Nazi Germany and Japan to be justified, these acts were grave violations of jus 
in bello principles. Since the just war tradition primarily is linked to non-consequentialist 
considerations, there really is no need to consider the utilitarian apologies defending these 
acts. But, even when arguing within a utilitarian point of view, I think it would be hard to 
argue for their justifiability. Their importance for the outcome of the war remains doubtful, 
as does the claim of a supreme emergency.  
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3.3.3.1. Reign of terror 
As mentioned, the question of state terrorism is a debated issue in the literature on terrorism. 
The first controversy is related to whether state actors should be left out of the definition as a 
matter of principle. I have already discussed this issue, and concluded that state actors can 
perform terrorism. The second controversy is related to what kind of actions state terrorism 
refers to. Walzer has suggested that it can take two forms:  
 
There is also state terrorism, commonly used by authoritarian and totalitarian governments against 
their own people, to spread fear and make political opposition impossible: the Argentine 
‘disappearances’ are a useful example. And, finally, there is war terrorism: the effort to kill 
civilians in such large numbers that their government is forced to surrender. Hiroshima seems to 
me the classic case. 
(Walzer 2004: 130).  
 
I have clarified that my definition of terrorism will include the deliberate bombings of non-
combatants in war, what Walzer refers to as ‘war terrorism’. But what about the kind of acts 
he labels ‘state terrorism’?  
As I have pointed out before, there are historical reasons in support for including 
these acts in a definition of terrorism, as ‘terror’ originally referred to a system or reign of 
terror. What counts against implementing these acts in a definition of terrorism is that we 
might be facing the same problem as we did with the deliberate bombing of non-combatants, 
namely to be at odds with the common understanding of the notion. And again, there seem to 
be no consensus amongst scholars if these acts should be defined as terrorism, or not.  
Laqueur has argued that ‘acts of terror carried out by police states and tyrannical 
governments, in general, have been responsible for a thousand times more misery than all 
actions of individual terrorism taken together’ (Laqueur 1987: 146). Wilkins claims that the 
hypothetical Jewish terrorists would be ‘meeting terrorism with terrorism’ (Wilkins 1992: 
26), indicating that the Nazis’ persecution of the Jews should be defined as terrorism. 
Following Wilkins’ view, I think we also could include other historical examples where there 
has been systematic prosecution, such as in the Soviet Union under Stalin, the Khmer Rouge 
in Cambodia, Argentina under the generals, Chile under Pinochet. Yet, others have argued 
that this would be to push the semantic reference of the notion too far, and that we must not 
fall for the temptation of labeling every encroachment on human rights performed by state 
actors as state terrorism. This points at something crucial, namely that there are other notions 
that are related to terrorism, genocide, persecution of political opposition, torture, etc., where 
the semantic borderlines are vague. This is not to say that they could not be equally wrong, or 
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perhaps even worse, in moral terms. My claim is just that we tend to designate acts as 
something else than terrorism even though they bare many of the hallmarks of terrorist acts. 
So, is it possible to clarify what acts we are talking about in relation to this type of state 
terrorism?  
This has been, and still remains, a difficult question within the literature on terrorism, 
and I am not sure whether I can bring any clarity to this issue with my own definition. I do 
think we can speak of state terrorism in the Arendtian form, even though there are many 
difficulties in determining when it becomes something else. I grant Walzer right on the 
Argentine disappearances. Equally, I think we could count in the random killing of death 
squads and other examples of severe violence where the intention is to create a climate of 
fear in a segment of own population. But there are many other cases where it is more difficult 
to take a stand. Was the shooting at demonstrators in Nepal in April 2006 an example of state 
terrorism, for instance? What about the Israeli’s counter-terrorism against the Palestinians? 
Primoratz has argued that this should be described as terrorism (Primoratz 2004b, in Coady 
& O’Keefe (eds.): 36). What about the Russian policy against the Chechen? Do they perform 
state terrorism? These are difficult questions, and I do not consider myself capable of 
answering them. The definition I have given is not capable of clarifying this subject, and the 
other definitions I have presented seem to suffer from the same deficiency disease. 
Therefore, I have to conclude as follows: Can we speak of state terrorism in the Arendtian 
way? Yes, but we lack the definitional tools to provide a good answer to what it is. We would 
need to develop another semantic framework that focuses on defining these acts alone. 
Unfortunately, this task is much too extensive for the limits of this thesis. 
 
 
3.3.4. Concluding remarks 
 
In this part I have tried to draw an analogy between acts of war that deliberately target non-
combatants. I not only found that there was an analogy, but also concluded that these acts 
merit to be designed as terrorist acts. In the aftermath, the bombing of urban areas during 
WWII had an important effect on significant developments in international law. Article 51 of 
the Additional Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions in 1977, says; ‘the civilian population 
as such, as well as individual civilians, shall not be the object of the attack. Acts or threats of 
violence the purpose of which is to spread terror among the civilian population are 
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prohibited’ (Schindler & Toman (eds.) 1988: 53). It is regrettable, however, that the terror 
bombing does not only address WWII. According to Lackey, it was also used as a tactic 
during the Korean War, the Vietnam War, the Gulf War, and against Serbia in 1999 (Lackey 
2004, in Primoratz (ed.): 133). 
Coady argues that the claim of supreme emergency is ‘too elastic’ in the sense that 
‘whenever you are engaged in legitimate self-defence and look like losing you will be able to 
produce plausible reasons of ‘supreme emergency’ for attacking the innocent’ (Coady 2004d, 
in Coady & O’Keefe (eds.): 18). In my view, Coady points at something crucial here. If 
permitting exemptions from the moral absolute of not deliberately attacking non-combatants, 
we could easily be facing ‘slippery slope’ problems, causing a misuse of this policy. 
Therefore, it would be better to make no exceptions on this matter, neither for states nor non-
state actors. I have argued accordingly. Even though I think the claim of an analogy is 
correct, I do not think this grants terrorism justification. Coady claims that some of our moral 
beliefs are so deeply entrenched in our moral thinking that if we were to reject them, we 
would create an unbalance and incoherence in the totality of our moral thought. He explains 
his position by drawing an analogy to Quine’s proposal that some of our empirical 
propositions are so deeply entrenched in our way of thinking, that we cannot imagine what it 
would be like to give them up. Quoting Coady, ‘the prohibition on intentionally killing 
innocent people functions in our moral thinking as a sort of touchstone of moral and 
intellectual health. To suspend this, because of necessity or supreme emergency, is to bring 
about an upheaval in the moral perspective’ (Coady 2004d, in Coady & O’Keefe (eds.): 19). I 
agree. Some moral absolutes make an important demarcation line, a borderline that should 
never be passed. The deliberate targeting of the innocent is such an absolute. And it should 
be so both for state and non-state actors. 
Therefore, I agree with Coady that there is ‘a certain hypocrisy in much common 
indignation about terrorism’ (Coady 2004a, in Primoratz (ed.): 8), if we fail to put the 
state terrorism performed in wartime on a morally equal footing as the terrorism of non-
state actors: ‘The Americans were correct to judge that the terrorists who flew those 
planes on September 11 were avatars of evil. What they have not realized is the degree 
to which their own policies, since January 1945, are more of the same’ (Lackey 2004, in 
Primoratz (ed.): 137). The question of peace and war does not make a difference on this 
matter. As I have stated earlier, in war and love all is not fair. There are rules to follow; 
legally and morally; both for state and non-state actors. We should bear this in mind in 
the ongoing war on terrorism, which I will focus on in the next and final chapter.  
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4. Conclusion 
 
It seems to be a widely accepted understanding within the political community that terrorism 
is both easy to identify and easy to condemn. In this thesis I have tried to challenge both of 
these claims.  
In part two, I showed that there are many controversies related to how we should 
define terrorism, which suggests that terrorist activity is not always easy to identify. My 
scope has been the academic arena, focusing mainly on philosophical attempts to define 
terrorism, but the same problems are also linked to institutional definitions. One might argue 
that defining and identifying is not necessarily the same thing. Laqueur has suggested that 
terrorism “resembles pornography, difficult to describe and define, but easy to recognize 
when one sees it’ (Laqueur 1986: 88-89). Yet, I think there is more obscurity to the question 
of identifying terrorism than Laqueur’s quotation suggests. Sometimes it is easily 
identifiable; 9/11; the Beslan massacre and the train bombings in Madrid, are some 
examples. But we should bear in mind that “terrorism’ can designate a wide range of actions. 
When moving to the periphery of the notion, it is not always easy to determine whether a 
specific act falls inside the reference of the term. Even if we adopt a narrow definition, which 
categorically excludes the typical borderline cases, such as guerrilla warfare, resistance 
movements, sabotage missions and political assassinations, there are still problems connected 
to what acts the definition includes and what acts it leaves out. One example being the 
attacks on US troops in post-war Iraq. Is it terrorism or armed resistance against an 
occupying force? Another is the issue of state terrorism in ‘the Arendtian style’, where we 
lack the definitional tools to clarify what kinds of acts this concept applies to.  
In part three I tried to challenge the view that terrorism always should be condemned 
from three angles: Honderich’s utilitarian argument for justification, the rights-based 
arguments of Wilkins’ and Held, and lastly, the claim that the analogy between terrorism and 
certain acts of war makes it inconsistent to consider one to be justifiable but not the other. In 
my discussion, I pointed at difficulties connected to each of these positions, and I concluded 
that I did not consider any of them to provide a justification for terrorism. I must admit, 
however, that my disagreement stems from a basic difference in perspective. Whereas the 
justification arguments focused on the collective level, I have tended to put more emphasis 
on the actor-role, understanding morality in relation to the interaction between individuals. 
As I have mentioned before, I consider both of these levels to be important for an ethical 
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discussion. But balancing these two levels is a hard task. Often, we seem to focus either on 
the collective perspective or on the individualistic interpretations of ethics. The key is, I 
think, to try to grasp the interaction between the two. Both seeing the individual in the 
community and the community as a creation of individuals. Let me try to clarify what I mean 
by this in relation to the issue of terrorism. 
There are two basic reasons why I think terrorism is unjustifiable. First of all, and 
most importantly, it violates the basic rights of the victim. The indiscriminate character of a 
terrorist attack suggests that the justification of these acts is based on collective 
interpretations of guilt. It is true that every collective entity is composed of individuals. Erase 
every individual and the collective ceases to exist. Yet, as I see it, individuals do not act as 
collectives. They act and interact as individuals, from which collective effects are created. 
Therefore, I disagree that a collective can be considered to be a super-individual, understood 
as an entity that performs collective acts in terms of being a collective consciousness.  
Having said this, I find it important to underline that we share responsibilities – and 
guilt, if we fail to meet these responsibilities – as collectives. I agree with Honderich that our 
omission to reduce poverty is a collective disgrace. I agree with Wilkins’ and Held that when 
one group of people systematically deprive another group of people from basic rights, they 
share a collective guilt in doing so. Yet, this is not to say that it is justified to attack the 
collective through indiscriminate violence. The punishment is not in harmony with the 
violation, so to speak, since it does not harm collectively, but individually. This is not to say 
that terrorism cannot have collective effects. Of course it can, but most people carry on with 
their lives. A bit shuttered, perhaps, but seldom collectively wounded. For the individuals 
that have been attacked and the people who are emotionally attached to them, it is another 
story. Therefore I think acts of terrorism are in disproportion to the harm they seek to punish. 
On the individual level, it is an overreaction. On the collective level, it will seldom have the 
effect the perpetrators hope to achieve.  
This brings me to the second reason for why I do not think terrorism should be 
considered justifiable; it most often turns out to be inefficient or counter-productive in 
achieving the aims of the terrorists. If terrorism indeed is a last resort, which always remains 
doubtful, this suggests that the society in question would show little sensitivity for the 
victims of the attack. Other methods, preferably non-violent ones, should be employed. If 
failing to use these preferable methods, the effect on the attacked community would most 
often be repulsion and anger, and a strengthened will not to comply with the terrorists’ 
demands.   
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But even though I do not consider terrorism to be justified, this is not to say that I do 
not think it creates ethical dilemmas. Dilemmas we should acknowledge and take into 
account when we are discussing terrorism as a phenomenon, both ethically and politically. 
Therefore, in these last pages, I would like to switch focus and clarify how I think this ethical 
discussion has relevance for our political reality. How should we confront terrorism? Based 
on my discussion, I have ten suggestions:  
First, an absolute condemnation of terrorism, allowing no exceptions or exemptions 
from this principle, does not mean we have to embrace the understanding of “moral clarity’ 
that has been adopted as a key concept in the Bush administration’s “war on terrorism’. Here, 
the notion is connected to the moral legitimacy of taking action against terrorism by the use 
of military force. It is perfectly possible to be morally clear on the question of terrorism, 
meaning that it should always be morally condemned, and still disagree with the policy that 
terrorism should be confronted by weapons instead of other means. 
 Second, I do not think terrorism should be interpreted as an ideology, such as 
“communism’ or “liberalism’. Nor is it a psychopathology, such as “sadism’. It is a tactic, 
adopted to attain some socio-political end (see Goodin 2006: 36). We can have sympathy 
with the socio-political end in itself, without embracing the methods or means that are being 
employed to pursue this end. To use an analogy: We might condemn the British bombing of 
German cities in WWII and still have sympathy for their cause. Even though an act of war 
can be a violation of jus in bello, this does not imply that the jus ad bellum arguments for this 
war are unjust. I think we should reason on terrorism accordingly. Despite the fact that 
terrorists violate jus in bello principles, they might have a just cause. We can condemn one 
and endorse the other, without being ethically inconsistent.  
 Third, terrorism should be treated as a criminal act. In order to do this it is important 
that we strive to create efficient tools within the international community, in addition to the 
state system of laws. This is conditioned by having a generally accepted definition on 
terrorism, which can enable us to formulate a framework for confronting this issue within 
international law. So far the UN member states have not been able to agree on one definition, 
even though there have been many attempts to reach it. The problem seems to be embedded 
in the freedom fighter/terrorist-fallacy, which I have discussed earlier. Thus, “[t]he price of 
reaching such a consensus may be the adoption of a quite narrow definition, but that is a 
price well worth paying’ (Stephen 2004, in Coady an O’Keefe: 2). We already have such 
frameworks for combating piracy and slave trading, which shows us that the task is not 
unfeasible. A variety of governments have used the anti-terrorism campaign (war on terror) 
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to deal with secessionist opposition that use legitimate means under the pretence of 
combating terrorism. One should be careful not to label insurgents one sympathizes with as 
‘freedom fighters’, ‘guerillas’, and the like, while insurgents fighting for a cause that one 
disagrees with as ‘terrorists’. Whether an act should be labeled terrorism should not depend 
on its political motivation, but solely on its form. 
Fourth, we must break out of the Manichean vision of the world that has echoed the 
US led war on terrorism ever since President Bush gave his address to a joint Congress and 
the American people on 20. September 2001 and stated that: “Every nation in every region 
now has a decision to make. Either you are with us or you are with the terrorists’47. Are we in 
a conflict between good and evil? I think not. We must recognize that terrorism is a complex 
phenomenon. Terrorists commit acts that are morally blameworthy and that should be legally 
punished, but there might be both just and unjust reasons for committing these acts.  
Fifth, if choosing to confront terrorism by acts of war, it is crucial that we make 
efforts to comply with jus ad bellum and jus in bello principles. In relation to the war in Iraq, 
there are at least four aspects that suggest that this war was not just: 
• Was there a just cause for the attack? As regime change in itself cannot be said to 
justify the attack, and no weapons of mass destruction have been found, it is hard to 
make this case. 
• Was it a last resort? Bearing in mind the diplomatic crises in the forefront of the 
attack, and the Iraqi government’s willingness to cooperate with the international 
community, it seems obvious that it was not. 
• Did the war have a reasonable prospect of being successful? Before that war, many 
claimed that the US plans for post-war Iraq lacked realism. Four years later, Iraqi 
society is on the brink of civil war.  
• Was it a proportional use of violence? The alleged reasons for attacking Iraq was 
weapons of mass destruction, but they were never found. According to “Iraq body 
count’, the present figures for Iraqi casualties are between 35,000 and 39,000 
casualties48. Over 2,400 US troops have died (May 2006)49    
 
Sixth, we need to acknowledge that the “war on terrorism’ cannot be won. In his 
speech to Congress, on 20. September 2001, President Bush stated: “Our war on terror begins 
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 http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html 
48
 http://www.iraqbodycount.net/ 
49
 http://icasualties.org/oif/ 
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with Al Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global 
reach has been found, stopped and defeated’50. Is there any realism in this? Can one win a 
war on terrorism? Who may declare that such a war has been won and that “terrorism’ has 
been defeated? How can we defeat something that can be perpetrated by a small group of 
people without ending in an “Orwellian horror-scenario’, a situation of permanent emergency 
– threatening the basic values of our society. Bearing in mind a point I made earlier, 
terrorism is not an ideology. It is a tactic. It is not something that erupted on 11. September 
2001. It has been a part of our political system for hundreds of years. Can we defeat 
terrorism? I think not. Neither do the authors of the US 9/11 Commission Report: 
 
We do not believe it is possible to defeat all terrorist attacks against Americans, every time and 
everywhere. A president should tell the American people, ‘No president can promise that a 
catastrophic attack like that of 9/11 will not happen again. History has shown that even the most 
vigilant and expert agencies cannot always prevent determined, suicidal attackers from reaching a 
target. 
(US 9/11 Commission Report 2004: 365) 
 
Seventh, we should be careful that counter-terrorism measures does not mean the end 
of human rights (Luban 2003, in Gehring (ed): 60). In a CNN poll in 2001, 45 percent of the 
respondents said that they would favour the use of torture if it could provide information 
about terrorism (Welch 2003: 9). These are alarming figures. The recent reports of prison 
abuses in the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq and Guantanamo Bay reveal a worrying tendency of 
human rights violations. In total, over 10,000 people have been detained without trial in 
Afghanistan, Iraq and at Guantanamo Bay base (Rogers 2006: 4). The authorizing of military 
tribunals for suspected terrorists, signed by President Bush on 13 November 2001, have 
implied violations of the Geneva Conventions (Rothe & Muzzatti 2004: 342). We have to 
decide whether we should regard terrorism as acts of war, subject to the rules of war, or acts 
of crime, subject to the rule of law. The hybrid solution of the present US administration51 is 
not satisfactory. 
  Eighth, governments should strive to find other means to confront terrorism than 
counter-violence. Responding to terrorism with military measures has often turned out 
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 http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html 
51
 “In line with the war model, they lack the usual rights of criminal suspects – the presumption of innocence, 
the right to a hearing to determine guilt, the opportunity to prove that the authorities have grabbed the wrong 
man. But, in line with the law model, they are considered unlawful combatants. Because they are not uniformed 
forces, they lack the rights of prisoners of war and are liable to criminal punishment. Initially, the American 
government declared that the Guantanamo Bay prisoners have no rights under the Geneva Conventions.’ 
(Luban 2003, in Gehring (ed): 53). 
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counter-productive. As Lloyd Dumas has pointed out, Israel has for long responded to 
terrorism with military retaliation, yet “there exists today more terrorism directed against 
Israel than ever before (…) Israelis live in fear and Palestinians live in misery’ (Dumas 2003, 
in Gehring (ed.): 73). The “eye for an eye’ policy has proven itself insufficient: “Indeed, 
terrorists will welcome counter-terrorism; it makes the terrorists’ excuses more plausible and 
is sure to bring them, however many people are killed or wounded, however many are 
terrorized, the small number of recruits needed to sustain the terrorist activities.’ (Walzer 
1988, in Luper-Foy (ed.): 243) 
Ninth, most terrorism has a specific aim: To create fear. We should be careful not to 
overreact and end up in social hysteria. Statistically, terrorism remains a marginal 
phenomenon. In the US in 2001, fifteen times more people died in a motor vehicle accidents 
than in the 9/11 attacks (Goodin 2006: 116). Yet, we are constantly reminded that we are 
facing a grave and imminent danger. Quoting a passage from a speech President Bush gave 
2. August 2004: “We are a nation in danger. We're doing everything we can in our power to 
confront the danger’52. One thing concerns the spending: The US Department of Homeland 
Security has a budget of $34.2 billion for 2006, most of it consumed by the war on terror 
(Goodin 2006: 152), money that could have been used on social security programmes and 
other important social spending. Another concerns the surveillance policies that have been 
implemented in the aftermath of the attacks. The USA Patriot Act (the Uniting and 
Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct 
Terrorism Act) of 2001, have been widely criticized for violating basic civil rights. The same 
goes for other countries. Consider this ad from The UK, local Neighbourhood Watch: ‘The 
police cannot defeat terrorism alone, communities defeat terrorism! If you see any suspicious 
activity: Call the free confidential hotline on 0800 789 321 or contact your local police 
station.’ (Goodin 2006: 153). Would we want a society where neighbours report ‘any 
suspicious activity’? I think not, quoting Goodin: ‘We must be careful, in the War on 
Terrorism, not to create a terrorist state.’ (Goodin 2006: 175).  
Tenth, what to do? I think Goodin points at one part of the solution: ‘Sometimes 
“doing nothing” is the optimal response (...) Terrorism might well be just such a case. If it is 
attention that evil people are seeking through desperate deeds, then ignoring them might 
indeed be the best way of making them go away’ (Goodin 2006: 160). Yet this is not 
sufficient. We need to create some kind of dialogue, some way to seek solutions, and the 
                                                 
52
 http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/08/20040802-2.html 
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only way to do that is to lend an ear of the opposing party’s arguments. Should we negotiate 
with terrorists? Not always, but sometimes. We cannot settle with the ‘you cannot negotiate 
with terrorists’ fallacy, which is not a solution to the problem we are trying to solve. Again, I 
think we must differentiate between the act on the one hand and the cause on the other. Some 
forms of terrorism are worse than others, just as some wars are worse than other wars. Some 
acts of terrorism are more justified than others, just as some wars are more justified than 
other wars. One example we have discussed earlier is the ANC’s struggle against the 
Apartheid regime in South Africa. We have to grant terrorists the right of having a just cause, 
without being accused of ‘going soft’ on them, and we might condemn their actions but 
understand their cause. As the French say; comprendre ce n’est pas de pardoner – to 
understand is not to forgive.  
 Summing up, terrorism poses intriguing questions, both morally and politically. 
Complicated problems most often condition complicated solutions. We need to grant these 
questions their complicity and avoid the simplistic understanding of this issue – both in 
ethical discourse and political life. The issue at question is more complex than the ‘us-
them/evil-good/never negotiate with terrorist’ view suggests. If we fail to recognize this, we 
will hardly be able to solve the problem we are facing. 
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